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Hyun Jin Kim 
CONSTRUCTION OF A DISPUTE-RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK UNDER 
THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF  
THE INTER-KOREAN CONFLICT OVER THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE:  
OPERATING THE ADVISORY PROCEEDINGS OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
 To construct a dispute-resolution framework for the inter-Korean conflict over the 
Northern Limit Line (“NLL Conflict”) under the international judicial system, this dissertation 
proposes an advisory proceeding of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) as the most 
promising alternative. It has proven difficult to draw a negotiated solution to this decades-long 
conflict, despite each of the respective State parties involved in the NLL Conflict presenting 
various arguments and claims about the valid legal status of the NLL. In this context, this 
dissertation examines the ICJ’s contribution to the resolution of international disputes, 
particularly controversy over the question of laws, through its advisory jurisdiction even in the 
absence of any involved State’s consent. For the purpose of this project, therefore, this 
dissertation examines the mechanism of the ICJ jurisdictional system with an emphasis on the 
essential elements required to establish each type of jurisdiction in its advisory proceeding. 
Through an analysis of relevant advisory precedents, in which not only substantive but also 
procedural issues were considered, this paper concludes that an advisory proceeding initiated 
by a competent primary organ of the UN is the most promising alternative for a dispute-
resolution framework for the NLL Conflict under the present UN-centered international 
judicial system. Based on a judicial guidance rendered by the ICJ, North and South Korea are 
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In the context of the inter-Korean relations, a conflict over the Northern Limit Line 
(“NLL Conflict”/“Conflict”) collectively refers to the decades-long maritime confrontation 
between South and North Korea (“the two Koreas”). The Conflict encompasses legal, political, 
diplomatic, and military disputes over the valid legal status of the line separating the maritime 
areas of the two sides in the Yellow/West Sea. In the disputed area, the Northern Limit Line 
(“NLL”/“Line”), which is composed of straight-line segments, is a mid-channel line running 
between North Korea’s shoreline and the Five Northwestern Islands (“FNI”) that are solely 
owned by South Korea as provided in the Korean Armistice Agreement (“KAA”). Starting 
from the Han River Estuary, the Line may be seen as an extension line of the Military 
Demarcation Line on land (“MDL”), extending to the median point between the mainland 
China and the Korean Peninsula at its northwestern extremity. In fact, the Line was initially 
delimited by the US-led United Nations Command (“UNC”) for the control of both military 
and civilian South Korean vessels navigating the Yellow/West Sea in the absence of any mutual 
agreement between the belligerent parties to the KAA on any delimitation for that maritime 
area.1 The Line had acted its role as a de facto maritime demarcation boundary for almost 
twenty years, until the West Sea Incidents occurred in December 1973. Since then, North Korea 
has been continually denied its validity and legality under international law, including the KAA. 
In seeking a mutually acceptable solution to the NLL Conflict, the two Koreas and the 
US made repeated efforts to reach out a negotiated settlement in the wake of almost every 
dispute. At the 346th Military Armistice Commission (“MAC”) held in 1973 to deal with the 
aftermath of the West Sea Incidents, for example, North Korea for the first time suggested a 
	
1 For more detailed information on the background of the establishment of the Northern Limit Line (“NLL”), see 
Hyun Jin Kim, The Inter-Korean Conflict over the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical 
Consolidation (August 2015) (unpublished LL.M.-Thesis, Indiana University) at 5—9, available at 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/etd/23/.  
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new method of maritime demarcation in the disputed area, as well as claiming its right to 
adjacent territorial waters. Afterward, as a result of the repeated efforts to normalize the stalled 
relations, prevent accidental military clashes, and promote mutual exchange and cooperation 
in the disputed area, the two Koreas in 1992 signed off the Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-
aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (“Basic Agreement”) 
along with three protocols. However, there were significant limitations to such instruments, 
mainly because they failed to redefine the maritime jurisdiction of each side and the maritime 
demarcation line for the area. The Basic Agreement is defined as a gentlemen’s agreement in 
light of international law, and thus has been deemed ineffective since North Korea’s 
withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1993. 
The First Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish in 1999 was the critical juncture when the long-
standing confrontation between the two Koreas in the disputed area became a significant 
security threat to the Korean Peninsula and the wider East Asian region as well. 
Notwithstanding subsequent efforts, the two Koreas found no solution to the NLL Conflict that 
had given rise to the skirmish. During the talks, clear differences in their positions toward the 
NLL arose. While South Korea was experiencing a split in public sentiment in the aftermath 
of the skirmish, North Korea tried to use the situation to its advantage to ease the economic 
and trade sanctions that had been imposed on it. On the other hand, the US and the UNC 
maintained their long-standing support of the validity and effectivity of the Line under the 
KAA. As will be shown later in this paper, North Korea began to propose alternatives allegedly 
based on international law in an effort to replace the NLL. These included the Chosun West 
Sea Military Demarcation Line (“CMDL”) and the Navigation Order of the Five Western 
Coastal Islands (“Navigation Order”), which were invoked to undermine the valid legal status 
of the Line. 
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In 2002, the Second Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, which was another heavy blow to the 
regional peace and security, occurred in the disputed waters, again sparking a controversy over 
the legality and validity of the NLL. In spite of the heated debate, the US maintained its support 
of the Line as a de facto maritime demarcation line under the KAA. Accordingly, the US 
became more reluctant in seeking a negotiated settlement for the Conflict with North Korea, 
since North Korea recognized neither the validity nor the legality of the Line. Notably, the 
then-South Korean government kept trying to reach a compromise with North Korea based on 
the international law of the sea by presenting the West Sea Special Maritime Area for Peace 
and Cooperation Initiative (“West Sea Initiative”) that had been announced at the Declaration 
on the Advancement of South-North Relations, Peace and Prosperity (“2007 Declaration”). 
Nevertheless, a concatenation of political factors, such as regime change in South Korea, 
resulted in a failure to produce an agreement on the Conflict. In all probability, neither of the 
two Koreas might have been strongly committed to such a new idea, given that no further action 
was taken as a follow-up measure. The conflicting points of view between the two Koreas over 
the status of the Line lies at the center of this continuing politico-military confrontation. 
The confrontations between the two sides over the NLL reached their peak during the 
conservative administration that took office in 2008 to the impeachment of President Park 
Geun-hye stepped in 2017. As soon as President Lee Myung-bak assumed office, his 
administration repudiated all previous inter-Korean agreements, protocols, and declarations 
executed by preceding progressive administrations. Amidst this intensified politico-military 
confrontation, the Sinking of the South Korean Warship Cheonan happened, resulting in the 
death of 46 South Korean sailors near the disputed waters. After this incident, the South Korea 
took countermeasures, including the total suspension of all trade and exchange with North 
Korea and enforcement of economic sanctions in cooperation with the US not much later; 
however, North Korea instigated another military provocation against South Korea by bombing 
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Yeonpyeong Island, which is one of the FNI. This Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, as it is 
known, caused civilian casualties, causing inter-Korean relations to deteriorate beyond all 
recovery. The Lee administration adopted the extreme hardline policies and the confrontation 
between the two Koreas came to a climax 
When President Moon Jae-in seized power in May 2017, both inter-Korean relations 
and the US-North Korea relations saw a dramatic turning point, represented by the 
PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Winter Games and the hosting of the summits convened to 
improve the strained relations and the peaceful settlement of long-term disputes. Prior to this 
turnaround, the Trump administration had taken a firm stand on the North Korea issue.2 With 
tensions growing sharply between the US and North Korea because of North Korea’s advanced 
intercontinental ballistic missile test,3 the Moon administration of South Korea prepared a 
negotiation timetable for the States concerned for the denuclearization, as well as execution of 
a peace treaty.4 North Korea’s participation in the PyeongChang Olympics and a subsequent 
series of diplomatic events, such as the South Korean special envoy’s visit to North Korea in 
March 2018 and the 3rd inter-Korean summit in April 2018, provided a momentum for North 
Korea to be considered a normal country. During a visit in March 2018, the North Korean 
representatives stated its government’s position that North Korea was willing to talk about the 
denuclearization as well as a total prohibition of any category of weapons against South Korea. 
The 3rd inter-Korean summit also received a favorable evaluation from the international 
community, since the heads of the two Koreas agreed to the following: first, construction of a 
peace regime on the Korean Peninsula—legal peace—through the declaration of the end of the 
	
2 Donald J. Trump, President of the United States of America, Remarks to the 72nd Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly (Sept. 19, 2017). 
3 Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers US, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 8, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/world/asia/north-korea-un-
sanctions-nuclear-missile-united-nations.html (quoting President Trump’s expression that “North Korea best not 
make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.”). 
4 Chung-in Moon and Timo Kivimaki, Peaceful Pyeingchang Olympics can lead to lasting Korean peace: View, 
EURONEWS, Feb. 9, 2018, https://www.euronews.com/2018/02/09/peaceful-pyeongchang-olympics-can-lead-to-
lasting-korean-peace-view.  
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Korean War and the conclusion of a peace treaty; second, confidence-building—factual 
peace—between the confronting armed forces by cessation of all hostile acts against each other; 
and third, complete denuclearization. 
As a result of the recent reconciliatory mood created since the Olympics, the two 
Koreas also agreed upon that the peaceful settlement of the NLL Conflict should be a priority 
as part of the aforementioned legal and factual peace goals. In the course of the 3rd inter-
Korean summit, the Moon administration put economic issues ahead of political and military 
matters, e.g., resuming economic cooperation that had been stopped by previous 
administrations and reactivating the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang 
tourism, whereas North Korea prioritized political and military issues, e.g., lifting sanctions 
against North Korea imposed by the UN Resolution 2270 and the May 24 Measure imposed 
by the South Korean government. However, as there was consensus that the NLL Conflict 
posed a significant problem between them, the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration executed at the 
summit reached an accord concerning the transformation of the disputed waters around the 
NLL to a peace zone as part of the process for the conclusion of a peace treaty. Significantly, 
the Korean Central News Agency—the nation’s official news agency in North Korea—or the 
first time used the term “NLL” in referring to the Declaration. In line with the West Sea 
Initiative, during which the two Koreas reconfirmed the differences of opinions about the status 
of the Line, the Declaration specifies the establishment of a peace zone for co-fishery and co-
development. In an effort to implement the agreement, the government officials of South Korea 
visited both Yeonpyeong Island and Baekryeong Island to canvass the views of local residents 
about the establishment of such a peace zone. The South Korean government asserted, however, 
that the Line should not be affected by the peace zone and should be maintained as a maritime 
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demarcation line until the conclusion of an inter-Korean peace treaty.5 Thus, South Korean 
officials stated that any negotiation on zone should include discussions with the military 
authorities. In South Korea, certain actions by the Moon administration in the course of the 
negotiations, such as presenting a detailed nautical chart of the Han River Estuary at a military 
talk held in January 2019, were widely criticized. 
In spite of such diplomatic efforts, however, the final settlement of the NLL Conflict 
has not yet been achieved, since there is a difference of opinion between the two Koreas about 
the process. First, the agreements adopted at the 3rd inter-Korean summit were not followed 
by any specific action plan on how to implement the agreed matters to bring about a resolution 
of the Conflict. Since it is difficult for the two Koreas to prepare such details, a series of efforts 
made by both governments paradoxically served to highlight the need for judicial guidance. 
Second, as observed in the final draft of the 2018 Singapore Declaration executed at the first 
summit between the US and North Korea in June 2018, it is difficult to come up with a concrete 
plan solely through high-level political talks. In fact, the representatives of both governments 
did not accept any pre-packaged deals on the denuclearization at this summit: the US adhered 
to the Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement (“CVID”), whereas North Korea 
demanded the lifting of sanctions, the normalization of diplomatic relations, and the withdrawal 
of the US Armed Forces in Korea as preconditions for a peace agreement. Indeed, the Trump 
administration aggressively pushed its CVID approach as a precondition for North Korea’s 
demands and asked for a public disclosure of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. In any case, the 
2nd US-North Korean summit also revealed the ineffectuality such high-level political or 
diplomatic package deals when not accompanied by practical action plans.  
	
5 Ministers visit border islands for discussions on maritime peace zone, THE KOREA HERALD, May 7, 2018, 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20180505000044&ACE_SEARCH=1. 
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Although the States concerned, including North Korea, made meaningful efforts in 
accordance with international standards to solve problems that had been building up between 
them, it seems difficult to resolve the issues between the two Koreas, including the NLL 
Conflict, solely through political dialog. For the two Koreas to move forward, they must seek 
help from the established international system the functions beyond political talks conducted 
entirely between the States concerned. As a precondition to introducing the peace regime to 
the Korean Peninsula, the NLL Conflict, which is deemed to be the issue requiring urgent 
attention, should be resolved peacefully and fairly so as to be accorded recognition by the 
international community. 
To construct a dispute-resolution framework under the international judicial system for 
the settlement of the NLL Conflict, therefore, this paper proposes that the advisory proceeding 
of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”/“Court”) be invoked. In fact, throughout its 
advisory proceedings, the Court has rendered judicial opinions for the States involved in 
international disputes, as well as for the international community on the basis of international 
law and has established its jurisprudence on both substantive and procedural matters. Political 
or diplomatic efforts, as noted above, have been turned out to be not plausible, at least with 
respect to the Conflict. Even if the final agreement will have to go through diplomatic efforts 
and be made by political decisions of the States involved in this Conflict, such decisions must 
be drafted with due consideration to internationally accepted rules and principles for the sake 
of securing legal legitimacy in the international community. 
This project holds that the advisory proceeding of the ICJ is the most effective 
alternative for the peaceful resolution of the NLL Conflict. There are several reasons for this. 
First of all, the ICJ may exercise its advisory jurisdiction on any legal question at the request 
of the UN’s primary organs, such as the General Assembly of the UN (“UNGA”) and the 
Security Council of the UN (“UNSC”), even in the absence of the state consent. As will be 
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examined later in this paper, the Court has on occasion established its jurisdiction to give its 
advisory opinion on questions involving thorny international disputes and conflicts. The 
Court’s opinions, despite having no binding effect on sovereign states, are regarded as highly 
persuasive and substantively authoritative with respect to points of law. Throughout the 
Conflict, the two Koreas have developed their own arguments based on a variety of legal rules, 
principles, or theories in relation to the validity and legality of the Line. Therefore, the Court’s 
opinion about such legal disputes will be notably influential and, as the primary judicial organ 
of the UN, will contribute to the development of international law in general through exegesis 
on such arguments. Second, although an advisory opinion has no legally binding force over a 
sovereign State in the absence of consent from said State, some opinions rendered by the Court 
through its advisory proceedings have nonetheless played a pivotal role in the final resolution 
of international conflicts, or at the very least spurred the disputing States to seek a legal solution 
to their issues. Therefore, given that all the States concerned in the Conflict are intent on 
settling the issues in accordance with international standards, it seems reasonable for the two 
Koreas to seek judicial guidance from the Court so that they will receive a fair and equitable 
resolution. By constructing a dispute-resolution framework under the international judicial 
system, the two Koreas are more likely to introduce a peace regime to the Korean Peninsula to 
replace the current armistice system. Furthermore, the international community in its entirety, 
including the UN, will see its core mission fulfilled through the outcome of this advisory 
proceeding since that mission includes the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
peacemaking beyond peace-keeping, and the development of international law.  
This dissertation, places more emphasis on procedural issues rather than substantive 
ones in relation to the advisory proceeding of the ICJ. Chapter I gives an overview of the inter-
Korean Conflict over the NLL. The first section will explore the origin of the Line, while the 
second section will give a brief history of the naval skirmishes between the armed forces of the 
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two Koreas in the disputed waters. The third section summarizes the political and diplomatic 
efforts made by the States concerned, including the US, to conclude a negotiated settlement for 
the Conflict. The last section of this chapter elaborates all arguments, assertions, contentions, 
and claims presented by the two Koreas throughout the Conflict over the validity, legality, and 
efficacy of the Line. Chapter II will outline the mechanism of the jurisdiction system of the 
ICJ. The first section clarifies relevant concepts and the dual jurisdiction system. To explain 
how the system works in principle, the second section outlines the four basic pillars of the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The third section will articulate the process of establishing the 
advisory jurisdiction. Chapter III analyzes the precedents rendered through the Court’s 
advisory proceeding, which have been selected for drawing the conclusion of this project. The 
second section provides a case analysis on each of the precedents, with priority given to the 
process that the Court went through for the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction therein. 
Last, Chapter IV will focus on demonstrating why the advisory proceeding of the Court should 
be regarded as the most promising dispute-resolution framework under the present 
international judicial system for the States concerned. 
 
I. THE INTER-KOREAN CONFLICT OVER THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE 
 
A. Introduction to This Chapter 
 
Rather than presenting a doctrinal discussion on a dispute-resolution framework for the 
resolution of the NLL Conflict, Chapter I of this dissertation will provide an introduction to 
the Conflict, focusing on the origin of the NLL, the history of armed conflicts in the disputed 
waters, and political efforts made by the States concerned to conclude on a negotiated 
settlement for the Conflict, and the position taken by the two Koreas toward the NLL. To this 
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end, Section B of this chapter will first examine the origin of the Line by drawing on relevant 
facts and information disclosed in recent years. Although there is still a great deal of 
information that remains unrevealed and unconfirmed, it is known, as will be dealt with in 
more detail later in this paper, that the Line was unilaterally designated by the UNC for its own 
purposes after the execution of the KAA. Since the negotiating parties to the KAA came to no 
agreement on the delimitation of maritime demarcation line during negotiations nor in the 
aftermath, this armistice agreement does not contain any express provision on the maritime 
delimitation. The parties ended up adopting a basic guideline governing “contiguous” maritime 
areas in the text of the agreement. 
Section C will outline the naval skirmishes that broke out in the vicinity of the NLL 
between the two Koreas’ naval forces. Even though small-scale clashes had occurred 
previously in the disputed waters, the First Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish is defined as the first-
ever head-to-head military conflict between the two Koreas over the Line. Afterward, the 
confronting naval forces engaged in another military clash, the Second Yeonpyeong Naval 
Skirmish, resulting in casualties on both sides. The two separate military collisions serve as 
reminders to the concerned States of the need to seek a peaceful settlement of the Conflict so 
as to prevent any re-occurrence of such incidents. 
Section D will enumerate the political and diplomatic efforts made by the governments 
in the NLL Conflict to seek a negotiated settlement, before and after the two naval skirmishes. 
However, at issue throughout the efforts was the need to redefine the legal status of the Line 
and redraw a new maritime demarcation line in the disputed waters based on mutual consent. 
In other words, throughout the negotiations, the ownership or jurisdiction over the FNI was not 
in dispute. In fact, at its first official complaint in 1973, North Korea denied the validity and 
legality of the NLL in the Yellow/West Sea and raised for the first time an alternative 
demarcation line in an attempt to modify the delimitation of maritime zones in its favor. In the 
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final text of the Basic Agreement, the two Koreas managed to introduce some guidelines about 
the maritime jurisdiction in the disputed waters, although the absence of a firm agreement on 
the delimitation of a new maritime demarcation line eventually led to military conflicts. In 
bilateral and multilateral talks held between the States at various levels, a new maritime order 
for the disputed area was not instituted since there was a radical difference of opinion among 
the parties in defining the validity and legality of the Line. From 2006, the leaders of the two 
Koreas tried through multiple new proposals to create a peaceful arrangement with regards to 
the co-development of fishery resources and navigable sea lanes, such as the West Sea Initiative 
proclaimed in 2007. The two countries also paid more attention to finding a legal solution to 
the re-delimitation of the Line. However, after the regime change in South Korea in 2008, 
military tensions between the two Koreas rose, resulting in the Sinking of the South Korean 
Warship Cheonan and the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. Ever since these tragic events, 
the two Koreas’ efforts to seek a negotiated settlement on the Conflict have been stalled, even 
though President Moon Jae-in, who has been more committed to the improvement of inter-
Korean relations than his predecessors, assumed the presidency in 2007. 
Section E will focus on the dispute over the legal status of the NLL and equitable 
maritime delimitation, explaining what arguments and claims have been made by each of the 
two Koreas in terms of international law. Above all, for a better understanding of the research, 
Sub-Section 1 will explore the major set of principles, concepts and theories of customary and 
conventional international law which the two Koreas have debated throughout the NLL 
Conflict in defense of their own positions. Sub-Section 2 of this Section E will introduce the 
position taken by North Korea and will also articulate the claims made between 1973 and 2007 
to modify or replace the Line. North Korea has made its rebuttal to the arguments put forth by 
South Korea on the basis of customary and conventional international law, asserting that there 
was a lack of constituent on its part sufficient enough to support South Korea’s such arguments. 
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As will be indicated below, North Korea, in furtherance of its position, refers to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) to define the Line as a violation of 
the Convention, alleging that it infringes its maritime sovereignty. Moreover, the fact that 
North Korea takes a completely opposite stand with South Korea on the interpretation of the 
agreements executed between the States concerned, such as the KAA and the Basic Agreement, 
will be also examined. Second, Sub-Section 3 will elaborate South Korea’s position throughout 
the dispute by investigating both South Korean experts’ opinion and the official opinion 
publicized by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea (“ROK MND”). Based on 
relevant legal sources (i.e., theories and principles of customary and conventional international 
law, the UNCLOS, the KAA, and the Basic Agreement) South Korean jurists set forth a variety 
of legal opinions to defend the legal status of the Line as a maritime demarcation boundary. 
Although there is not a great deal of disagreement with the experts’ view, the ROK MND’s 
argument will also be elaborated in this Sub-Section 3. As a competent authority, the ROK 
MND declares its position with reference to the provisions of the KAA and the Basis 
Agreement, as well as multiple historical events that might support its argument based on 
international law. 
 
B. Tracing Back to the Origin of the NLL 
 
In the context of the inter-Korean relations, the NLL refers to a disputed de facto 
maritime demarcation line running between North and South Korea’s western coastal areas in 
the Yellow/West Sea. It is generally known that this mid-channel line was initially drawn 
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between North Korea’s shoreline and the FNI by a unilateral act of the then-UN Commander, 
General Mark Clark.6  
 
Map 1: Northern Limit Line and the Yellow/West Sea Area 
Source: Jon Van Dyke, The Maritime Boundary Dispute between North & South Korea in the Yellow 
(West) Sea, 38 North (July 29, 2010), http://38north.org/2010/07/the-maritime-boundary-between-north-south-
korea-in-the-yellow-west-sea/. 
 
Before the date of its designation was revealed by the declassified CIA report named 
“the West Coast Korean Islands,”7 it had been broadly recognized that the NLL was established 
on August 30, 1953 or, at best, at some point after the end of the Korean War.8 Due to the 
failure to reach an agreement on the location of maritime borders, the waters surrounding the 
Korean Peninsula—especially the Yellow/West Sea—remained a potential powder keg 
between the two armed forces. Fearing the potential for accidental or intentional hostilities in 
the future, General Clark designated the Line in the waters to facilitate internal operational 
	
6 Terence Roehrig, The Northern Limit Line: The Disputed Maritime Boundary between North and South Korea, 
NCNK ISSUE BRIEF, Sept. 2011, at 1—2. 
7  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WEST COAST KOREAN ISLANDS (1974), available at 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114023.pdf?v=d900fbd9e398a7088363eb558f433093 (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2020) (stating that “no documentation can be found to indicate that the NLL was established prior 
to 1960.”) 
8 Roehrig, supra note 6, at 2 (pointing out that “some North Korean statements acknowledge the Line was drawn 
sometime in the 1950s.”). 
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control.9 Thus, the Line was not originally designed to serve as a maritime demarcation line— 
rather it was delimited to prevent South Korean naval and fishing boats from advancing far too 
north, unintentionally or otherwise, and also to restrict military patrols of the UNC forces after 
the signing of the KAA. 10  The confusion surrounding the origin of the NLL is also 
demonstrated by the fact that there have been several other names used to refer to the Line, 
such as the Northern Patrol Limit Line, since the beginning of the Conflict.11 For all these 
reasons, it is difficult to find any official documentation with details on the origin of the NLL. 
 Technically speaking, the NLL has not been integrated into the KAA, so there is no 
provision defining its location or status in its texts. During the course of armistice talks for 
ceasefire, the negotiating parties agreed to draw the MDL, along with a two-kilometer width 
of the Demilitarized Zone (“DMZ”), on either side of the line.12 They were not, however, able 
to decide on the establishment of maritime boundaries or to reach agreement on the breadth of 
territorial waters. The UNC claimed a three nautical miles (nm) zone of territorial waters, while 
the Communists contended that the territorial waters should be extended for 12 nm off the 
coastlines.13 This conflict of opinion was rooted in the interchangeable use of the terms “coastal 
waters” and “territorial waters” in international law in the mid-20th century.14 The UNCLOS 
later adopted the 12 nm zone, which the Communists had insisted on, as the international 
standard for the breadth of territorial waters. 
 On May 27, 1953, the negotiators explicitly prescribed the ownership of the FNI and 
suggested a basic guideline governing “contiguous” maritime areas, although they did not 
	
9 Moon Bong Ryoo, The Korean Armistice and the Islands, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, Nov. 2011, at 9. 
10 Roehrig, supra note 6, at 1; Ryoo, supra note 9, at 13. 
11 Roehrig, supra note 6, at 1. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. Based on the then-international standard “3 nautical miles of territorial waters,” the Northern Limit Line 
(“NLL”) was designated midway between the South Korean-held Five Northwestern Islands (“FNI”) and North 
Korea’s adjacent coastline, connecting the Han River Estuary to 12 median coordinates. Ryoo, supra note 9, at 9. 
14 Ryoo, supra note 9, at 9. 
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agree to the delimitation of maritime demarcation lines.15 The final texts—namely, the KAA 
states that Baekryeong-do, 16  Daecheong-do, Soceong-do, Yeonpyeong-do, and Woo-do—
stated that the FNI would remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, UNC. 
With respect to overall maritime governance, however, Article 2, Section 15 of the KAA 
provides that “opposing naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the DMZ and to the 
land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.”17  
 
 
Map 2: Respecting the Waters Contiguous to the Land Area of the Opposing Side (Article 2, Para 15) 
Source: THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, PROCEEDING MINUTE OF 
SOUTH AND NORTH MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE 5TH SESSION 283 (1992). 
 
 
At the time of the armistice negotiations, the UNC was exercising full military control over all 
islands and waters annexed to the Korean Peninsula, from Yallu River Estuary in the west to 
Tuman River Estuary in the east. However, after the KAA was signed, all air and naval military 
	
15 Roehrig stresses that the Korean Armistice Agreement (“KAA”) should have defined the term “contiguous.” 
Roehrig, supra note 6, at 1. 
16 Baekryrong Island is the biggest among the FNI, and South Korea’s northwest-most point, lying about 190km 
north of Incheon of South Korea and only 16 km away from Jangsangot Peninsula of North Korea. Ryoo, supra 
note 9, at 2. 
17 Korean War Armistice Agreement, U.N.C.-N. Kor.-China, art. 2.15, July 27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 234 (alteration in 
original) [hereinafter KAA]. 
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operations were conducted on and around the islands and waters situated below the NLL and 
the Northern Boundary Line (“NBL”), which was designated as the maritime boundary for the 
East Sea Area as the equivalent of the NLL in the west.18  
 
C. Naval Skirmishes Occurred in the Disputed Water 
 
The NLL is located only 15 km away from North Korea’s coastline. As it leaves North 
Korea little access to its maritime areas and resources in the Yellow/West Sea, the Line has for 
decades caused military confrontations and armed clashes between the two Koreas. In 
December 1973, North Korea pronounced its official opposition to the existence of the Line, 
stating that it did not recognize the validity or legality of the Line.19 However, no head-to-head 
clash broke out between the two sides until June 15, 1999, when for the first time North and 
South Korean patrol boats exchanged fire in the disputed area.  
 
	
18 Young Koo Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L. L. 481, 482 (2009). 
19  Roehrig, supra note 6, at 1—2 (also mentioning that “the DPRK representative announced that the FNI 
designated in armistice were in North Korean territorial waters and that access to these islands required prior 
notification and permission from the DPRK.”). 
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Map 3: Location of Yeonpyeong Island 
Source: Jon Rabiroff and Yoo Kyong Chang, After North Korean attack, many residents wrestling with whether 
to move back to island, STARS AND STRIPES, Feb. 12, 2011, https://www.stripes.com/after-north-korean-attack-
many-residents-wrestling-with-whether-to-move-back-to-island-1.134580. 
 
This battle, now known as the First Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, resulted in the deaths of at 
least 30 North Korean sailors and the destruction of five North Korean boats.20 As a result of 
that skirmish, at least five South Korean patrol boats were damaged and nine sailors were 
wounded.21  An investigation found that an unidentified North Korean gunner on a North 
Korean patrol boat, which was reportedly crossing the Line, first opened fire on one of the 
South Korean naval boats. After the First Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, North Korean fishing 
boats and patrol boats crossed the Line for several times, although those crossings did not lead 
to an actual clash between the two forces until the Second Yeonpyeong Skirmish occurred on 
June 29, 2002 in the same vicinity. This battle, which lasted until the North Korean vessels 
went back to the north of the Line after about 20 minutes of fighting, inflicted considerable 
damage on both sides. Five South Korean sailors were killed and another 19 were wounded in 
	
20 Jon M. Van Dyke et al., The North/South Boundary Dispute in the Yellow (West) Sea, 27 MARINE POL’Y 143, 
143 (2003). 
21 Id. The later investigation revealed that a North Korean gunner first opened fire on one of the South Korean 
naval boats engaged, which was ramming a North Korean boat crossing the Line. Id. 
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action, while 19 casualties were reported on the North Korean side, although this number has 
never been officially confirmed.22  
 
D. Efforts for Negotiated Settlement 
 
In the wake of the West Sea Incidents, the representatives appointed by each 
government attended a meeting at the 346th MAC to investigate the details of the Incidents 
and determine follow-up measures. At the meeting, the North Korean representative denied the 
validity and legality of the NLL, stating that the Line should not be recognized as the de jure 
demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea for two reasons23: first, the Line had no basis in the 
KAA; and, second, the UNC unilaterally delineated it in the absence of any mutual consent.24 
In support of its position, North Korea further suggested a hypothetical provincial boundary 
line that extended parallel to the Latitude from the end of the provincial border between its 
Hwanghae-do Province and South Korea’s Gyeonggi-do Province.25  
 
	
22  Aiden Foster-Carter, No-Penalty Shootout, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, July 3, 2002, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/DG03Dg01.html. Reportedly, the engaged North Korean boats opened fire 
on the South Korean boats that tried to block them and other fishing boats crossing the line. Id. 
23 Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, supra note 18, at 483; Roehrig, supra note 6, at 2. 
Due to the North Korean representative’s statement at the 168th Military Armistice Commission (“MAC”) held 
in May 1963, some South Korean scholars and officials argued that it disproved North Korea’s acknowledgment 
of the Line. In fact, the two sides held this meeting to determine whether one of the North Korean spy boats had 
crossed the Line. In its response, the representative refuted, stating that “our boat did not cross the Line and did 
stay north of that.” For detailed information about this meeting and the statements, see JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF: 
MILITARY MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION, Vol. 4, MANUAL FOR THE KOREAN MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION 
(1999), at 138—40.  
24 Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, supra note 18, at 483. 
25 Id. 
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Map 4: The North Korea’s Hypothetical Extension Line proposed in 1973 
Source: Young Koo Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L. L. 481, 483 
(2009). 
 
In addition to this, North Korea announced that the UNC and South Korean vessels, whether 
military or civilian, must get permission prior to navigating to and from the South Korean-held 
FNI, based on the assertion that the Islands were located within North Korea’s territorial 
waters.26  
 In 1992, another diplomatic effort by the Military Subcommittee made during the 
course of negotiations concluded that the Basic Agreement was not a realistic solution to the 
Conflict. Amidst the difference of opinion, the two sides managed to adopt the Basic 
Agreement Article 11, providing that “the South-North demarcation line and areas for non-
aggression shall be identical with the MDL specified in the Military Armistice Agreement of 
July 27, 1953 and the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each side under the present 
	
26 J.R.V. Prescott, Maritime Jurisdiction in East Asian Seas, EAST-WEST ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY INSTITUTE 
OCCASIONAL PAPER, Vol. 4, 1987, at 48—9, quoted in Roehrig, supra note 6, at 2. 
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time.”27 South Korea introduced the concept of “special interim relationship” to define inter-
Korean relations with respect to the interpretation of this article. In other words, due to the 
extraordinary circumstances of inter-Korean relations, South Korea recommended that the two 
Koreas must “respect political entity of each party as well as fait accompli jurisdiction area.”28 
South Korea deemed “the areas that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the 
present time” to be the maritime order created and maintained by the NLL.29 On the other hand, 
North Korea stuck to its rejection of the maritime jurisdiction and boundaries created by the 
Line, proposing that its 1973 hypothetical boundary line should be considered as an 
alternative.30  
 In the aftermath of the First Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, the tendency to use the NLL 
Conflict as political leverage during negotiations intensified. In an attempt to get a dominant 
position, the negotiating representatives from the US, North Korea, and South Korea, presented 
their recommendations for follow-up measures throughout several rounds of talks. On June 15, 
1999, the General Officer from the UNC stated that “the Line has existed for many decades as 
a de facto demarcation line and both Koreas have acknowledged its existence in the waters off 
the east and west coasts of the Korean Peninsula…so both sides must withdraw their naval 
forces from the vicinity.”31 South Korea proposed the reunification of separated families, as 
well as indicating its intention to adjust the Line in accordance with the outcome of the 
	
27 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North 
art. 11, S. Kor.-N. Kor., Dec. 13, 1991 [hereinafter Basic Agreement]; see also Protocol on Non-aggression art. 
10, S. Kor.-N. Kor., Sept. 17, 1992 (providing that “the South-North sea non-aggression demarcation line shall 
continue to be discussed in the future. Until the sea non-aggression demarcation has been settled, the sea non-
aggression zones shall be identical with those that have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present 
time.”). 
28 Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, supra note 18, at 484. 
29 Id; GUK-BANG-BU [THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA], BUK-BANG-HAN-GYE-SEON-EUL 
DAI-HA-NEUN WOO-RI-EUI JA-SE [THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA POSITION REGARDING THE NORTHERN LIMIT LINE] 
(2nd ed. 2007), at 24, available at http://www.military.co.kr/english/NLL/NLL.htm (last visited June 25, 2019). 
30 Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, supra note 18, at 484. 
31 Press Release, UNC Public Affair Office, U.N. Command and North Korean Generals Discuss Naval Incidents, 
cited in Ryoo, supra note 9, at 10. 
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negotiations. North Korea did not make any change in its stance throughout the talks.32 In 
August, at the General Officer-level discussion, the UNC reaffirmed its position, declaring that 
the adjustment of the Line as per North Korea’s stance was non-negotiable.33  The UNC 
requested that North Korea comply with the then-established maritime order in the disputed 
waters until the two sides reach a new maritime boundary line through the process at the Joint 
Military Commission (“JMC”).34 In furtherance of the UNC’s position, in its general-level 
talks with North Korea, the US representative proposed that the two Koreas should contemplate 
possible ways to establish a South-North Joint Military Commission at which they could 
discuss issues surrounding the NLL Conflict.35  
 On September 2, 1999, the DPRK Army General Staff issued a special communiqué 
declaring the illegality of the NLL and proclaiming the CMDL as its replacement in the 
disputed waters. However, the CMDL claimed by North Korea did not contain any contention 
over the ownership of the FNI. This newly claimed demarcation line was simply delineated 
equidistant from the two corresponding coastlines between North and South Korea. 36 
Objecting to this new claim, the US reiterated its position: “The NLL has been designated by 
the UNC to serve as a practical demarcation line for the effective separation of the two 
confronting forces in the Yellow/West Sea. It has been an effective means to de-escalate 
military tension in this area for 46 years.”37  
 
	
32 See Van Dyke et al., supra note 20, at 144. 
33  Asian Political News, FIND ARTICLES, Nov. 29, 2008, http://findarticles.com/ 
/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_1999_August_23/ai_55619988, cited in Ryoo, supra note 9, at 10. 
34  NLL - Controversial Sea Border Between S. Korea, DPRK, PEOPLEDAILY.COM, Nov. 21, 2002, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/21/eng20021121_107188.shtml, cited in Ryoo, supra note 9, at 10 
35 See Van Dyke et al., supra note 20, at 144. 
36 Roehrig, supra note 6, at 2. 
37 GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 29, at 10 (alteration in original). 
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Map 5: A New Demarcation Line Proposed by North Korea 
Source: THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, PROCEEDING MINUTE OF 
SOUTH AND NORTH MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE 5TH SESSION 266, Map 4 (1992). 
 
There is a view that the military provocations committed by North Korea were part of 
its brinkmanship diplomacy. In other words, the CMDL was also referred by North Korea 
which during negotiations requested that the US ease the economic and trade sanctions 
imposed on North Korea in exchange for halting the development of long-range ballistic 
missile. 38  While the negotiations were ongoing, however, North Korea announced the 
Navigation Order in March 2000, subjecting all civilian and military vessels to its prior 
authorization when traveling to or from the FNI.  
 
	
38 Van Dyke et al., supra note 20, at 144. 
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Map 6: Navigational Corridors claimed by North Korea 
Source: MICHAEL AL. MCDEVITT AND CATHERINE K. LEA, East China and Yellow Seas Overview Essay, in THE 
LONG LITTORAL PROJECT: EAST CHINA AND YELLOW SEAS 1, at 5 (2012). 
 
In conjunction with the Navigation Order, North Korea designated a number of two nm-width 
navigational corridors in the area. North Korea also declared its policy to take military actions, 
if required, to enforce the order and navigable sea-lanes as part of exercise of sovereignty over 
its territorial waters.39 
 The Second Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish in 2002 was another heavy blow to politico-
military and diplomatic initiatives in the Korean Peninsula, putting mounting pressure on both 
sides to resolve the decades-long maritime dispute. It was reported that this skirmish broke out 
when South Korean patrol boats tried to drive out North Korean Navy and fishing boats that 
had navigated south of the NLL. Experts hold that the strategy was intended to bring up 
questions about the validity and legality of the NLL itself, rather than a diversionary tactic 
related to North Korea’s nuclear development.40 The Kim Dae-jung administration, although 
supporting the Sunshine Policy stressing reconciliation with North Korea, defined the action 
	
39 Id. at 145. 
40 Id. at 148. 
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as premeditated. Instead of overturning over the Sunshine Policy, however, the Kim 
administration decided to revise the rules of engagement for its armed forces to allow for more 
aggressive action and to request an official apology from North Korea.41 By quoting the Basic 
Agreement Article 11, the then-South Korean government declared that military actions could 
be taken to protect the Line, which it deemed a maritime border in the disputed waters.42  
After the Second Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, the US government reconfirmed its 
long-standing position toward the NLL Conflict. In the aftermath of the skirmish, the US 
became more reluctant to resume diplomatic talks with North Korea, while North Korea 
decided to cancel the bilateral ministry-level talk that was to be held in Pyongyang between 
the two sides.43  The Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces in Korea announced 
support for the South Korean government’s approach toward the skirmish, holding that the 
North Korea’s military provocations should be deemed a serious violation of the KAA.44 In the 
same context, the UNC also defined North Korea’s action as a breach of the KAA, thereby 
requesting the two sides to create a special investigative team under the supervision of the 
MAC to restore the effective enforcement of the armistice agreement.45 
 By contrast, while denying the validity and legality of the NLL, North Korea also 
denied an allegation that it had committed a preemptive attack against the South Korean boats. 
However, North Korea admitted that its naval boats were present at the time of the skirmish in 
the battle area to escort fishing boats.46 Flipping the accusation, North Korea asserted that the 
South Korean boats went up north across the Line, thereby infringing its maritime 
	
41 Id. at 147. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 HANKOOK DAILY, July 2, 2002, cited in Van Dyke et al., supra note 20, at 146. 
45 Id. at 147. 
46 Van Dyke et al., supra note 20, at 145. After the clash, however, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff reported 
that the battle was not accidental, but was resulted from North Korea’s premeditated plan, pointing out that it tried 
to test South Korean Navy’s response in two similar incidents that had occurred on June 27 and 28 and it 
deliberately isolated the engaged South Korean ship from the group in advance in an intention to provoke South 
Korea. Furthermore, the report made clear that the existence of North Korean fishing boats in the battle area was 
not identified as opposed to North Korea’s excuse. Id. at 146—7. 
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sovereignty.47 In line with its position, North Korea declined to attend a meeting proposed by 
the UNC unless the issues related to the Line were set as the primary agenda.48 Based on its 
assertion that the Line had no basis in international law, North Korea pointed out the potential 
risk of large-scale armed clashes between the two sides unless the issues were handled in a 
peaceable manner.49 North Korea offered to let South Korea to conduct a salvage operation for 
its sunken vessels, which were located five miles south of the NLL and 14 miles west of 
Yeonpyeong Island.50 While not accepting the offer, South Korea still carried out its operation 
without giving any notification to North Korea so as to not put the Line back on the negotiation 
table.51  
In late July and August 2002, North Korea changed its position, proposing to discuss 
follow-up measures to deal with the aftermath of the Second Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish. In 
this context, North Korea expressed its regret for the skirmish—though it did not go as far as 
an official diplomatic apology—and offered proposals, such as constructing improved 
communication channels, establishing a maritime buffer zone, holding regular staff-officer 
meetings, and reinforcing search and rescue efforts in the disputed waters as part of 
collaborative efforts to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict.52 Expert opinion holds that 
North Korea made these proposals for the following reasons: 1) reopening high-level talks 
between the two Koreas to resume the stalled reconciliation project; 2) holding a meeting with 
the UNC to discuss the aftermath of the skirmish; 3) redrawing a maritime boundary in the 
disputed area; and 4) offering a visit of a US special convoy to Pyongyang.53  
	
47 As a matter of fact, it was later confirmed by the Defense Ministry of South Korea (“ROK MND”) that not 
South Korean naval ships, but some of its fishing boats had crossed the South Korean Navy-drawn Fishing Control 
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 A series of talks were held between the two Koreas as part of confidence-building 
measures to prevent accidental armed conflicts in the disputed area. As a consequence of the 
13th and 14th ministry-level talks, where the two sides had reaffirmed the need for easing 
military tension to develop sound diplomatic relations, the 1st and 2nd general-level talks were 
agreed to be held in May and June 2004 respectively to discuss more practical alternatives. In 
those talks, the military officials reached agreement on various terms that were designed to 
prevent further accidental clashes in the disputed waters.54 Notwithstanding this agreement, 
however, North Korea was later accused of violating it by using the unified communication 
system, which had been adopted as part of the agreement between the military officials, to 
disrupt South Korea’s naval activities in the vicinity of the disputed area.55 Furthermore, 
inasmuch as the agreement did not clearly describe matters related to the disputed waters, it 
gave rise to a certain level of interpretational discrepancy. This is often cited as one of the 
reasons that the agreement could not serve as an ultimate solution to the NLL Conflict.56 
 In the general-level talks held in 2006 through 2007, the military officials involved 
agreed to seek a legal solution to the NLL Conflict that would be based on the KAA and 
international law. 57  They also agreed to foster a peaceful fishing environment in the 
Yellow/West Sea through prevention of accidental armed conflicts.58 More importantly, in 
exchange for South Korea’s relinquishment of the NLL, North Korea agreed to abolish its 
	
54 In general, they agreed to operate the 156.8 MHz and 156.6 MHz trunked radio system and unified visual 
signaling between patrol boats, and to exchange information about controlling illegal fishing in the disputed 
waters. See GUK-GA-JEONG-BO-WON [NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE], NAM-BUK-HAN-HOP-EUI-MOON 
[INTER-KOREAN AGREEMENTS] (2008), at 33—5. 
55 The Peace Foundation, Examining “Special Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the Yellow/West Sea” Initiative 
(Dec. 12, 2007), at 18. 
56 Id. 
57 Both sides reached an agreement to contemplate the fundamental principles embodied in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), e.g., the principle of equidistance and equity, and natural 
prolongation, for the settlement of the NLL conflict. 
58 Yong Joong Lee, Seo-Hae-Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-E Dae-Han Nam-Buk-Han Joo-Jang-Eui Guk-Je-Beop-
Jeok Bi-Gyo Bun-Seok [A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas], 
KYUNGBUKDAEHAKGYOBEOPHAKYEONGUWONBEOPHAKNONGO Je32Jip [KYUNGPOOK NAT’L. UNIV. L. REV. 
Vol. 32] 537, at 564 (2010). 
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Navigation Order (designed to restrict the navigation of both civilian and military ships 
entering and leaving the FNI.)59  North Korea further proposed a new maritime boundary 
designed for the disputed waters, while admitting South Korea’s sovereignty over the FNI as 
defined in the KAA.60  
 
 
Map 7: West Sea Security Line 
Source: Yoo Kang-moon, Unification minister hints at possible shift in North Korea’s attitude towards Northern 
Limit Line, HANKYOREH, May 7, 2018, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/843593.html.  
 
North Korea also suggested that the waters where the two sides had been engaged in armed 
clashes should be divided equally and that other areas should be divided in accordance with 
the principles and methods embodied in the UNCLOS.61 However, South Korea insisted on the 
NLL and instead proposed establishing co-fishery zones and a direct sea route navigating to 
and from Haeju in North Korea.62 South Korea added that such zones and the routes should be 
	
59 Id. 
60 The Peace Foundation, supra note 56, at 23. The new line claimed in the 6th general-level talk held in 2007 
was analogous to the NLL in most parts, except for the part of the waters between Yeonpyeong and Sochung Island 
of the FNI: drawn far more south than the NLL. Tai Uk Chung, Seo-Hae-Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon Jae-Ron: 
Yeon-Pyeong-Do-Po-Gyeok-Sa-Geon-Ul Gye-Gi-Ro [The Northern Limit Line and North Korean Artillery 
Attack], MINJOOBEOPHAK Je45Ho [DEMOCRATIC LEGAL STUD. Issue. 45] 255, at 265 (2011). 
61 Chung, supra note 61, at 265. This newly proposed maritime demarcation line was an equidistance line between 
the South Korean-held FNI and North Korea’s Hwanghae-do Province; and it was analogous to the military 
control line of South Korea. Id. 
62 Id; Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 565. 
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explicitly designated in advance according to the respective maritime areas that had been under 
the jurisdiction of each side.63 Whereas North Korea asked to incorporate the waters south of 
the Line into the zones,64 South Korea did not agree to this request, saying that such an issue 
should be handled at the ministry-level rather than at the general-level talks.65  
 The West Sea Initiative that was included in the 2007 Declaration could well have been 
a critical turning point for the NLL conflict.66 In hopes of achieving peace in the disputed area, 
the heads of the two Koreas discussed economic cooperation and co-prosperity as a means to 
ease the decades-long military tensions in the Yellow/West Sea. The West Sea Initiative 
suggested an idea for the establishment of the Special Maritime Area, including North Korea’s 
Haeju and its adjacent waters. The Initiative also provided detailed outlines about the 
establishment and operation of co-fishery zones, peace zones,67 special economic zones, and 
direct routes navigating to and from the port of Haeju, as well as a co-development plan for 
the Han River Estuary.68  
 
	
63 Afterward, South Korea stepped back from this approach, arguing that the two sides should share the fishing 
areas equally and symmetrically divided on opposite sides of the NLL, while giving up on its adherence on the 
delimitation method of “equidistance and equal area.” The Peace Foundation, supra note 56, at 27. 
64 Id. at 26. 
65 Id. 
66 Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Relations art. 3, 5, S. Kor.-N. Kor., Oct. 4, 2007 [hereinafter 
2007 Declaration].  
67 According to the West Sea Initiative, in these peace zones, South and North Korea were required to share 
responsibility of maintaining public maritime order by operating a jointly established police and administrative 
agency, such as the Co-Ranger operated by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources. The Peace Foundation, supra note 56, at 27. 
68 Yong Suk Jang, Seo-Hae-Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-Gwa Pyeong-Hwa-Hyeop-Ryup-Ji-Dae Jae-Ron [The West 
Sea NLL and Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation Revisited], TONGILMOONJEYEONGOO Je59Ho [THE 
KOREAN JOURNAL OF UNIFICATION AFFAIRS Issue. 59] 181, at 190 (2013). 
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Map 8: West Sea Peace and Cooperation Zone Proposed by South Korea in 2007 
Source: Song Ho-jin & Kim Nam-il, Lawmaker releases map showing Roh’s proposed North-South joint fishing 
area, HANKYOREH, July 15, 2013, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/595745.html. 
 
In the following ministry-level and general-level talks held in November and December 2007, 
respectively, the representatives discussed concrete solutions, such as the establishment of a 
Joint Military Commission, and navigational routes and procedures for civilian vessels.69 
However, the two Koreas eventually failed to reach agreement during the course of 
negotiations, since the ideas contained in the Initiative, such as the establishment of co-fishing 
zones or a direct navigational route from the Haeju port, hinged on political consensus, rather 
than working-level agreement.70 More significantly, North Korea made attempts to invalidate 
the NLL, whereas South Korea insisted that the newly proposed maritime areas should be 
divided equally and symmetrically on opposite sides of the Line. 
 When President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2008, his administration repudiated all 
the previous agreements, protocols, and declarations made by past administrations, which was 
followed by large-scale armed conflicts in the disputed area: The Sinking of the South Korean 
Warship Cheonan and the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. In May 2009, North 
	
69 Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 566. 
70 The Peace Foundation, supra note 56, at 34—5 (arguing that issues concerning North Korea’s denuclearization, 
establishing diplomatic relationship with the US, and participation in concluding a peace treaty must be prioritized 
for the ultimate resolution of the NLL conflict). 
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Korea elevated hostilities over the disputed waters, declaring that it would disregard the legal 
status of the FNI and would not assure safe passage for any vessels in the area.71 North Korea 
also announced that it would not acknowledge the validity and legality of the Line, claiming 
that the Line infringed its territorial sovereignty in its maritime areas.72 
The Sinking of the South Korean Warship Cheonan, a Pohang-class corvette, had a 
tremendous impact on inter-Korean relations, rendering the decades-long negotiated efforts 
useless. On March 26, 2010, the Cheonan was sunk 1 nm off the south-west coast of Baekryong 
Island, the northernmost island of the FNI, by an alleged torpedo attack from an unidentified 
North Korean submarine.  
 
 
Map 9: Possible route taken by North Korean submarine 




71 RODONG DAILY, May 28, 2009, at 3, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 567. 
72 Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 567. 
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The Cheonan was carrying 104 navy personnel when it sank and 46 South Koreans died as a 
result of the attack.73 At the request of President Lee Myung-bak,74 the South Korean-led Joint 
Civilian-Military Investigation Group (“JIG”), comprising experts from various countries, was 
formed. The JIG launched its own investigation to answer the questions surrounding the 
reported explosion and subsequent sinking. In the summary of its report released on May 20, 
2010, the JIG concluded that the Cheonan was hit by a North Korean-manufactured CHT-02D 
torpedo containing 250 kg (550 lb) of TNT equivalent explosives, which generated a bubble 
jet effect that created a shockwave strong enough to split the ship in two.75 The release of the 
official results supported South Korean military and governmental officials’ policy 
enforcement76 to impose stronger sanctions against North Korea.77 In line with this trend, the 
Lee administration announced trade embargoes, prohibiting all inter-Korean trades and 
	
73 On the night of the sinking followed by the reported explosion of the ship, it was later disclosed that South 
Korea and the US naval fleets had been engaged in the Key Resolve/Foal Eagle joint military exercise conducted 
annually 75 miles away from the location of the incident. According to the reports released thereafter, many 
modern warships were in particular conducting anti-submarine warfare exercises. Pauline Jelinek, AP Enterprise: 
Sub attack was near US-SKorea drill, BOSTON.COM, June 5, 2010, 
http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/06/05/ap_enterprise_sub_attack_came_near_dri
ll/. At the outset, it was reported that the ship had been torpedoed by a North Korean submarine based on the fact 
that the South Korean naval ships had returned fire pointed at an unidentified target. However, the South Korean 
government, which had been reluctant to acknowledge the possibility of North Korean involvement in its first few 
press briefings, announced that the shots may have been targeting at a flock of birds that had not been detected on 
radar. Kim Sengupta, Warship mystery raises Korean tensions, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 27, 2010, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/warship-mystery-raises-korean-tensions-1928740.html; South 
Korea urges restraint over sunken warship, BBC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/8598267.stm; Tania Branigan and Caroline Davies, South Korean naval ships sinks in disputed area after 
‘explosion,’ THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 26, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/26/south-korea-navy-
ship-attack. 
74 South Korea urges restraint over sunken warship, BBC NEWS, Apr. 1, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/8598267.stm; South Korea mourns victims of ship sinking, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8643374.stm.  
75 See JOINT CIVILIAN-MILITARY INVESTIGATION GROUP, INVESTIGATION RESULT ON THE SINKING OF ROKS 
“CHEONAN” (2010), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_05_10jigreport.pdf (last visited 
June 25, 2019). According to the first summary, it was also alleged that a group of salmon-class and shark-class 
North Korean submarines, escorted by a support ship, had departed Cape Bisagot’s naval base few days before 
the firing, taken a detour out to arrive in waters near Baekryong Island, and returned to the port on March 28, 2010 
after the accomplishment of their mission. ‘North Korean torpedo’ sank South’s navy ship – report, BBC NEWS, 
May 20, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/10129703; How Did N.Korea Sink the Cheonan?, THE CHOSUN ILBO, 
May 21, 2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/21/2010052100698.html.  
76 Navy Chief Vows for Revenge for Cheonan, THE KOREA HERALD, Apr. 30, 2010; “Change All of Plans, 
Weapons, Organization, Culture” Military Announces Omni-directional Reform, HERALD ECONOMICS, May 4, 
2010, http://biz.heraldcorp.com/view.php?ud=20100504000486.  
77 North Korea accused of sinking ship, STUFF, May 20, 2010, http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/asia/3721583/North-
Korea-accused-of-sinking-ship.  
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exchanges, and any type of North Korean civilian ships’ passage in the disputed waters.78 In 
response to the investigation, North Korea released an official statement denying any 
involvement in the sinking79 and offered to dispatch investigators on its behalf to re-examine 
the evidence presented by the JIG.80 Furthermore, North Korea accused South Korea, Japan, 
and the US of manipulating the investigation process and escalating insecurity of the region.81 
North Korea further declared political and military countermeasures, including cutting off all 
ties and communications with South Korea.82 In the aftermath of the sinking, all diplomatic 
talks were stopped, as South Korea’s political leaders insisted that North Korea had to make 
an official apology before any dialog could be re-opened.83 However, due to Russia’s persistent 
objections, the UNSC issued a presidential statement condemning the attack and, in lieu of 
naming North Korea as the attacker, denounced “those responsible.”84 
 The artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island worsened the already tense political and 
military relations over the disputed waters, and also prompted international condemnation of 
North Korea’s military provocations. On November 23, 2010, in response to South Korea’s 
	
78  Sang-hun Choe, South Korea cuts trade ties with North over sinking, THE AGE, May 25, 2010, 
http://www.theage.com.au/world/south-korea-cuts-trade-ties-with-north-over-sinking-20100524-w7y6.html.  
79 Military Commentator on Truth behind “Story of Attack by North,” THE (NORTH) KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS 
AGENCY, May 28, 2010, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201005/news28/20100528-18ee.html. In November 
2010, the (North) Korean Central News Agency (“KCNA”) published a report specifically and respectively 
rebutting the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group’s conclusion. “Cheonan” Case Termed Most Hideous 
Conspiratorial Farce in History, THE (NORTH) KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 2, 2010, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201011/news02/20101102-10ee.html. 
80 In 2012, a high-profile North Korean defector, who defected to South Korea in 2011, testified that the crew 
members of the North Korean submarines involved had been awarded and honored, getting credits for the deadly 
torpedo attack. N. Korean sailors awarded hero’s title for attack on S. Korean warship: defector, YONHAP NEWS 
AGENCY, Dec. 7, 2012, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2012/12/07/31/0401000000AEN20121207008700315F.HTML.  
81 Xiong Tong, DPRK accuses U.S. of cooking up, manipulating “Cheonan case,” XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 
28, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-05/28/c_13321709.htm.  
82  Jonathan Thatcher, Text from North Korea statement, REUTERS, May 25, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-text-idUSTRE64O3YU20100525.  
83 Seoul Insists on N.Korea Apology Before Dialogue, THE KOREA HERALD, Apr. 18, 2011; Seoul Renews Demand 
for N.Korea’s Responsible Steps Over Deadly Attacks, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 18, 2011. 
84 Tae-ho Kwon, Requested Security Council Cheonan measures weaken considerably, THE HANKYOREH, July 2, 
2010, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/428559.html.  
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regular artillery drill, North Korea fired approximately 170 artillery shells and rockets, hitting 
both military and civilian targets on the island.85  
 
 
Map 10: North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island 




Map 11: Direction of North Korean artillery fire 




85 Mark McDonald, ‘Crisis Status’ in South Korea After North Shells Island, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 23, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/world/asia/24korea.html?src=mv&_r=0. 
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In response, South Korean marines stationed on the island returned fire with 80 shells and 
rockets, aiming at the North Korean coastal artillery batteries on Mu-do and Kaemori. South 
Korean jet fighters were deployed to the battle area, although they did not engage in a 
counterattack. As a result of the bombardment, the island suffered widespread damage. The 
shelling killed four people (two soldiers and two civilians); injured 19 more (16 soldiers and 
three civilians); destroyed military facilities, civilian buildings, and vehicles; and burned 70 
percent of the island’s hillsides and fields.86  Even though North Korea did not officially 
announce any damage caused by South Korea’s counterattack, it was later reported that the 
artillery batteries that had participated in the artillery attack also suffered critical damage and 
casualties.87 
Despite opinions to the contrary,88 it is generally recognized that North Korea launched 
this attack to extend its maritime influence over the disputed waters.89 Prior to the direct hit on 
the island, North Korea first fired multiple rounds of shells and rockets into the waters north 
of the Line, then extended its range into the waters south.90 According to North Korea’s official 
statement on the incident, it took military action to warn South Korea about conducting a 
shooting exercise within the boundary of North Korea’s territorial waters between Yeonpyeong 
and Sochung Island.91 In its rebuttal, the ROK MND stated that its live-fire drill had been 
	
86 Jung Nu Ri, Is the Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island a War Crime?: A Review under Article 8 of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court, 57(1) KOR. J. INT’L L. 157, at 158 (2012). 
87 Military suggests counterfire caused ‘many casualties’ in N. Korea, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 2, 2010, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/12/02/83/0301000000AEN20101202009100315F.HTML.  
88  North Korea attack linked to leadership succession, ABC NEWS, Nov. 26, 2010, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-11-26/north-korea-attack-linked-to-leadership-succession/2352506 (reporting 
that internal tensions caused by the leadership change in North Korea seems to be linked to the artillery attack 
inasmuch as such shelling would not have been possible without a direct order from Pyongyang). 
89 Statement Released by Spokesman of DPRK Foreign Ministry, THE (NORTH) KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, 
Nov. 24, 2010, http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201011/news24/20101124-17ee.html (stating that its artillery 
attack was to retaliate against South Korea’s military exercise conducted within the boundary of its claimed 
territorial waters). 
90 Chung, supra note 61, at 287—8. 
91 KPA Supreme Command Issues Communique, THE (NORTH) KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 23, 2010, 
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201011/news23/20101123-19ee.html. See also Chung, supra note 61, at 284 
(arguing that South Korea’s firing shells into the disputed waters off Baekryong and Yeonpyeong Island should 
be considered illegal). 
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carried out 4–5 km away from the Line and had been directed to the southwest of the 
Yeonpyeong Island.92 However, North Korea continued to argue that South Korea’s military 
exercise was conducted to assert the status of the Line, even though it infringed maritime 
sovereignty.93  
 At both a military and political level, South Korea’s response to the aftermath of the 
artillery attack was uncompromising, notwithstanding North Korea’s efforts to settle the matter 
through political and diplomatic channels. The Joint Chiefs of Staff officially condemned the 
attack, describing it as “a premeditated, intentional illegal violation of the UNCLOS, the KAA, 
and the Basic Agreement. It is also an inhumane atrocity indiscriminately firing shells into 
unarmed civilian residential areas.”94 Because of the threat of escalation, however, there was 
disagreement between the governments of South Korea and the US about whether to deploy 
jet fighters to strike the North Korean coastal artillery batteries that were allegedly engaged in 
the bombing.95 In lieu of airstrikes, South Korea and the US jointly carried out the largest 
military exercise in the vicinity of the NLL. In December, South Korea conducted live-fire 
drills in the disputed area, even though some members of the UNSC objected, and the National 
Assembly also approved an increased military budget.96 In the year following the attack, South 
Korea expanded its military presence, not only on Yeonpyeong Island, but on all islands of the 
FNI.97 In addition, the Lee administration revised its rules of engagement, allowing its armed 
	
92  North Korea fires artillery into sea near western border, THE KOREA HERALD, Nov. 23, 2010, 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20101123000840. 
93  Military to kick off annual defense drill next week, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY, Nov. 26, 2010, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2010/11/16/10/0301000000AEN20101116007000315F.HTML.  
94  N.K. artillery strikes S. Korean island, THE KOREA HERALD, Nov. 23, 2010, 
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20101123001048 (alteration in original).  
95  Obama stopped South Korea’s plan to retaliate against North Korea, HANKOOK DAILY, Jan. 15, 2014, 
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=038&aid=0002458076.  
96  Increased military budget passed for the year of 2011, MBC NEWS, Dec. 9, 2010, 
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=100&oid=214&aid=0000162775. 
97  Israeli spike missiles deployed, THE KOREA TIMES, May 19, 2013, 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/05/116_135966.html.  
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forces to act in self-defense, if deemed necessary, without the UNC’s prior authorization.98 In 
the political domain, the Lee administration completely shut down all political and economic 
exchange with North Korea, including inter-Korean Red Cross talks as well as the operation of 
the Kaesong Industrial Region.99 As part of its policy to reopen talks, North Korea expressed 
its regret over what had happened to civilian residents on the island during the artillery 
attack. 100  However, since the South Korean government had insisted that North Korea’s 
apology officially for its action, neither of them could find any breakthrough in their stalled 
relations. 
 
E. Dispute over the Legal Status of the NLL and Equitable Maritime Delimitation 
 
1. Principle, Concept, and Theory of Customary and Conventional 
International Law at Issue 
 
Throughout the NLL Conflict, the two Koreas have offered conflicting claims about 
the legal basis of the NLL in international law. A major point of difference concerns the 
principle of acquisitive prescription and the theory of historical consolidation. South Korea 
argues that its authority is established by the principle of acquisitive prescription, given that 
North Korea has been acting in compliance with the maritime order created thereby in the 
disputed waters. North Korea, however, denies any acquiescence on its part, contesting that 
	
98  Rules of engagement entirely revised to protect civilians, SBS NEWS, Nov. 25, 2010, 
http://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1000825552&plink=OLDURL; Charn-kiu Kim, North 
Korean Bombardment on Yeonpyeong-do: An evaluation from International Humanitarian law and rules of 
engagement, 33 KOR. J. INT’L L. 29, at 38 (2013).  
99  Seoul Warns of ‘Severe Punishment’ Over N.Korean Attack, CHOSUN ILBO, Nov, 24, 2010, 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/11/24/2010112400306.html.  
100  North Korea says civilian deaths, if true, very regrettable, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-civilians-idUSTRE6AQ0O720101127 (condemning that “South 
Korea should be held responsible for the incident as it took such inhuman action as creating ‘a human shield’ by 
deploying civilians around artillery positions and inside military facilities.”).  
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transferring a sovereign territory under this principle can only be allowed when the original 
authority has acquiesced in the defective possession by a possessing State for a considerable 
period of time without raising any objection.101 On the other hand, South Korea also asserts the 
consolidation of its historical title to the Line based on both its effective occupation of the 
disputed area and North Korea’s acquiescence therein. Conversely, North Korea argues that 
there was no acquiescence, recognition, nor any form of agreement on its part that South Korea 
could claim acquisition of said territorial sovereignty over the Line and its vicinity.102 
As an identified legal mode of acquisition of territory in customary and conventional 
international law, the principle of acquisitive prescription allows the acquisition of territory 
subject to another sovereignty through the peaceful exercise of de facto sovereignty therein for 
a significant period of time.103 In the event that a certain sovereign claims its acquisition of 
territory based on this principle, as analogous to the common law doctrine of adverse 
possession for private real estate, the claiming sovereign must prove that its occupation of the 
subject territory was maintained for a considerable period without being interrupted by any 
action of the original authority. 104  Even though the role of “immemorial possession” is 
generally acknowledged in the formation of this principle,105 the principle also encompasses 
under its heading “prescription properly so called” in which the element of “adverse possession” 
comprises a significant portion. “Adverse possession” is by definition an assertion of territorial 
	
101 Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 552—3. 
102 Id. 
103 Randall Lesaffer, Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive 
Prescription, 16-1 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 25, 46 (2005) (quoting STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (I. A. Shearer ed., 
11th ed. 1994)). But see Land and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 629, at 678 (Sept. 11) 
(separate opinion of Judge Torres Bernardez) (insisting that “acquisitive prescription is a highly controversial 
concept which, for my part, I have the greatest difficulty in accepting as an established institute of international 
law”). 
104 Lesaffer, supra note 104, at 46–7. 
105 D. H. N. Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title, 1955 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 215, 219 (1955); see also Lesaffer, 
supra note 104, 46–56. 
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rights against another sovereign State.106 Therefore, a claimant State may cure its defective¾at 
the beginning of the process¾title by demonstrating its “peaceful and uninterrupted possession 
of the subject territory for a considerably long period of time.”107 On the basis of this principle, 
a State may claim a wider belt of territorial waters within the high seas that is deemed res 
communis or to a particular portion of land or sea area belonging to another sovereign¾even 
if said waters used to be fully governed by such sovereign.108  
Although this concept of effective occupation was originally invented to govern a 
situation concerning the acquisition of terra nullius,109 this concept also plays a pivotal role in 
the interpretation and application of the principle of acquisitive prescription and the theory of 
historical consolidation to a given territorial dispute. However, an act of effective occupation 
is not in itself understood as a legal mode by which to acquire territory, but is considered one 
of the constitutive elements demonstrating the existence of possession of a given territory by a 
State claiming its acquisition either through prescription or through historical consolidation.110 
Throughout the precedent of international courts and arbitration panels, the concept has been 
defined as “undisturbed, uninterrupted and unchallenged possession,” 111  “continuous and 
peaceful display of territorial sovereignty,”112 “continuous and peaceful display of authority, 
and the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such 
authority.”113 Based on this understanding, it is determined on a case-by-case basis whether an 
	
106 Artur Koztowski, Legal Construct of Historic Title to Territory in International Law: An Overview, 30 POLISH 
Y.B. INT’L L. 61, 93 (2010) (quoting Juridical Regime of Historic waters including historic bays-Study prepared 
by the Secretariat, [1962] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143 at 64 [hereinafter Juridical Regime]). 
107 Lesaffer, supra note 104, at 49. 
108 Johnson, supra note 106, at 219—20. 
109 JEREMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTORS TO 
ACTORS 32 (2006). 
110 Lesaffer, supra note 104, at 51. 
111 Chamizal Case (Mex. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 309 (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 1911). 
112 Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, at 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
113 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 45¾6. 
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act of a sovereign can be deemed to be a “display of sovereignty” over a given territory.114 
However, as the ICJ holds, such a display may be interpreted in various ways: 
 
The exercise of sovereign authority pertaining to the disputed territory; 115  the 
exercise of sovereignty by a State on its own116 or by authorizing an individual 
activity as exercise of sovereignty on its behalf;117 or conferring a form of license 
upon a private company.118  
 
 
Furthermore, in such cases, it will also be decided whether the claiming State has displayed its 
sovereignty “in a peaceable way.”119 Since another State may simply stop this process of 
display with its “diplomatic protest,” the claimant needs to show more than the mere absence 
of violence.120 To that extent, acquiescence on the part of other States may be considered 
evidence of sovereignty.121  
As a hybrid mode of acquisitive prescription and occupation, a State may claim its 
historically consolidated title to a specific territory that is terra nullius or one that was once 
fully ruled by another sovereign. 122  In the wake of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
(“Fisheries Case”),123 the theory of historical consolidation was newly introduced as a mode 
of territorial acquisition, distinct from occupation or acquisitive prescription,124 embracing the 
notion of immemorial possession and that of adverse possession (which have been deemed 
contradictory to each other) as well as the mode of occupation.125 In addition to combining 
such conflicting notions, the theory has also influenced the development of international law 
	
114 Lesaffer, supra note 104, at 51 (citing Island of Palmas Case, supra note 113, at 840). 
115 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan/Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 625, at ¶ 136 (Dec. 2002) 
[hereinafter Pulau Ligitan/Pulau Sipadan Case]. 
116 Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, at 65, 69 (Nov. 17). 
117 Pulau Ligitan/Pulau Sipadan Case, supra note 116, at ¶ 140. 
118 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, at 1105 (Dec. 13). 
119 Lesaffer, supra note 104, at 51. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Koztowski, supra note 107, at 96. But see Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, supra note 117. 
123 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec.18). 
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of acquisition of territory by putting more emphasis over traditional modes on the maintenance 
and manifestation of sovereignty over a given territory throughout the gradual process of 
historical consolidation: “A title should not only be acquired, but also be continuously 
maintained.” 126  With respect to the constituent features of a title based on historical 
consolidation, the International Law Commission’s study suggests the following: a) the 
effective exercise of authority over a disputed land or maritime area by a State claiming its 
historic title thereto; b) the continuous display of such exercise of authority; and c) the attitude 
of foreign States.127 The last feature “the attitude of foreign States,” which may also be referred 
to as “toleration of foreign States or the international community” without asserting any 
adversarial claim, is considered the decisive one, inasmuch as the theory was initially designed 
to deal with a case concerning res communis.128 
 
2. North Korea’s Position in the Dispute 
 
a. Against the NLL: Defying Its Validity and Legality 
 
 At the general-level talk held on the day of the First Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, North 
Korea publicly rejected the validity and legality of the NLL for the first time by referring to 
international law. Since then, North Korea has persistently tackled South Korea’s justification 
of the Line, citing customary and conventional international law as well as the UNCLOS. First, 
North Korea points out that there was no official notification from the UNC about its 
designation of the Line.129 Second, North Korea also asserts that it has neither acknowledged 
	
126 Id. at 223; see also the Island of Palmas Case, supra note 113. 
127 Juridical Regime, supra note 107, at ¶ 80. See also Lesaffer, supra note 104, at 49, 55. 
128 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 156 (3rd ed. 1979). 
129 Seong Ho Jeh, Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-Eui Beop-Jeok Yu-Hyo-Seong-Gwa Da-Eung Bang-Hyang [Legal 
Validity of the Korean Northern Limit Line and South Korea’s Possible Measures], CHUNGANGBEOPHAK Je7Jip 
Je2Ho [CHUNG-ANG L. REV. Vol. 7-2] 107, at 128—30 (2005) (casting doubt on whether the designation of 
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nor accepted the Line as a legally valid maritime demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea area. 
As proof, North Korea notes that its naval boats and ships have been crossing the Line more 
than approximately 40 times a year since 1973.130 This directly contradicts South Korea’s 
justification of the legal status of the Line based on the principle of acquisitive prescription or 
the theory of historical consolidation. Indeed, the North Korean Navy refuted the South 
Korean-backed theory of historical consolidation, arguing that it is difficult to define the theory 
as a widely-accepted mode of territory acquisition in the international community.131 Moreover, 
North Korea also criticized South Korea’s justification of the Line based on the principle of 
acquisitive prescription, asserting that it has persistently and consistently protested against 
South Korea’s exercise of authority over the disputed area for its illegality under customary 
and conventional international law.132 In other words, regarding South Korea’s argument that 
it has acquired a sovereign right through the completion of adverse but peaceful prescriptive 
process, North Korea contends that it has been constantly interrupting the process of acquisitive 
prescription by raising objections through diplomatic channels and by instigating military 
conflicts. 
 From 1999, North Korea began to contest the validity and legality of the NLL, grounded 
in the methods and principles achieved in the UNCLOS. North Korea points out that the Line 
	
the NLL was subject to obligatory notification, whether customary international law obligates a state to notify 
within certain period of time, and whether the law permits an indirect and informal way of notification). But see 
Chung, supra note at 61, at 281—2 (asserting that the 1959 Chosunchoongang Yearbook simply indicated a set 
of disconnected demarcation lines to respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area 
of Korea under the military control of the opposing side as prescribed in the KAA, contradicting Professor Jeh’s 
argument that North Korea at least received an indirect notification of the delineation of the NLL given the map 
included in its Yearbook). 
130 Young Hee Lee, Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-Eun Hap-Beop-Jeok Goon-Sa-Boon-Gye-Seon-In-Ga? [Is the NLL 
a Legal Military Demarcation Line?] TONGILSIRON JE3HO [CONTEMPORARY OPINION ON UNIFICATION VOL. 3] 
23, at 54 (1999). See also Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae [People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy], NLL Jaeng-
Jeom-Gwa Dae-An [NLL: Problems and Solutions] (Nov. 22, 2011), at 12, 
http://www.peoplepower21.org/PSPD_press/962270 (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (pointing out that South Korea 
never has an intention to possess the disputed waters to complete the process of acquisitive prescription in terms 
of international law given that its military had often used the term “high sea” to describe the waters in the late 
1950s). 
131 RODONG DAILY, Mar. 3, 2000, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, 
supra note 59, at 555—6. 
132 Id. 
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infringes on its 12 nm-width boundary of territorial waters that each and every coastal State is 
inherently permitted to possess under the Convention.133 North Korea refers to the waters 
between Sochung and Yeonpyeong Island, where many of the inter-Korean naval clashes have 
occurred, as an example of such infringement. Under the Convention, each island of the FNI 
shall be entitled to generate its own territorial waters boundary as against the opposing coastline 
of North Korea, thus supporting the legal status of the Line concerning the waters surrounding 
the group of islands. Nevertheless, the Line runs toward the northwest about 45 nm, unusually 
cutting North Korea’s navigational access off through its claimed territorial waters, according 
to North Korea.134 Specifically, North Korea’s position is that, although the FNI are entitled to 
generate their own territorial waters, their generating effect should not be used in such a way 
to separate North Korea from access to its own territorial waters.135 As the Line runs through 
the alleged boundary of territorial waters of North Korea in the disputed area, North Korea 
often points to this to reject the validity and legality of the Line.136 On the premise that the Line 
has no basis in the Convention, North Korea further suggests a new maritime demarcation line 
supposedly delineated on the basis of the methods and principles of the Convention, e.g., 
equidistance principle, equitable principles, mutual agreement, and natural prolongation.137  
 Considering the fact that the NLL was unilaterally designated as part of self-restraining 
measures of the UNC after the ceasefire of the Korean War, North Korea argues that the Line 
should not be automatically incorporated into the KAA in the absence of mutual consent, thus 
	
133 RODONG DAILY, July 3, 1999, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 554. 
134 See Van Dyke et al., supra note 20, at 151 (citing the principle of non-encroachment prescribed in the UNCLOS 
Article 7(6), which prohibits such use of a straight baselines system “in such a manner as to cut off the territorial 
sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic zone,” to explain the situation). 
135 See Roehrig, supra note 6, at 4. 
136 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 7 (stressing that for this reason the NLL might give rise to the 
continuing inter-Korean naval conflicts over the disputed waters). 
137 See GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO [NATIONAL ASSEMBLY RESEARCH SERVICE], BUK-BANG-HAN-GYE-
SEON MOON-JE-WA DAE-EUNG-BANG-HYANG [THE NLL CONFLICT AND PLANS OF REACTION] at 13, 50 (2011). 
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denying its binding effect over the parties to the agreement.138 In this view, North Korea 
considers South Korea’s advocacy of the Line as a breach of the KAA—i.e., North Korea 
condemns South Korea for trying to create a maritime order in its favor in the Yellow/West 
Sea area. Hence, North Korea further argues that the disputed waters surrounding the Line 
should be appertained to part of its maritime territory, defining South Korean naval activities 
as a military provocation. 139  In fact, the two sides did not agree to draw any maritime 
demarcation line in the course of armistice negotiations nor later concluded any subsequent 
protocols to establish any maritime order for the disputed waters, as noted above. According 
to the KAA, the Parties are at best obliged to respect the waters contiguous to the DMZ and 
the land area, though they are also prohibited to engage in any type of blockade of each other’s 
coastal area.140 Notwithstanding the fact that the KAA prescribes a provincial boundary line 
between Gyeonggi-do and Hwanghae-do Province as the only demarcation line to indicate the 
control of coastal islands on the west coast of the Korean Peninsula,141 it also makes clear that 
“no other significance or none shall be attached thereto.”142 Ironically, the UNC’s approach 
supports North Korea over South Korea to some extent: regardless of the practicality and 
effectiveness of the Line as a de facto military demarcation line, the UNC deems it a part of its 
internal operational instructions designed to prevent South Korea’s naval ships from crossing 
over after the signing of the armistice agreement.143 According to the Letter from the UNC for 
the South Korean Defense Minister written in 1989, the UNC clearly stated that it had no 
	
138 Seong Ho Jeh, Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-Eui Beop-Jeok Go-Chal [Legal Analysis on the Northern Limit Line], 
GUKBANGJEONGCHAEKYEONGU [NAT’L DEF. POL’Y STUD], Winter 2004, at 127, 135.  
139 Lee, Is the NLL a Legal Military Demarcation Line?, supra note 131, at 34. 
140 KAA, supra note 17, art 2, para.15. 
141 North Korea backs its CMDL unilaterally proclaimed to replace the NLL up by relying on the fact that the 
provincial boundary line is located in equidistant points between the coastline of Gyeonggi-do and Hwanghae-
do Province. Jeh, Legal Validity of the Korean Northern Limit Line and South Korea’s Possible Measures, 
supra note 130, at 136. 
142 KAA, supra note 17, art 2, para.13(b), map 3. See also Lee, Is the NLL a Legal Military Demarcation Line?, 
supra note 131, at 37—41 (asserting that the article should not be understood in a way that it permits to connect 
each island of the FNI by drawing certain line for whatever purpose). 
143 Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae, supra note 131, at 4—5 (citing Letter from the United Nations Commander-in-chief for 
the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea (June 3, 1989)). 
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legitimate authority to condemn North Korean naval boats for simply crossing the Line. 
However, the letter clarified that North Korean boats entering into the three nm-territorial 
waters boundary of the FNI without any prior approval would constitute a violation of the 
KAA.144 
 North Korea also undermines the Basic Agreement Article 11 and the Protocol on Non-
aggression Articles 9 and 10, asserting that the terms employed thereof are not sufficient to 
provide a legal basis to defend the valid legal status of the NLL. Regarding the articles, there 
is a progressive point of view among South Korean experts that the phrase “the areas that have 
been under the jurisdiction of each side” should be understood as the areas that have been 
“jointly” managed by the two sides, i.e., the Han River Estuary and the DMZ.145 In this view, 
as the Line and its vicinity have been unilaterally controlled by the UNC, rather than having 
been jointly controlled by the two Koreas, the agreement and the protocol were intended to 
assume the future establishment of a non-aggression maritime demarcation through subsequent 
negotiations.146 
 
b. North Korea’s Claims Made Since 1973 
 
In the wake of the West Sea Incident, North Korea began to lodge an official protest 
against the NLL, often with its own suggestions about replacing the Line. However, the 
argument was intended to undermine the validity and legality of the Line, rather than casting 
doubt on the ownership over the FNI as stipulated in Article 2, Section 15 of the KAA. In 
December 1973, soon after the West Sea Incident, North Korea asserted that “the seas 
surrounding Haeju, Dungsangot and Ongjin Peninsula must appertain to the DPRK” in 
	
144 Letter from the United Nations Commander-in-chief for the Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea (June 
3, 1989). 
145 Lee, Is the NLL a Legal Military Demarcation Line?, supra note 131, at 29—32. 
146 Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae, supra note 131, at 13. 
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consideration of the textual interpretation of the KAA. 147  Quoting the KAA Article 2, 
paragraph 13(b), as introduced above, North Korea proposed “a hypothetical extension line 
stretching extended parallel to the Latitude from the end of the provincial boundary line 
between Hwanghae-do and Gyeonggi-do Province.”148 In line with this new idea, North Korea 
then required all types of navigating vessels to obtain its prior authorization to enter or leave 
the FNI through the designated corridors, stressing that the islands lay within its “coastal 
waters.”149 In 1977, North Korea unilaterally proclaimed a 200 nm-width Exclusive Economic 
Zone (“EEZ”) generated from its coastal baseline, followed by the establishment of the Military 
Control Zone (“MCZ”) irrespective of the presence of the FNI. The new zones and boundaries 
claimed by North Korea at that time appeared to be a direct violation of the KAA, which 
expressly prescribes the presence and ownership of the islands-group.150  
 
 
Map 12: Maritime Delimitation Claimed by North Korea 
	
147 RODONG DAILY, Dec. 1, 1973, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 551. 
148 Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, supra note 18, at 483. 
149 RODONG DAILY, Dec. 3, 1973, at 6, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 544. 
150 Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae, supra note 131, at 8. 
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Source: GUK-BANG-BU [THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA], BUK-BANG-HAN-
GYE-SEON-EUL DAI-HA-NEUN WOO-RI-EUI JA-SE [THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA POSITION REGARDING THE NORTHERN 
LIMIT LINE] (2nd ed. 2007) 19, available at http://www.military.co.kr/english/NLL/NLL.htm. 
 
 Since the First Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, as discussed above, North Korea has been 
continuously opposing to the validity and legality of the NLL,151 denouncing the Line as “a 
violent encroachment on its maritime sovereignty.” 152  At a ministry-level talk held in 
Panmunjom on June 22, 1999, a North Korean representative insisted that “the FNI are located 
within its territorial waters boundaries.”153 From this perspective, the representative further 
asserted that “the Line neither has any basis in the KAA, nor has any basis in any type of 
bilateral agreement between the two sides… North Korea never recognized its presence or role 
for the Yellow/West Sea area…therefore, neither a demarcation line nor a sea border has ever 
been delineated between the FNI and North Korea’s coastline.”154  
In the 1990s, North Korea presented an argument based on the UNCLOS in furtherance 
of its position against the NLL. To be specific, North Korea stressed that the Line deprived its 
territorial integrity given the following: first, the Line encroached on the boundary of its 
territorial waters as guaranteed for each and every coastal State under the UNCLOS;155 and, 
second, a mutual agreement between the parties to the KAA to settle the legal status of the 
Line. North Korea further asserted that belligerent States are supposed to delimit the boundaries 
of an island based upon mutual agreement in a case where such an island is lying within the 
opposing State’s territorial waters.156 On that basis, North Korea justified its maritime activities 
	
151 RODONG DAILY, June. 16, 1999, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 553. 
152 Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 553 [alteration in 
original]. 
153 RODONG DAILY, June 23, 1999, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 553. 
154 RODONG DAILY, June 28, 1999, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 553. 
155 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 3, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered 
into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS] (providing that “[E]very State has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles….”). 
156 RODONG DAILY, July 3, 1999, at 5 (quoting UNCLOS, supra note 156, at art. 15), cited in Lee, A Study on 
Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 555. 
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in the disputed area as exercise of its sovereignty and supported its unilateral declarations of 
the maritime zones and demarcation lines on its own behalf.157 
In terms of international law, the North Korean Navy refuted South Korea’s arguments 
of historical consolidation or the principle of acquisitive prescription.158 Regarding the former, 
the North Korean Navy contested that there had been no consent, approval, or acquiescence, 
which are deemed the necessary requirements to fulfill the consolidating process.159 With 
respect to the latter, the North Korean Navy also contended that the principle was originally 
designed and developed to legitimize a specific mode of territory acquisition, though it might 
be considered violent in its nature.160 In other words, the principle requires a State to acquiesce 
in the violation of the possessing State for a reasonable period of time without lodging any 
protest to interrupt the process of acquisitive prescription.161 In reference to this, the North 
Korean Navy asserted that “insofar as South Korea did not provide any other reliable legal 
ground to prove North Korea’s acquiescence on the Line, it could not invoke acquisitive 
prescription in defense of the legal status of the Line.”162 Throughout its rebuttal, the North 
Korean Navy strongly supported its government’s position: A new maritime demarcation line 
for the disputed waters should only be established on the basis of international law, including 
the KAA, requiring mutual consent between the parties concerned.163 
As mentioned above, North Korea unilaterally pronounced the CMDL in September 
1999, which was followed by the Navigation Order. Compared to North Korea’s earlier 
proposals, which had taken into account the provincial boundary line in delimitation, the 
	
157 RODONG DAILY, July 11, 1999, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 5. 
158 RODONG DAILY, Sept. 2, 1999, at 5; RODONG DAILY, Sept. 17, 1999, at 5; RODONG DAILY, Sept. 23, 1999, at 
6, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 557—8. 
159 RODONG DAILY, Mar. 3, 2000, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 




163 See RODONG DAILY, July 3, 1999, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
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CMDL was not extended parallel to the Latitude, but it instead protruded deep into the gulf of 
Gyeonggi and blockaded the Seoul metropolitan region.164 Precisely speaking, even if the 
CMDL was a hypothetical extension line that was running from the end of the provincial 
boundary line between Hwanghae-do province and Gyeonggi-do province, it connected 
multiple arbitrary equidistant points between the FNI and North Korea’s corresponding 
coastline.165 To secure the enforcement of the CMDL, North Korea afterward claimed that the 
waters lying north of the line should be appertaining to its maritime sovereignty. 166  In 
association with the CMDL, the North Korean Navy also proclaimed the Navigation Order, 
which restricted to a substantial degree the passage of ships of the UNC or South Korean 
Registry navigating to and from the FNI.167 The order divided the disputed waters into three 
maritime zones: Zone 1 – Baekryong-do, Taechong-do, and Sochung-do; Zone 2 – 
Yeonpyeong-do and its vicinity; and Zone 3 – U-do. North Korea required all military and 
civilian vessels to navigate only through the designated navigable corridors when entering and 
leaving the islands situated, specifically in Zone 1 or Zone 2.168  
 
	
164 Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, supra note 18, at 485. 
165 Id. 
166 CHOONGANG DAILY, Sept. 3, 1999, at 1—3; CHOSUN DAILY, Sept. 3, 1999, at 4. At this time North Korea 
publicly declined the NLL to define either as a de facto maritime demarcation line or a maritime border. 
167 RODONG DAILY, Mar. 24, 2000, at 2, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
Koreas, supra note 59, at 558—9. 
168 Young Koo Kim, Buk-Han-Ee Joo-Jang-Ha-Neun Seo-Hae-Hae-Sang-Gyeong-Gye-Seon-Gwa Tong-Hang-
Jil-Seo-E Dae-Han Boon-Seok [Legal Appraisal on the CMDL and the Navigation Order], 
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Map 13: Declared Navigation Corridors 
Source: Jung Sung-ki, Will Leaders Agree on Tension-Reduction Plan?, THE KOREA TIMES, Sep. 4, 
2020, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/06/113_8269.html. 
 
 After the Second Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, North Korea adopted a more aggressive 
stance toward the NLL by giving an item-by-item rebuttal to the defenses claimed by South 
Korea. First, North Korea alleged that the South Korean boats committed the first-strike against 
its boats at the time of the military contact, while its boats were carrying out regular patrol 
operations within the boundary of its territorial waters.169  In support of this approach, a 
spokesperson of the North Korean Foreign Ministry condemned the validity and legality of the 
Line, underscoring that “it was obvious that the South Korean boats had provoked by infringing 
upon its territorial waters and committing a surprise attack against its naval forces, and its boats 
took self-defense measures in their response.”170 With regard to the particulars of the skirmish, 
North Korea reiterated its long-standing position against the Line as follows:171  
 
First and foremost, the Line was unilaterally designated by the UNC without 
notifying the DPRK of the designation. Moreover, the Line is a grave violation of 
the KAA, international law, and the UNCLOS. Most importantly, both America and 
	
169 RODONG DAILY, July 2, 2002, at 4, 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
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170 RODONG DAILY, July 4, 2002, at 5, cited in Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two 
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North Korea proposed a new maritime demarcation line at the 6th South-North general-
level talk held in 2007. In its shape and location, as shown in Map 7 above, this new line 
proposed by North Korea was distinguishable from the NLL and its predecessor—the CMDL. 
However, North Korea did not clarify whether the line was proposed as a maritime demarcation 
line or as a sea border.172 In particular, this line appeared to be analogous to the NLL in many 
segments: e.g., the segment between Baekryong-do, Daechong-do and Sochung-do; the 
segment between Jangsangot and Ongjin Peninsula; and the segment between Haeju and 
Deungsangot, and Yeonpyeong-do. North Korea did not duplicate the Line in its new proposal, 
given that it extended further south of the Line, e.g., in the waters between Sochung-do and 
Yeonpyeong-do. Meanwhile, North Korea explicitly claimed the full 12 nm-breadth territorial 
waters from its coastline. This new line proposed by North Korea was designed to merge the 
waters at a distance of about 10 kilometers from the Line, which had been under the de facto 
military control of South Korea, into its own maritime jurisdiction. 
 
3. South Korea’s Position in Defense of the NLL 
 
a. Upholding the Validity, Legality, and Effectiveness of the NLL 
 
	
172 Professor Chung believes that North Korea came up with the new line as its sea border, given that it had not 
been discussed at the US–North Korea general-level talk, which had been irregularly held on behalf of the Military 
Armistice Commission, but at the South-North general-level talk. Chung, supra note 61, at 266. Nevertheless, it 
was not clear whether North Korea considered the U.S.-North Korea general-level talk as a replacement of the 
Military Armistice Commission. Rather, North Korea might have wanted to negotiate with South Korea about 
significant economic and security issues arising from the disputed waters. Therefore, it is not accurate to say that 
North Korea suggested it as its sea border by simply quoting that this new line was discussed at the 6th South-
North general-level talk. In other words, it is still possible to say that the line was proposed as a sea demarcation 
line as a replacement of the NLL. 
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 Most South Korean experts hold that the NLL has its legal basis in customary and 
conventional international law; e.g., the theory of historical consolidation, effective occupation, 
and the principle of acquisitive prescription.173 First, in defense of the historically consolidated 
status of the Line as a regional norm, prevailing opinion stresses that South Korea has 
effectively controlled the Line and its surrounding waters for decades since the execution of 
the KAA.174 Furthermore, North Korea’s attitude toward the Line, i.e., its acquiescence or 
toleration, coupled with the doctrine of estoppel, is referred to as proof of South Korea’s 
acquisition of sovereign right throughout the consolidation process.175 As will be discussed 
below, this argument presents multiple historical occasions in which North Korea was deemed 
to have acted in compliance with the presence of the Line to prove the implicit recognition on 
the part of North Korea. 176  Second, this opinion also cites the principle of acquisitive 
prescription—one of the traditional modes of territory acquisition in customary and 
conventional international law—to prove the legality of the Line by supporting South Korea’s 
acquisition of sovereign right thereto.177 According to this principle, a State may acquire a 
sovereign title to a particular territory being subject to another original sovereign through open, 
peaceful, and uninterrupted exercise of a de facto sovereignty for a significantly long period of 
	
173 Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 553. See also Jeh, 
Legal Validity of the Korean Northern Limit Line and South Korea’s Possible Measures, supra note 130, at 115—
8; Jeh, Legal Analysis on the Northern Limit Line, supra note 139, at 127, 132—5. 
174 Kim, The Inter-Korean Conflict over the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical Consolidation, 
supra note 1, at 61—71; Jeh, Legal Analysis on the Northern Limit Line, supra note 139, at 133; Lee, A Study on 
Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 551—3. 
175 Kim, The Inter-Korean Conflict over the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical Consolidation, 
supra note 1, at 40—2, 52—7, 68—71. 
176 GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 29, at 4—9; GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 12, 50; Jeh, Legal 
Analysis on the Northern Limit Line, supra note 139, at 136—7. Contra Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae, supra note 131, 
at 12—3. 
177 Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 553. The doctrine 
allows a state to acquire a particular territory being subject to another sovereign state or the international 
community through the open and peaceable exercise of de facto sovereignty for a very long period of time. See 
Kim, The Inter-Korean Conflict over the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical Consolidation, 
supra note 1, at 38—40 
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time.178 On that basis, North Korea has been deemed to have acted in recognition of the Line 
over periods of time, thereby supporting South Korea’s acquisition of prescriptive right.179 
In opposition to North Korea’s claims based on the UNCLOS, South Korean legal 
experts have developed various defense theories to deny the application of the Convention to 
the NLL Conflict or to utilize the principles and methods enshrined therein on South Korea’s 
behalf. First, Professor Lee emphasizes that the core of the Conflict is not about maritime 
boundary delimitation in peacetime but, rather, the legal status of the Line in the disputed 
waters within the milieu constructed by the KAA.180 In this regard, Professor Lee argues that 
the Convention should have no influence either on the validity or legality of the Line unless 
otherwise agreed between the parties to the KAA.181 Second, another group of the experts 
completely reject the application of the Convention to the NLL Conflict. In other words, 
inasmuch as the two Koreas have been in a state of war, the principles and methods that are 
primarily designed to deal with peacetime maritime issues should not be applicable to the 
Conflict.182 This approach finds its basis in the Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (“Report of Flotilla Incident”) 183  and a 
disagreement of the opinions presented by the UNCLOS Member States throughout the 
incident.184 Third, it is often noted that, although both Koreas had participated in the signatory 
	
178  See Kim, The Inter-Korean Conflict over the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical 
Consolidation, supra note 1, at 38—42 (quoting Lesaffer, supra note 104, at 46), 44—6. However, the application 
of acquisitive prescription might be tackled, since North Korea has never had possess original sovereign title to 
any parts of the disputed waters; in particular, the waters between Yeonpyeong and Sochung Island. See Kim, The 
Inter-Korean Conflict over the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical Consolidation, supra note 
1, at 63. 
179 Lee, A Study on Northern Limit Line Dispute between the Two Koreas, supra note 59, at 553. 
180  Jae Min Lee, Buk-Bang-Han-Gye-Seon-Gwa Gwan-Ryeon-Doen Gook-Je-Beop-Jeok-Moon-Je-Eui Jae-
Geom-To [Revisiting Legal Issues over the Northern Limit Line], SEOULGOOKJEBEOPYEONGOO Je15Kwon 
Je1Ho [SEOUL INT’L. L. REV. Vol. 15-1] 41, 56 (2008). 
181 Id.  
182 GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 38. 
183 U.N. Secretary-General’s Panel, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 
Flotilla Incident, at 102, ¶ 70 (Sept. 2011) (reporting that “…once an armed conflict has commenced, the 
traditional laws of naval warfare apply (ius in bello). Those rules would apply in place of the general provisions 
of the law of the sea otherwise applicable in peacetime.”). 
184 Barnard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 
VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 832 (1984) (commenting that the maritime nations participating in the course of negotiations 
Hyun Jin Kim 
S.J.D. Dissertation 53	
process, it was only South Korea that ratified the Convention thereafter. In other words, the 
fact that North Korea has not ratified the Convention undermines the reliability of North 
Korea’s claims based on the Convention. Aside from a debate on whether any part of the 
Convention has been integrated into customary and conventional international law after being 
adopted, this argument points out North Korea’s contradictory approach in developing its 
arguments based on the Convention.185 Fourth, it is also asserted that the general rules and 
principles of international law, including the Convention, should not be applied to understand 
or to address conflict between the two Koreas, because South Korea is deemed the only 
legitimate sovereign State governing the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands since the 
execution of the KAA. This assertion is focused on the contextual analysis of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Korea, which is the official name of South Korea (“ROK Constitution”).186 
This assertion is also based on rulings rendered by the South Korean courts on the nature of 
inter-Korean relations.187 
	
intended to maximize their freedom of military activities in seas and oceans), quoted in GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-
SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 38. The maritime nations intentionally avoided discussing concrete restrictions on 
naval operations, thus clarifying the intention to limit the application of the Convention only to peacetime marine 
activities. Oxman, supra note 185, at 811; R. R. CHURCHIL & V. A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 421 (3rd ed. 
1999); SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA, EXPLANATION 
93 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995); A HANDBOOK ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 1321 (Rene-Jean Dupuy & 
Daniel Vignes eds. 1991); Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and Maritime Security Operations, 48 GERMAN Y. B. INT’L L. 151, 160 (2005), cited in GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-
SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 38. 
185 GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 29, at 23 (accusing North Korea, which has not even ratified the UNCLOS, of 
violating it by unilaterally proclaiming a military demarcation line that is not conform to the provisions achieved 
therein). 
186 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEON] [CONSTITUTION] art. 3 (defining that “The territory of the Republic of 
Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands.”), 4 (requiring that “The Republic of Korea 
shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of 
freedom and democracy.”) (S. Kor.) [hereinafter ROK Constitution], cited in Kim, The Inter-Korean Conflict over 
the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical Consolidation, supra note 1, at 17—8. 
187 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 90Da1451, Sept. 25, 1990 (S. Kor.); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2003 Hun-
Ma114 (consol.), June 30, 2005, (17(1) KCCR, 879) (S. Kor.); Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2004Hun-Ba68 
(consol.), July 27, 2006 (18(2) KCCR 880) (S. Kor.); see also Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 89NU6396, Sept. 28, 1990 
(S. Kor.) (holding that the Copyright Act enacted by the National Assembly is valid even in the territory of North 
Korea), cited in Kim, The Inter-Korean Conflict over the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical 
Consolidation, supra note 1, at 17—8. However, by contrast, the Constitutional Court of South Korea once found 
that one of North Korean universities should not be treated as same as a university officially registered in the 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Korea in spite of the Article 3 of the ROK 
Constitution. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2006Hun-Ma679 (consol.), Nov. 30, 2006 (18(2) KCCR 549) (S. 
Kor.), cited in Kim, The Inter-Korean Conflict over the Northern Limit Line: Applying the Theory of Historical 
Consolidation, supra note 1, at 17—8. 
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On the other hand, other South Korean experts invoke the UNCLOS in defense of the 
validity and legality of the NLL. First, there is a view that the Convention should not affect the 
Line absent any separate accord,188 assuming that the two Koreas have implicitly agreed to the 
role and effect of the Line as a valid de facto maritime demarcation line in the Yellow/West 
Sea area.189 This view stresses that Article 15 and Article 74, paragraph 4 of the Convention, 
which leaves the possibility of delimitation of territorial waters and EEZ between opposite or 
adjacent States under special circumstances, e.g., historic title or international agreements, 
should be considered to deny the applicability of the principles and methods embodied in the 
Convention to the NLL Conflict.190 Second, since the Convention embraces the concept of 
“historic bay” as an exception to the general principles and methods of maritime delimitation, 
the ROK MND refers to this to justify its claim of sovereignty over the Line and its vicinity.191 
According to the Convention, a historic bay refers to internal waters over which a coastal State 
has exercised its maritime jurisdiction for a considerable period of time with foreign State’s 
acquiescence, even if the bay does not meet the standard requirements to be defined as a bay 
as stipulated in Article 10. 192  This means that, regardless of its principles and methods 
regarding maritime boundary delimitation, the Convention allows a coastal State to exercise a 
special type of jurisdiction over its historic waters, including historic bays, in consideration of 
certain special circumstances, such as compelling strategic or economic reasons.193 Based on 
	
188 Lee, Revisiting Legal Issues over the Northern Limit Line, supra note 181, at 56—7. 
189 However, this argument simply disregards what lies at the center of the NLL conflict: a dispute over the legal 
validity of the de facto maritime demarcation line under international legal system. 
190 UNCLOS, supra note 156, at art. 15 (making clear that “the equidistance principle of delimiting territorial 
waters does not apply “where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit…in 
a way which is at variance therewith”) (alteration in original). Id. at art. 74, para. 4 (also providing that “Where 
there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of EEZ shall 
be determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.”). 
191 GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 40—1 (quoting GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 29). 
192 See UNCLOS, supra note 156, art. 10, para. 2 (defining that “a bay is a well-marked indentation whose 
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more 
than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as 
large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that 
indentation.”). 
193 See Id. art. 10, para. 6; art. 298, para. 1. 
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this special concept of historic maritime jurisdiction, the ROK MND supports South Korea’s 
sovereign title to the Line and its vicinity established over the decades, contending that South 
Korea has effectively exercised its control over the area with North Korea’s decades-long 
acquiescence.194 
The fundamental principles and methods of maritime boundary delimitation that are 
embodied in the UNCLOS are also cited by South Korean experts in support of the legal 
validity of the NLL. First, Professor Kim highlights that the Line was delineated about midway 
between the FNI and North Korea’s opposing coastlines.195 Therefore, in his opinion, the Line 
should not be considered a violation of the principle of equidistance provided in the 1958 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and in the UNCLOS.196 Second, 
although the UNCLOS Article 3 permits every coastal State to have the 12 nm-width territorial 
waters, there are many examples of coastal States around the globe that have claimed a smaller 
breadth of territorial waters in consideration of their neighbors’ maritime rights and privileges, 
such as innocent passage through congested seas or oceans.197 In other words, according to this 
approach, the 12 nm-territorial sea should not be deemed to be an absolute guarantee for every 
coastal State. Rather, the UNCLOS encourages a State to adjust the breadth out of recognition 
of an adjacent or opposing State’s interests, if appropriate.198 This approach underscores that 
North Korea should not rely on the UNCLOS in support of its claims to the waters surrounding 
	
194 GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 40—1 (quoting GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 29). The 
ROK MND seems to recognize that claiming sovereign title to the area would be inconsistent with the notion of 
territorial waters prescribed in the Convention.  
195 However, this approach would not justify the fact that South Korea has exercised military control over some 
parts of the disputed waters, i.e., the waters between Sochung Island and Yeonpyeong Island where there is no 
South Korea’s maritime feature located as opposed to North Korea’s coastline. But see GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 
29, at 9 (claiming that “…if the NLL had been broken in the middle, Yeonpyeong-do and Baekryeong-do would 
be completely isolated so their security would not be assured. The military necessity was the reason why the Line 
had been initially drawn as a single line without being broken in middle. The UNCLOS leaves open a possibility 
of such exceptional cases of military necessity.”) (alteration in original). 
196 Myung Ki Kim, The Legal Status of 5 Island Groups on the Yellow Sea, 23(1-2) KOREAN J. INT’L L. 323, 
332—7 (1978). 
197 E.g., Van Dyke et al., supra note 20, at 153—4. 
198 Id.  
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the FNI, since it is obliged to respect the opposing State’s interest. Third, Professor Jeh rebuts 
one of North Korea’s claims arising from UNCLOS Article 7, paragraph 6, which prescribes 
that “the system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut 
off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an EEZ.”199 The professor highlights 
that the Line, though it may be restrictive to North Korea’s navigational access to some extent, 
does not entirely separate North Korea from its access to external seas and oceans, given the 
fact that it still can navigate to and from its ports by taking a route around the Line.200  
 While admitting the fact that the KAA does not include any provision defining the NLL, 
some South Korean experts point out that the Line has effectively served the armistice system 
for decades as an essential follow-up measure for the maintenance of security and order in the 
Korean Peninsula, along with the Yellow/West Sea. According to this view, the Line was 
initially established for effective enforcement of the KAA Articles 2, paragraph 13 and 
paragraph 15.201 In other words, this view argues that, despite the fact that the Line was not 
contained in the final texts of the KAA agreed upon by the parties thereto, it was necessary to 
separate the combatants for the stable management of the newly established armistice system 
	
199 Jeh, Legal Validity of the Korean Northern Limit Line and South Korea’s Possible Measures, supra note 130, 
at 130—1. 
200 Id. 
201 KAA, supra note 17, art 2, para. 13(b) (stipulating that “Within ten days after this Armistice Agreement 
becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal 
islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, 
unless there is a mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any 
action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term “coastal islands” refers to 
those islands which, although occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, 
were controlled by the other side on June 24, 1950. However, provided that all the islands lying to the north and 
west of the provincial boundary line between Whanghaedo province and Kyonggido province shall be under the 
military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers, except the group of islands including Paengyong-do (37° 58’N, 124° 40’E), Taechong-do 
(37° 50’N, 124° 42’E), Sochung-do (37° 46’N, 124° 46’E), Yonpyong-do (37° 38’N, 125° 40’E), and U-do (37° 
36’N, 125° 58’E), which shall remain under the military control of the United Nations Commander-in-Chief.”); 
KAA, supra note 17, art 2, para.15 (providing that “This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval 
forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of 
Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.”).  
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for the Korean Peninsula and for the prevention of any accidental armed conflict in the 
Yellow/West Sea.202 
The National Assembly Research Service (“NARS”) publicizes its research results 
highlighting the need for textual interpretation as prescribed in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treatise Article 31, paragraph 1: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning…and in the light of its object and purpose.”203 The 
NARS points out that the primary object and purpose of an armistice agreement is, in general, 
to immediately suspend hostile activities by ceasefire, thereby separating engaged armed forces. 
Armistice agreements do not stipulate every detail, such as the location of military demarcation 
line.204 Therefore, in the absence of any provision governing such issue, it is reasonable to 
assume that negotiating parties to an armistice agreement intend to retain their military 
occupation “as-is” when that agreement becomes fully effective on the basis of the principle 
of uti possidetis.205 In this view, the NARS asserts that the parties to the KAA must have 
intended to delimit military demarcation lines between them in consideration of both land and 
maritime areas that had been occupied, and effectively controlled, by the other side at the time 
of execution, as provided in Article 2, paragraph 15 and paragraph 16.206 In addition to that, 
	
202 Jeh, Legal Validity of the Korean Northern Limit Line and South Korea’s Possible Measures, supra note 130, 
at 117—8; Jeh, Legal Analysis on the Northern Limit Line, supra note 139, at 134. 
203 GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 22—3, 24—30 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, art. 31, para. 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1969 Vienna 
Convention]. See also Kim, Legal Appraisal on the CMDL and the Navigation Order, supra note 169, at 18—21 
(asserting that “the NLL was immediately established as the line of contact between the two sides of the KAA, 
given that mutual agreement, either explicit or implicit, on military demarcation should be considered an integral 
part of an armistice agreement in pursuit of the termination of hostile activities; therefore, crossing the Line is in 
itself a violation of the KAA Article 1.6 and 2.15.”). 
204 GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 22—3. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 26—7 (citing KAA, supra note 17, art 2, para. 15 (providing that “This Armistice Agreement shall apply 
to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the water contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and 
to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side…”) (emphasis added); art. 2, para. 16 
(also providing that “This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall 
respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the 
opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.”) (emphasis added)). The report also points out that the 
UNC decided to withdraw its military forces from all the islands, except the FNI, located above 38th parallel in 
consideration of North Korea’s passage right navigating to and from Haeju. GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, 
supra note 138, at 26—7. Contra Chung, supra note 61, at 274 (pointing out that belligerent parties to an armistice 
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the NARS further suggests a legal foundation of the Line based on the textual interpretation of 
Article 2, paragraph 17 of the KAA: “The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish 
within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete 
compliance with all of the provisions here of by elements of their commands.”207 In other words, 
the NARS report defines the UNC Commander-in-Chief General Clark’s unilateral action of 
proclaiming the Line as a necessary follow-up measure taken to effectively implement and 
enforce the armistice agreement.208 On the basis of Article 2, paragraph 13(b),209 the NARS 
also asserts that North Korea is not allowed to have any jurisdiction over the waters surrounding 
the FNI, since doing so would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Agreement; 
i.e., it would lead to an overlap of maritime jurisdictions over the islands-group and its vicinity, 
thus escalating military tensions.210 By providing the provision “…All the islands on the west 
coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the 
military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,” according to the 
NARS, the parties to the Agreement must have intended to lay a groundwork for the 
management of the armistice system in the Yellow/West Sea.211 Given all this, the NARS 
	
agreement usually adopt a follow-up protocol to that agreement in order to delineate military demarcation lines 
afterward). 
207 KAA, supra note 17, art 2, para. 17 (emphasis added). 
208 GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 27—8. 
209 KAA, supra note 17, art 2, para. 13(b) (providing that “Within ten (10) days after this armistice agreement 
becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal 
islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, 
and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action 
which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands", as used above, 
refers to those islands, which, though occupied by one side at the time when this armistice agreement becomes 
effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the 
north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under 
the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese 
People's volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37 58' N, 124 40' E), TAECHONG-DO (37 
50' N, 124 42' E), SOCHONG-DO (37 46' N, 124 46' E), YONPYONG-DO (37 38' N, 125 40' E), and U-DO (37 
36'N, 125 58' E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations 
Command. All the island on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall 
remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.”) (emphasis added). 
210 GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 28—30 (quoting Lee, Revisiting Legal Issues over the 
Northern Limit Line, supra note 181, at 48—50). 
211 GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 29. 
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draws a conclusion that the Line should neither be subject to any separate agreement, nor 
subject to joint management between the two Koreas.212 
 In light of customary and conventional international law, South Korean jurists also 
support the legal foundation of the NLL, arguing that the waters lying south of the Line should 
be defined as a valid “war zone” or “military defense zone” under the KAA.213 Citing multiple 
historic examples of special maritime zones and areas that have been established under 
particular circumstances around the globe, Professor Jeh argues that a sovereign State may 
legally proclaim a war zone during wartime to achieve military objectives, and may also 
designate a defense zone, in its discretion, even in peacetime if it deems such measures 
necessary for national defense.214 In other words, as the Korean Peninsula has not returned to 
status quo ante bellum, any aggressor involved in the Korean War, whether signatory or not, 
may in its sole discretion, establish and operate a special military zone or area for the 
management of the armistice system.215 Thus, in this view, the professor stresses that the 
parties to the KAA should be obliged to act in compliance with the establishment of the Line 
as a valid de jure maritime demarcation line unless otherwise specified in a separate agreement 
between them.216  
 South Korean jurists also refers to the Basic Agreement as an evidentiary source 
supporting the valid legal basis of the NLL so that they can uphold the Line’s binding effect 
over the two Koreas as an established maritime order and system in the Yellow/West Sea.217 
	
212 Id. at 23. 
213 Jeh, Legal Analysis on the Northern Limit Line, supra note 139, at 133—4. Contra Chung, supra note at 61, at 
277—80 (pointing out that the UNCLOS Article 33 restricts a State’s right to enforce its laws and regulations in 
its contiguous zone only to prevent the specified infringements as well as limiting the breadth of the zone in 
consideration of the principle of freedom of the high seas). 
214 Jeh, Legal Validity of the Korean Northern Limit Line and South Korea’s Possible Measures, supra note 130, 
at 113—4 (quoting BROWNLIE, supra note 129, at 250). 
215 Jeh, Legal Validity of the Korean Northern Limit Line and South Korea’s Possible Measures, supra note 130, 
at 113—4. 
216 Id. 
217 Jeh, Legal Analysis on the Northern Limit Line, supra note 139, at 134. However, it is heavily disputed whether 
the Basic Agreement could be applied as a treaty due to the difficulties of defining the inter-Korean relations. See 
GOOK-HOE-IP-BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 32—5. On the premise of a special interim relationship 
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The Basic Agreement Article 11 stipulates that “the South-North demarcation line and the areas 
for non-aggression shall be identical with the MDL provided in the Military Armistice 
Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the areas over which each side has exercised jurisdiction 
until the present time.”218 According to the view propounded by this group, the provision of 
the article leaves open the possibility for the Line to be understood at least as a de facto 
demarcation line until the two Koreas reach a separate agreement on this issue. From this 
perspective, the Protocol on Non-aggression reinforces the Basic Agreement’s approach by 
prescribing that “The South-North sea non-aggression demarcation line shall continue to be 
discussed in the future. Until the sea non-aggression demarcation has been settled, the sea 
non-aggression zones shall be identical with those that have been under the jurisdiction of each 
side until the present time.”219 Therefore, this view stresses that the two Koreas apparently 
acknowledge the existing legal status of the Line as a valid de facto demarcation line in the 
Yellow/West Sea until they settle a new non-aggression demarcation line in a forthcoming 
separate agreement.220 
 
b. The Official Stance of the ROK MND221 
	
between the two Koreas, both the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of Korea have a tendency to define 
the Basis Agreement as a gentlemen’s agreement, thus denying its binding power over the South Korean 
government. See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Du14525, July 23, 1999 (S. Kor.); Constitutional Court [Const. 
Ct.], 1992Hun-Ba6 (consol.), Jan. 16, 1997 (S. Kor.). 
218 Basic Agreement, supra note 27, art. 11 (emphasis added). 
219 Protocol on Non-aggression, supra note 27, art. 10 (emphasis added). But see Chung, supra note at 61, at 
282—3 (arguing that “the areas over which each side has exercised its jurisdiction until the present time” and “the 
sea non-aggressions zone” should not be equally understood as the waters lying south of the NLL over which 
South Korea has exercised its maritime jurisdiction; rather, the areas and zones should be equally treated as the 
contiguous water prescribed in the KAA, according to Professor Chung); Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae, supra note 131, 
at 12—3 (arguing that the Basic Agreement and the Protocol on Non-aggression merely made clear the need to 
establish a sea non-aggression demarcation, rather than acknowledging the NLL as a valid demarcation in the 
Yellow/West Sea). 
220 Albeit declining to understand the Basic Agreement as an international treaty, the NARS report stresses that 
both governments expressed a clear intent to create a legally binding instrument governing their relations given 
the form, terms, and procedures adopted by the Agreement: Article 24 (Amendment and Supplementation), Article 
25 (Effectuation), the adoption of following protocols, the ratification by North Korean legislatures, and the 
official announcement of the South Korean government on the effectuation of the Agreement. GOOK-HOE-IP-
BEOB-JO-SA-CHEO, supra note 138, at 34—6. 
221 See Cham-Yeo-Yeon-Dae, supra note 131. 
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In defense of the NLL, the ROK MND has developed arguments based on international 
law. First, the ROK MND asserts that the Line has taken its place as a de facto sea demarcation 
line in the Yellow/West Sea for the effective management of the armistice system created by 
the KAA.222 The ROK MND further states that, as South Korea has effectively exercised its 
control over the Line and its vicinity, the Line has contributed to the materialization of the 
armistice.223 The ROK MND, on that basis, requires that both South and North Korea are 
obliged to respect the present maritime order created by the Line in accordance with the Basic 
Agreement, as well as the KAA.224 The ROK MND provides relevant material to corroborate 
its claim that the negotiating parties agreed that all the islands and coastal areas lying in 
between the 38th parallel and northwest of the provincial boundary of Hwanghae-do province 




Map 14: North Korea’s Obligation to Retreat by the Primary Text of the KAA Article 2, paragraph 13(b). 
Source: THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL UNIFICATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, PROCEEDING MINUTE OF 
SOUTH AND NORTH MILITARY SUB-COMMITTEE 5TH SESSION 280(1992). 
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Accordingly, the ROK MND underscores a point that the UNC and the UNC-backed ROK 
forces conceded to withdraw their claim to a number of coastal islands located south of the 
38th parallel so as not to blockade Haeju and Ongjin Peninsula appertained to North Korea 
once the KAA became fully effective after its execution.226 According to the ROK MND, hence, 
the UNC and the UNC-backed ROK forces relinquished the waters situated between the 38th 
parallel and the northwestern-most provincial border so the armistice system could be 
implemented effectively.227  
 
 
Map 15: North Korea’s Modified Obligation to Withdraw 
Source: Young Koo Kim, A Maritime Demarcation Dispute on the Yellow Sea, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L. L. 481, 487 
(2009). 
 
 Second, on the basis of the textual interpretation of Article 2, paragraph 13(b) and 
paragraph 15, the ROK MND asserts that the NLL, though admitting the absence of any 
bilateral or multilateral agreement therein, should be complied with by the signatories to the 
	
226 Id. at 25. 
227 Id. 
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KAA as a maritime demarcation line.228 In supporting this argument, the ROK MND argues 
that the two Koreas substantively recognized the legal status of the Line as a de facto sea 
demarcation line in the Yellow/West Sea through the adoption of the Basic Agreement Article 
11 and the Protocol on Non-aggression Article 10.229 Viewed from this perspective, at the 3rd 
South-North general-level talk held in 2006, the South Korean representative stated that the 
NLL Conflict should be an agenda to be discussed at a ministerial-level talk as it should be 
regarded as an established maritime order reaffirmed by the Basic Agreement and the Protocol 
on Non-aggression.230 Therefore, from the ROK MND’s perspective, the establishment of a 
new maritime demarcation line for the disputed waters should be settled through political 
consensus between the leaders of the two countries.231 
 The ROK MND presents multiple historical examples indicating North Korea’s 
recognition of or acquiescence on the NLL to support its argument, which argues that South 
Korea has acquired sovereign right to the Line and its vicinity, based on the theory of historical 
consolidation or the principle of acquisitive prescription. In its argument, the ROK MND 
asserts that North Korea acted in accordance with the existence of the Line, thereby admitting 
it as a de facto military demarcation line to separate the confronting armed forces. As the first 
example, the ROK MND cites the 1959 Chosunchoongang Yearbook published in North Korea, 
arguing that the yearbook described the Line as a military demarcation line.232 The second 
example presented by the ROK MND is that the North Korean representative’s statement 
regarding the Line at the 168th MAC held in May 1963. The meeting was held to discuss 
whether a suspected North Korean spy boat had crossed the Line at the time of its operation. 
In the course of discussions, the UNC alleged that the spy boat had trespassed based on the 
	
228 Id. at 26. 
229 See supra note 28. 
230 GUK-BANG-BU, supra note 29, at 27. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. at 22. 
Hyun Jin Kim 
S.J.D. Dissertation 64	
map indicating the Line as a military demarcation line, stating that “we fired because your boat 
was crossing the NLL at that moment.”233 In its response, the North Korean representative 
stated that “the boat did not cross the NLL, but rather stayed north of the Line.”234 The ROK 
MND quotes this statement to demonstrate the implicit recognition or acquiescence on the part 
of North Korea prior to its first official complaint made in 1973. 
In addition, the ROK MND also presents evidence in support of the legality and validity 
of the NLL and South Korea’s sovereign right thereto. First, the ROK MND cites an example 
of a 1984 meeting between the North-South Korean fleets in the vicinity of the Line. Between 
September 29 and October 5 of that year, the North Korean Red Cross delivered flood relief 
supplies to its South Korean counterpart as part of humanitarian aid. Both convoy fleets, 
including military ships and boats, decided on a rendezvous point located on the extension of 
the Line at the time of that exchange. The ROK MND points out that military vessels, in 
practice, are not permitted to carry out military operations beyond the boundary of another 
sovereign State’s territorial waters without prior authorization from that State. Therefore, the 
ROK MND suggests the rendezvous occurred between the fleets in 1984 is proof that North 
Korea recognized or acquiesced to the Line as a de facto demarcation line in the maritime area. 
Second, the ROK MND presents measures taken by international organizations as evidence. In 
May 1993, for instance, the Air Navigation Plan (“ANP”) was published by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”) and released the adjustment of the then-existing Flight 
Information Region (“FIR”), in recognition of the Line. The ROK MND points out that North 
Korea at that time did not raise any objection against the newly adjusted FIR until the ANP 
came into effect in January 1998.235 Although borders or boundaries marked on the ANP are 
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States, the ICAO draws up the ANP in accordance with lines, borders, and boundaries publicly 
known as established. In practice, as the ROK MND points out, each State is required to 
exercise its duty to rescue distressed airplanes within the designated lines, borders, and 
boundaries marked on the ANP.236 On that basis, the ROK MND supports its argument that 
North Korea recognized or acquiesced on the Line as a practical maritime border in the disputed 
waters.237 
 
F. Conclusion of This Chapter 
 
Looking at the background of the origin of the NLL, it appears inevitable that the Line 
would cause long-standing disputes in inter-Korean relations. In the absence of a definite 
agreed term on maritime demarcation between the combatants of the Korean War, the Line 
was originally designated by a unilateral act of the then-UNC Commander General Mark Clark 
for the purpose of internal sea control after the execution of the KAA. Therefore, the Line was 
controversial from the very start as to whether it could be construed as part of the armistice 
system, contrary to the ownership of the FNI which is expressly provided in the text of the 
armistice agreement. 
The two Koreas, together with the US, have made efforts to conclude a negotiated 
settlement for the NLL Conflict, though they could not prevent the armed clashes, including 
the two naval skirmishes in the disputed waters, resulting in damages and casualties on both 
sides. Since the West Sea Incident occurred in 1973, North Korea has made complaints about 
the validity and legality of the Line in terms of international law and the KAA. Even if the 
Basic Agreement executed in 1992 contains provisions that could have had an impact on the 
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Conflict, the two Koreas have displayed opposing views in interpreting such provisions. As 
observed in the following meetings held after the First Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, the two 
Koreas and the US-led UNC stood by their own positions regarding the issues related to the 
Line, and therefore no mutual agreement has been reached yet. Rather than consultation, in 
1999, North Korea suggested the CMDL as a replacement of the Line and the Navigation Order 
with an intention to change the maritime order in the disputed area created by the Line. Since 
all of the States concerned adhered to their long-standing stances toward the Line-related issues 
even after the Second Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmish, their efforts to build a military confidence 
through political and diplomatic channels for the prevention of recurrence of such armed 
clashes did not lead to any practical solution. Each of North Korea’s West Sea Security Line 
announced in 2007 and South Korea’s West Sea Initiative declared in 2007 could have been a 
dramatic turning point that could have led to the settlement of the Conflict. Unfortunately, all 
such preceding efforts to draw a negotiated settlement were obstructed by the occurrence of 
the two tragic incidents: the Sinking of the South Korean Warship Cheonan and the 
Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. Even though the Moon administration had been 
taking a more progressive approach in resolving the pending issues between the two Koreas 
since 2017, including the Conflict, there has been no distinct improvement in the Conflict. 
Since its first formal complaint against the NLL in 1973, North Korea has continually 
rejected both the validity and legality of the Line as a maritime demarcation line in the 
Yellow/West Sea. First, North Korea has been denying the existence of recognition or 
acquiescence on its part, as opposed to South Korea’s arguments based on the principle of 
acquisitive prescription and the theory of historical consolidation. Second, North Korea also 
asserts that the Line is a violation of the UNCLOS, infringing upon its boundary of territorial 
waters which is an inherent right of a sovereign State granted by the convention. Third, North 
Korea denies any binding effect of the Line as maritime order, stressing that the KAA has no 
Hyun Jin Kim 
S.J.D. Dissertation 67	
express provision defining such maritime demarcation line. Last, North Korea has been at odds 
with South Korea over the interpretation of the provisions stipulated in the Basic Agreement 
and the Protocol on Non-aggression with respect to the determination of maritime jurisdiction. 
In addition to rejecting South Korea’s arguments, North Korea has made multiple 
suggestions in an effort to change the maritime order in the disputed waters created by the NLL. 
In the wake of the West Sea Incident, North Korea began to claim maritime demarcation lines, 
zones and navigable sea lanes, though South Korea responded strongly against such claims in 
defense of the safety and security of the FNI. Although North Korea did not claim its ownership 
of any of the islands-group, it has maintained its position since 1990 that the Line is an 
encroachment on its maritime sovereignty and the FNI are located in the boundary of its 
territorial waters. Furthermore, while refuting South Korea’s arguments based on the theory of 
historical consolidation and the principle of acquisitive prescription, North Korea in the late 
1990s unilaterally proclaimed the CMDL as a replacement of the Line and the Navigation 
Order as a new maritime order for the disputed waters. Nevertheless, all the aforesaid claims 
did not provide sufficient justification to be considered acceptable as an alternative maritime 
delimitation or order, because the status of the FNI, which are expressly guaranteed by the 
KAA, was not taken into account. Even if North Korea’s suggestion in 2007 was assessed as a 
more equitable idea than its predecessors, such as the CMDL, the two Korea have not had an 
opportunity to discuss the adjustment of the Line in consideration of the suggestion up to date. 
South Korean jurists set forth arguments based on various legal sources of international 
law to uphold the valid legal status of the NLL as an effective maritime demarcation line. First, 
a group of these experts supports South Korea’s jurisdiction over the Line and its vicinity, 
relying on the theory of historical consolidation and the principle of acquisitive prescription in 
customary and conventional international law. Second, another group of experts defines the 
maritime area situated south of the Line as a war zone or military defense zone that has been 
Hyun Jin Kim 
S.J.D. Dissertation 68	
established for the performance of military objectives under the armistice system. Third, 
contracting North Korea’s claim based on the application of the UNCLOS to the NLL Conflict, 
the other group of experts deny the applicability of the convention to this Conflict based on 
that the two Koreas technically being in a state of war. Furthermore, among this last group, 
there is also a supplementary view that refers to the concept of historic title and historic bay, 
which is prescribed in the convention, in support of the valid legal status of the Line. Some 
member of this group further argue that the Line is in consonance with the principles and 
methods of maritime boundary delimitation embodied in the convention, given the fact that the 
Line is running midway between the FNI and North Korea’s opposing coastlines. 
Methodologies of treaty interpretation are also referred to in support of the South 
Korea’s position in the NLL Conflict. First, based on the teleological interpretation, it is argued 
that the Line has been served its role as an essential follow-up measure for the maintenance of 
the armistice system, irrespective of the fact that there is no express provision on such 
delimitation therein. Second, the NARS’s report, in furtherance of the aforesaid view, asserts 
that the armistice agreement already sufficiently articulates the maritime jurisdiction of each 
side, including the waters surrounding the FNI, for the effective management of the armistice 
system. Third, it is also argued that the articles prescribed in the Basic Agreement and the 
Protocol on Non-aggression assume the status of the Line as a de facto maritime demarcation 
line in the disputed waters unless otherwise settled by the two Koreas in a future agreement. 
The official stance of the ROK MND is based on similar legal analysis with the experts’ 
views discussed in Sub-Section 3 above, though it takes a relatively tougher stance throughout 
the Conflict. The ROK MND argues that South Korea’s exercise of effective control over the 
NLL and its vicinity over decades the Line has contributed to the effective management of the 
armistice system. Second, the ROK MND also invokes the provisions adopted in the Basic 
Agreement and the Protocol on Non-aggression in its favor, asserting that North Korea agreed 
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to at the time of executing those agreements the legal status of the Line as a de facto maritime 
demarcation line until a new line is drawn upon mutual consent. Last but not least, the ROK 
MND cites multiple historical occasions as evidence to prove the existence of recognition of 
or acquiescence on the Line on the part of North Korea in line with some group of the South 
Korean experts’ approach based on the theory of historical consolidation and the principle of 
acquisitive prescription. 
  
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ICJ ADVISORY JURISDICTION  
 
A. Introduction to This Chapter 
 
Chapter II of this dissertation will examine the operational mechanism of the ICJ 
jurisdiction with an emphasis given to basic concepts, types of the jurisdictions, requirements 
to establish each type of the jurisdictions and effect of the Court’s holdings. To this end, Section 
B of this Chapter II will lay out an overview of the ICJ jurisdictional system by studying 
relevant basic concepts and distinguishing the two different jurisdictions. To distinguish the 
advisory jurisdiction from the contentious jurisdiction, it is first necessary to understand the 
legal concepts of “jurisdiction” and “competence” through comparative analysis in the context 
of the ICJ practice. In the same vein, the admissibility of a claim/request, on which the Court 
usually adjudicates after the establishment of its jurisdiction at the preliminary stage, is often 
regarded as a significant concept to be apprehended due to a diversified range of the 
admissibility objections raised by the litigating States throughout the Court’s practices. Based 
on comprehension of said legal concepts, Section B will then provide a brief comparative 
analysis on the contentious and advisory jurisdiction of the Court before proposing the latter 
as a more promising judicial forum for the peaceful settlement of the NLL Conflict. 
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By examining each jurisdictional component required to establish the contentious 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, Section C of Chapter II will demonstrate why the advisory jurisdiction 
of the Court should be regarded as the more persuasive judicial option for the settlement of the 
NLL Conflict, with a focus on its jurisdiction ratione consensus. To adjudicate on international 
disputes of legal nature between sovereign nations, the Court requires multiple jurisdictional 
components to be verified prior to the establishment of its contentious jurisdiction. First, unlike 
its advisory proceeding, the Court’s contentious proceeding requires a sovereign State to be a 
claimant pursuant to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”) Article 34, 
paragraph 1. Second, the Court also requires “international dispute arising from a disagreement 
on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests” to be submitted by litigating 
States. Third, even if the aforementioned requirements are properly submitted, the Court 
renders its judgment through contentious proceedings only where both contesting and 
defending States have given their consent to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, whether 
ex ante compulsory or ex post optional/voluntary. Considering the arguments in Chapter I, the 
NLL Conflict qualifies for the first two requirements to be considered a matter to be adjudicated 
through the Court’s contentious proceeding. However, given the fact that the state consent has 
been the most challenging requirement to be satisfied through the Court’s preceding cases, a 
similar difficulty is very likely to arise to obstruct the establishment of the Court’s contentious 
jurisdiction over the Conflict. Therefore, from this point of view, Section C will concentrate 
on exploring the jurisdictional components of the Court’s contentious proceedings, with an 
emphasis on the concept of the state consent, to clarify a doctrinal hypothesis taken by this 
dissertation suggesting that the advisory jurisdiction of the Court is the most promising judicial 
option for the settlement of the NLL Conflict. 
Section D of Chapter II will explore each of the jurisdictional components of the ICJ’s 
advisory proceeding, as well as issues concerning the admissibility of an advisory request and 
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the Court’s judicial discretion, in comparison with those of the contentious proceeding. As 
different jurisdictional elements are required for the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction, 
the Court throughout its operation has adopted a more flexible approach in exercising its 
judicial discretionary power vis-à-vis the advisory jurisdiction. However, as will be discussed 
below, the Court has dealt with a unique type of ultra vires objection throughout its advisory 
proceedings, since some international organs and agencies may be eligible to make such 
advisory requests. Nonetheless, as long as its personal jurisdiction is established, the Court 
tends to at more liberty to contemplate whether certain advisory requests are related to legal 
controversies within the scope of the activities of a requesting organization. In Section D, the 
Court’s findings on objections based on the absence of the state consent will also be discussed 
to argue that the advisory proceeding of the Court is the most promising judicial forum that 
can be established for the resolution of the NLL Conflict. While dealing with an issue related 
with the admissibility objection in advisory proceeding, this Section D will also investigate the 
decisions made by the Court to dismiss such objections. 
 
B. Jurisdictional System of the ICJ 
 
1. Comparative Understanding of the Concepts of Jurisdiction and Competence  
 
In terms of academic legal writing, scholars and experts who specialize in the ICJ 
present a variety of perspectives to distinguish the legal concept of “jurisdiction” from that of 
“competence.” For example, Rosenne focuses on their conceptual difference, arguing that 
jurisdiction refers to the “Court’s capacity to decide a concrete case with binding force,”238 
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while competence is used to “elaborate the propriety of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.”239 
According to Rosenne, jurisdiction is concerned with the Court’s judicial capacity and binding 
power on its adjudication, while competence includes the elements of propriety in association 
with exercising its judicial power.240 On that basis, he stresses the ICJ Statute’s usage of the 
two slightly different concepts, asserting that while jurisdiction has occasionally been used in 
explaining the Court’s advisory proceedings, competence is a relatively more common concept 
used in the ICJ Statute. 241  However, Sir Fitzmaurice sets forth a different approach, 
emphasizing that competence is a more specific term by definition. In other words, jurisdiction 
is a legal question as to whether a given tribunal is entitled to adjudicate on the “general class 
of cases within the boundary of its general field,”242 while competence refers to whether a 
tribunal is entitled to “hear and determine a particular individual case.”243 Accordingly, under 
certain circumstances, the tribunal may not have competence to deal with a particular set of 
questions despite having jurisdiction over the general field related to the questions. 244 
Nevertheless, contrary to Rosenne’s perspective, Fitzmaurice asserts that competence should 
be used only to illustrate the authorized organs’ capacity in the operation of their advisory 
jurisdiction, whereas “jurisdiction” and “competence” may be preferably and interchangeably 
used when operating under contentious jurisdiction.245 Grisel further develops Fitzmaurice’s 
approach by incorporating another concept from international law called the “state consent.” 
Grisel argues that jurisdiction refers to the Court’s inherent authority, which is based on the 
ICJ Statute, empowering the Court to institute proceedings regardless of any party’s non-
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appearance and also to determine its own competence if controverted. 246  In his view, 
“competence is accorded as a result of the consent of the State parties involved by declaring in 
advance or at the moment of the arise of the dispute”247 their willingness to have the Court to 
adjudicate on the merits of a given claim. In short, the Court is generally allowed to enjoy 
jurisdictional power over all State parties to the ICJ Statute, whereas the state consent is 
specifically required for the Court to have competence over the merits of a given claim. 
The linguistic nuances between English and French are seen as a source of this 
conceptual confusion. Fitzmaurice simply underscores the different usage of jurisdiction and 
competence in the two languages, arguing that “English independently uses both legal terms, 
whereas French uses only the term ‘compétence’ without distinction as far as the ICJ is 
concerned.”248 On the other hand, although Dubisson focuses on the linguistic nuance, his view 
might be understood in the same context with Fitzmaurice’s writing. According to Dubisson, 
“in French law, the term ‘jurisdiction’…is used in opposition to the term ‘compétence’ because 
the former refers to the authority of judging considered in an abstract manner, generally or 
from the point of view of its sources. On the contrary, ‘compétence’ is used with reference to 
a definite case.”249  
Unfortunately, the ICJ’s practices have not provided any guidance on the two different 
legal concepts. Indeed, the concepts have been used interchangeably and inconsistently. 
According to Rosenne, since both the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute do not adopt 
individualistic legal terms to prescribe the concepts, it is not in practice necessary to make a 
clear distinction between them to understand the ICJ jurisdiction. 250  In the same vein, 
Fitzmaurice and Dubisson also admit that the two concepts are often used interchangeably, at 
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least with respect to understanding the jurisdictional authority of the Court.251 Notably, the 
Court has addressed the jurisdictional issues by using the heading of “jurisdiction” in English 
and “compétence” in French without making any particular distinction.252 
Academically speaking, it is not beneficial to distinguish jurisdiction from competence 
since they might be interchangeably used with respect to the ICJ jurisdiction. According to 
Szafarz, “the jurisdiction of the ICJ refers to the general and specific capacity of the Court to 
settle contentious cases between States with binding force and has the capacity to give advisory 
opinions.”253 On that basis, this study will adopt Szafarz’s definition of jurisdiction in the 
following discussion about whether the Court would have jurisdictional authority over the 
inter-Korean maritime conflict over the NLL. 
 
2. Comprehending the Admissibility of a Claim/Request 
 
To hear and decide the merits of a case at hand, the ICJ must establish its jurisdiction 
and, at the preliminary stage, determine the admissibility of a claim or request. Unless these 
two requirements are met, the Court will not be entitled to express its legal position on the case. 
In establishing its jurisdiction, the Court usually examines litigants, subject-matter, and the 
extent and limits of its judicial capacity in relation to a claim/request at issue.254 The Court’s 
deliberation on its jurisdiction over a certain case necessarily encompasses both institutional 
and material factors. At the same time, the admissibility of a claim/request is a matter of 
satisfying certain legal condition precedents for the Court, such as time limit and 
“litispendence,”255 in preference to exercising its jurisdictional authority. Even so, ascertaining 
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admissibility might also require the Court to explore both procedural and material aspects of a 
claim/request. 
A preliminary objection to the admissibility of a claim/request is one of many grounds 
on which a litigating State may challenge the competence of the ICJ. In practice, the Court has 
often confronted admissibility objections based on various aspects of a claim/request, 
particularly when the nationality of the claimant or the exhaustion of local remedies is 
involved.256 However, since a preliminary objection to admissibility touches upon “the validity 
of a claim,”257 this is basically a question to be determined after the Court has assumed its 
jurisdiction.258  Therefore, in practice, the Court determines a preliminary objection to its 
jurisdiction before it determines an objection to admissibility. To some extent, this enables the 
Court to consider admissibility exclusively by the merits of a given claim/request.259  
To understand the concept of the admissibility of a claim/request in light of the ICJ 
proceedings, it is first necessary to define its conceptual differences in relation to jurisdiction. 
By definition, jurisdiction refers to the Court’s legal power or capacity to hear a given case and 
decide the merits by rendering a binding judgment. Accordingly, the Court must explore 
“personal, material, and consensual conditions”260 prior to giving its decision on jurisdictional 
questions. On the other hand, according to Kolb, the admissibility of a claim/request is more 
concerned with the claim/request itself as well as documents and evidence pertaining to the 
particular dispute. As the question of admissibility is not specifically and explicitly prescribed 
in any of legal sources used by the Court, litigating State parties might be allowed to plead an 
admissibility objection on whatever grounds to prevent the Court from proceeding to the 
merits.261 
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These two different legal concepts can be compared on several other grounds. First, 
jurisdiction is a question of “general interest, public policy, or principle,”262 not a particular 
claim/request, document, or evidence. In the context of a particular claim/request, however, 
the Court will examine whether there is any error or omission while determining admissibility 
issues.263  Second, a case-by-case analysis is not usually required to establish jurisdiction, 
inasmuch as many cases have an express provision permitting it.264 Conversely, the Court will 
look at every aspect of a particular claim/request or case in determining its admissibility due 
to its “circumstantial and particular nature.”265 Third, regardless of whether a state party pleads 
or not, the Court may, on its own motion, raise an issue over the lack of jurisdiction,266 whereas 
admissibility is not a question that can be raised by the Court itself.267 Finally, the Court may 
separate a question of jurisdiction from its merits, while a question of admissibility may be 
more closely attached to the merits, thereby making it harder to separate the two concepts.268  
Throughout its operations and practices, the ICJ and its predecessor PCIJ dealt with 
some preliminary objections based on admissibility. The following is a list of the objections 
raised by the involved States parties in an attempt to tackle the issue of admissibility: 
 
Prior negotiations between the parties; whether the alleged dispute is a current 
dispute; the existence of the necessary standing to take action; the link of nationality 
in the context of diplomatic protection claims or dual nationality; the exhaustion of 
internal remedies; the objective existence of a dispute with the characteristics 
necessary in a given context; the absence of litispendence; the involvement of rights 
of third parties; the existence or absence of a res judicata; respect for certain time 
limits laid down in the ICJ Statute or other texts; the lateness or otherwise of a claim 
in light of the general principle that claims should be presented diligently; respect 
for formal requirements which impose binding conditions; no abuse of power; 
exhaustion of negotiations and other means made compulsory, prior to seizing the 
Court, by a text binding on the parties concerned or by a possible implied 
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understanding; and estoppel in consequence of an informal agreement not to submit 
a particular case to the Court.269 
 
 
Before moving on to the merits, the judges were obliged to render their opinions on such 
diversified admissibility objections raised by litigating States. Since the litigants were basically 
allowed to raise any type of admissibility objections that seemed relevant, they attempted to 
persuade the judges to refrain from deciding on the merits. 
In pursuit of judicial constraint and efficient administration of justice, the ICJ must 
follow the order of examination—i.e., the Court must determine admissibility objections at the 
preliminary stage before proceeding to the merits of a given case. Prior to determining 
admissibility, however, the Court must first establish its jurisdiction. This is because 
admissibility is more closely connected with particular issues of a claim/request, while 
establishing jurisdiction in a given case requires more fundamental and thorough deliberation 
pertaining to the case.270 Therefore, the Court must refrain from determining an admissibility 
objection before it clarifies the existence of its jurisdiction over the case at hand. Second, the 
Court must draw a clear distinction between the preliminary and the merits stage to avoid 
prejudging the merits in the preliminary stage.271 While it may be possible for the Court to 
touch upon the merits while examining issues of admissibility that are closely linked to the 
merits, the judges should proceed with caution. Since the Court, in the preliminary stage, might 
not have sufficient evidence or other resources to adjudicate on the merits, its examination must 
be strictly confined to issues related to jurisdiction or admissibility.272 In so doing, the Court 
can also prevent itself from expressing contradictory views on the same issue in any subsequent 
cases. 273  
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 Occasionally, however, there are cases in which the admissibility objection takes 
precedence over the objections against jurisdiction by reason of the convenience of judicial 
administration. In the Interhandel case, for example, the Court decided admissibility issues 
prior to the establishment of jurisdiction because the judges believed a more delicate approach 
would be required for the latter.274 Regarding a number of the preliminary objections raised by 
the US, therefore, the Court categorized them as admissibility issues, hence placing preference 
on admissibility over other objections against subject-matter and temporal jurisdiction of the 
Court. In this particular case, the Court did so on the grounds that the objections against 
jurisdiction involved an issue over “automatic reservations,” which must have required more 
profound discussion in relation to the optional declaration of the US under the ICJ Statute, 
Article 36, paragraph 2.275  
Although the ICJ has already classified some issues as inherently jurisdictional, such 
as personal locus standi in judicio,276 peculiar quality, and state consent, its practices have 
blurred the line between jurisdiction and admissibility of a claim. Thus, no question is solely 
and necessarily defined as an admissibility issue. For instance, even though setting a time limit 
usually falls within the scope of admissibility, it also could be a question of jurisdiction if an 
express time limit provision is provided under the title of jurisdiction.277 In the Mavromatis 
case, the PCIJ held the fulfillment of a prior diplomatic negotiation as a question of jurisdiction, 
whereas in other cases this was defined as an admissibility issue.278 
 
3. The Dual Jurisdiction System: Contentious Jurisdiction 
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275 Id. The US presented four preliminary objections in this case: the first through the third objections are related 
to temporal and subject-matter jurisdictional issues, while the fourth objection raised a question of admissibility 
— “exhaustion of international remedies in relation to private claims.” Id. 
276 Id. at 167. 
277 KOLB, supra note 255, at 167. 
278 Id. at 169. 
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The ICJ may settle “international disputes of legal nature that are submitted by States” 
arising out of a “disagreement between States on a question of law or fact, a conflict, or a clash 
of legal views or of interests.”279 In contentious proceedings, in which ICJ jurisdiction is based 
on the consent of the States, the Court is allowed to exercise its optional/voluntary jurisdiction 
grounded in the ICJ Statute and related legal principles. Additionally, there are some other 
methods and traditions conferring jurisdictional power upon the Court after a concrete case and 
controversy arises: ex post optional jurisdictions. First, as the ICJ Statute, Article 36, paragraph 
1 stipulates,280 States may conclude a bilateral or multilateral agreement for specific litigating 
purposes only. States would then submit notification of that special agreement to the Registry, 
providing the subjects of a dispute and State parties concerned.281 Second, even if the Court 
has neither subject-matter nor personal jurisdiction at the time of filing an application, the rule 
of forum prorogatum may provide the Court with a valid jurisdictional ground. For example, 
the Court may exercise its contentious jurisdictional authority in situations where litigating 
States have participated without raising any preliminary objections against the lack of 
jurisdiction.282 Based on the legal doctrine of implied acceptance, the rule may enable the Court 
to entertain a filed application immediately following the litigants’ subsequent acceptance of 
the Court’s jurisdiction, which the Court can infer from their words or conduct.283  
	
279 Contentious Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1 (emphasis added) (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
280 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 1, adopted on June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (entered 
into force Oct. 24, 1945) (providing that “the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer 
to it…”) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
281 Id. art. 40, para. 1; Rules of the International Court of Justice 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art. 39 [hereinafter ICJ 
Rule]. Submitting the notification of a special agreement as a way of instituting a contentious proceeding is 
exceptional because most of the contentious proceedings, so far, have been brought before the Court by filing an 
application instituting proceeding. See Basis of the Court’s Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=2 (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
282 Michael Waibel, Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, UNIV. CAMBRIDGE LEGAL STUDIES 
RES. PAPER SERIES, Feb. 2014, at 5. 
283  Basis of the Court’s Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=2 (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
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If a valid legal basis for the establishment of contentious jurisdiction has been 
determined before a dispute arises, the ICJ may have compulsory jurisdiction in the contentious 
proceeding.284 This type of jurisdiction is therefore ex ante in nature,285 and proceeding under 
this jurisdiction can begin when a “unilateral written application instituting proceedings”286 is 
filed. First, the Court exercises its compulsory jurisdiction on the basis of the ICJ Statute, 
Article 36, paragraph 1, which prescribes that “the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all 
matters specifically provided for in treaties and conventions in force.”287 A State’s application 
to institute this proceeding must contain basic information to meet procedural requirements, 
such as the issue in a dispute and the parties involved, 288  and the particular provisions 
establishing the jurisdiction that the applying State is relying on.289 
Second, the ICJ Statute also confers another basis of compulsory jurisdiction upon the 
ICJ—that a litigating State has already declared under an optional clause against an opposing 
litigant, who has also accepted the same obligation.290 At any time, a State may unconditionally 
declare its compulsory obligation ipso facto irrespective of any other State’s reciprocal 
acceptance of it.291 Having started with the written application, the Court operating under this 
jurisdiction can express its legal opinion on almost every sort of legal question. According to 
ICJ Statute, Article 36, paragraph 2, “the interpretation of a treaty, any question of international 
law, the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international 
	
284 Given that state consent is always required, the term “compulsory” does not necessarily mean that compulsory 
jurisdiction is consensual by nature. However, the term should rather be construed with regard to the scope and/or 
timing of consent, KOLB, supra note 255, at 188. 
285 See Waibel, supra note 283, at 5. 
286  Basis of the Court’s Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=2 (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
287 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 36, para. 1. 
288 Id. at art. 40, para. 1. 
289 ICJ Rule, supra note 282, at art. 38. 
290 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 36, para. 2—5. As of now, a total of 72 State parties to the ICJ Statute have 
made the declarations and they have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
291 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 36, para. 2, 3. 
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obligation, the nature and/or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an 
international obligation.”292 A State that recognizes compulsory jurisdiction under the optional 
clause may bring any legal dispute before the Court against any other State that has accepted 
the same obligation through an application instituting proceedings and vice versa. 
 
4. The Dual Jurisdiction System: Advisory Jurisdiction 
 
As a special procedure, international organs and agencies affiliated with the UN can 
request the ICJ’s advisory opinion on a specific legal question with respect to their activities 
or competencies.293 When it comes to the jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae 
of advisory proceeding, the UN Charter, Article 96 reads: 
 
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International 
Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. 
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may be so 
authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the 
Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.294 
 
 
However, both the UNGA and the UNSC may only ask the Court for an advisory opinion on 
particular types of legal questions, inasmuch as there is a general restriction imposed on the 
competence of the two organs in relation to this type of jurisdiction. For instance, the UNGA 
may request the Court’s legal advisory opinion insofar as a given concern falls into the material 
	
292 Id. at art. 36, para. 2. 
293 Organs and Agencies of the United Nations Authorized to Request Advisory Opinions, INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=2&p3=1 (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
However, the Court retains the “discretionary power” as to whether it responds to an advisory request. See KOLB, 
supra note 255, at 272—6; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, at 234—5 (July 8) (highlighting that “the Statute leaves a discretion as to whether or not it will give an 
advisory opinion that has been requested of it, once it has established its competence to do so.”); but cf. Judgments 
of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO in Complaints against UNESCO, 1956 I.C.J. 71 (Dec. 2) (holding that 
the Court must find “compelling reasons” in order to refuse an advisory request). 
294 U.N. Charter art. 96 (emphasis added). 
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sphere of the competence of the UNGA provided in the UN Charter, Article 10.295 Interestingly, 
although the UN Charter confers a relatively narrower competence upon the UNSC,296 it is 
equally competent with the UNGA in relation to the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the 
advisory proceeding by virtue of Article 96, paragraph 1. 
Albeit by more relaxed parameters, the ICJ must also establish its jurisdiction and 
demonstrate the admissibility of an advisory request in preference to rendering an advisory 
opinion. First, in order for the Court to have an advisory jurisdiction over a particular set of 
questions, a request must be submitted by “duly authorized organ[s], agencies, or entities”297 
empowered by the UN Charter or by a resolution of the UNGA. Accordingly, a State is not 
generally allowed to raise an objection against the Court’s exercise of advisory jurisdiction, 
even if the requested issue is in some way concerns international legal disputes. In an advisory 
proceeding, the Court is not being asked to direct the settlement of a dispute between States, 
but to express its non-binding but persuasive—and, sometimes, substantially authoritative—
judicial interpretation on particular legal or factual issues to assist a requesting organ or agency 
in dealing with said issues in accordance with international law.298 
Second, the ICJ only entertains its jurisdiction ratione materiae over a given question 
on the condition that the question is highly connected with activities or competence of 
requesting organs, agencies, or entities.299 For example, if an entity brings a question that is 
outside its competence, the request will certainly fail to invoke the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. 
While domestic judiciaries generally tend to refrain from entering partisan political 
	
295 KOLB, supra note 255, at 262—3. 
296 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1 (stipulating that “in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on 
their behalf.”) (emphasis added). 
297 KOLB, supra note 255, at 266 (citing U.N. Charter art. 96). 
298 KOLB, supra note 255, at. 269. 
299 Id. 
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controversies, the Court has no hesitation in confronting the political nature of a requested 
question or its expected political impact.300 
It is nonetheless plausible that the ICJ’s exercising of its advisory jurisdiction may be 
confronted based on the absence of the admissibility of a request. In practice, the grounds of 
inadmissibility have varied from case to case because there is no legal limit to raising an 
admissibility objection.301 Thus, the Court is obliged to examine a raised objection on a case-
by-case basis in conjunction with the merits of a requested question.302 However, it must be 
noted that the only admissibility objection accepted by the Court was based on the “non-
availability of essential factual information”303 in the Eastern Carelia case.  
Unless specifically agreed beforehand,304 no requesting organ, agency, or organization, 
or any State concerned is legally bound by the ICJ’s advisory opinion, since this is not a binding 
judgment of the Court with any operative force.305 Indeed, international organs and agencies 
generally have no obligation to resolve all kinds of disputes by complying with international 
law. Rather, they remain free to resolve in accordance with “equity or political consideration,” 
insofar as a “purely legal solution”306 is not specifically sought. Therefore, the requesting organ 
or agency may strive to attain a political compromise rather than adhere to the rendered 
advisory opinion on the pretext of seeking a more equitable solution. 
	
300 Id. at 267. 
301 See generally id. at 270—2 (providing a list of the admissibility objections raised in advisory proceedings).  
302 KOLB, supra note 255, at 272. 
303 Status of Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 28—9 (July 23) [hereinafter 
Eastern Carelia Case]. 
304  Advisory Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=2 (last visited Oct. 26, 2020) (presenting examples of the agreements 
where the Court’s advisory opinion may have a binding effect: the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities 
of the United Nations, the Convention on the Privileges and the Immunities of the specialized agencies of the 
United Nations, and the Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America). 
305 See Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion (First Phase), 
1950 I.C.J. 65, at 71 (Mar. 30) [hereinafter Peace Treaties Case, First Phase]; see also Applicability of Section 22 
of Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 
I.C.J. 177, at 188—9 (Dec. 15) [hereinafter Applicability Case]. 
306 GEORGES ABI-SAAB, LES EXCEPTIONS PRELIMINAIRES DANS LA PROCEDURE DE LA COUR INTERNATIONAL 75—
83 (1967), cited in KOLB, supra note 255, at 277—8. 
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Importantly, however, the ICJ’s advisory opinion does have a binding effect as to the 
“point of law,” hence the requesting organ or agency should invoke said opinion should it 
desire to settle the legal question in conformity with international law.307 Due to a lack of 
competence in construing and interpreting international law, organs and agencies cannot 
legitimately take a contradictory or an arbitrary legal position on a point of law once the Court 
has made a ruling.308 In other words, the authorized entities are strictly bound by the Court’s 
interpretation and application of legal documents.309 
Other than its substantial authority over construction and interpretation of the disputed 
point of international law, the ICJ’s advisory opinion may be effective and practical in various 
ways. Above all, it could have substantive political impact on the requesting organ/agency 
when choosing their next option.310 The Court has encouraged them to do so, stressing that it 
will ultimately help the development of “preventive diplomacy, peaceful international relations, 
and international law.”311 Besides, some international treaties and rules explicitly confer upon 
the Court a binding power to operate as a final decision-maker with respect to advisory 
opinions.312 Furthermore, in some rare circumstances, an advisory opinion may operate as a 
binding precedent with the effect of res judicata.  
 
C. Jurisdictional Components of the ICJ Contentious Proceeding 
	
307 KOLB, supra note 255, at 277. 
308 Id. at 278. 
309 Id. On the contrary, as the Member States can contest the Court’s interpretation of the UN Charter, this may 
lead to a new viewpoint of interpretation or even modification of the disputed provision. Id.  
310 Kolb specifically points out that the “obligations of good faith, mutual consideration, respect and cooperation 
between the UN organs under the UN Charter Article 2 Paragraph 2” give rise to this political practice of the 
organs. KOLB, supra note 255, at 276. 
311 Advisory Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=2 (last visited Oct. 26, 2020); see also KOLB, supra note 255, at 278—9 
(taking examples of advisory cases, such as Reparation (1949), Genocide (1951), Effects of Awards of 
Compensation (1954), and Namibia (1971), to underscore that the Court’s advisory opinions have helped the 
“development of the institutional law of the UN, treaty laws, etc. in significant ways). 
312 The UN Headquarters Agreement art. 8, sec. 21, June 26, 1947, 11 U.N.T.S. 147; Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies art. 9, sec. 32, Aug. 16, 1949, 33 U.N.T.S. 521. 
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1. Jurisdiction Ratione Personae (“Personal Jurisdiction”) 
 
According to the ICJ Statute, Article 34, paragraph 1, a sovereign State313 is the only 
claimant allowed to bring a contentious case before the ICJ and entitled to be a defendant. 
Unlike an advisory proceeding, therefore, international organizations are merely allowed to 
make informative statements in a contentious proceeding.314 Although private individuals are 
allowed to testify as witnesses, they are not permitted to be litigants. 
 There are two ways for a country to become eligible as a State party for the purpose of 
instituting a contentious proceeding. First, it can automatically become a party to the ICJ 
Statute by being admitted as a Member State of the UN.315 Second, on the recommendation of 
the UNSC, the UNGA may review certain conditions and requirements for a non-UN Member 
State to be an accepted State party to the ICJ Statute.316 As indicated, the role of the UNGA 
and the UNSC is therefore decisive in determining the sphere of the Court’s personal 
jurisdiction, considering that they have ultimate power when deciding UN membership,317 as 
well as setting threshold conditions and requirements on whether to admit a country as a party 
to the ICJ Statute.318 
 
2. Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae (“Subject-Matter/Material Jurisdiction”) 
	
313 Under international law, states are defined with the following elements: territory, population, government, and 
sovereignty. 
314 KOLB, supra note 255, at 178 
315 U.N. Charter art. 93, para. 1 (providing that “All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the 
Statutes of the International Court of Justice.”). 
316 Id. at art. 93, para. 2 (prescribing that “A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a 
party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”). 
317 U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 2 (stating that “The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations 
will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”). 
318 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 35, para. 3 (stipulating that “When a state which is not a Member of the 
United Nations is a party to a case, the Court shall fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the 
expense of the Court. This provision shall not apply if such state is bearing a share of the expenses of the Court.”). 
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For the ICJ to exercise its jurisdiction in a contentious proceeding, it must first identify 
the presence of an international dispute between opposing States.319 By definition, international 
dispute refers to a “disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of 
interests between two parties.”320 Even though the Court may allow the litigating State parties 
to present their views and opinions in determining an international dispute, its decision will 
always take precedence over them to ensure an objective determination as to whether a dispute 
exists between the parties.321 
More significantly, an international dispute brought before the ICJ under a contentious 
jurisdiction must be concerned with a litigable controversy in which the Court would suggest 
any substantial legal solution based on international law. If one party to the dispute alleges any 
violation of its right or privilege by its opponent, or alleges the opponent’s breach of duty owed, 
it can be said that the disputing State’s allegation is validly grounded in the subjective 
formulation of a legal claim.322 In other words, to be contemplated by the Court, an original 
claim, counter-claim, remedy, or defense must have its legal basis in international law.323 Thus, 
disputes involving diplomatic, historical, social, or political matters are not legally litigable in 
principle. However, given that an international dispute normally consists of diversified 
elements, a non-litigable dispute may be legally reformulated in appropriate legal terms.324 
 In rendering its decision, the ICJ must apply recognized principles and rules of 
international law.325 With respect to the Court’s subject-matter/material jurisdiction, the ICJ 
Statute, Article 38 provides the applicable legal sources, stating that “the Court, whose function 
	
319 See KOLB, supra note 255, at 180—2. 
320 Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 11 (Aug. 30). 
321 KOLB, supra note 255, at 181. 
322 Id. at 182. 
323 Id. 
324 See id. at 183. 
325 Id. at 183—4. 
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is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply 
international conventions…international custom…the general principles of international 
law…and judicial decisions and the teachings….”326 In addition to the sources listed, however, 
a contesting State may invoke a special set of rules contained in a valid bilateral or multilateral 
agreement for the Court to consider in its deliberations.327 Furthermore, the Court may take 
some domestic materials into account as part of the applicable sources insofar as the Court 
finds them supplementary as well as legally effective.328 Nonetheless, it must be noted that a 
litigating State cannot direct the Court to apply a specific legal source, even in a case where its 
jurisdictional authority has been upheld by State consensus. For example, the consensual 
character of an international legal dispute can never be a basis for a litigant to override the 
Court’s subject-matter/material jurisdiction in a contentious proceeding.329 
 
3. Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis (“Temporal Jurisdiction”) 
 
The jurisdiction of most international courts and tribunals is limited by the doctrine of 
temporal jurisdiction, “conferring the power to adjudicate upon the Courts only with regard to 
certain facts or legal claims that have occurred or have been consolidated before/after certain 
dates.” 330  By preventing international courts from ruling on past and future events, this 
jurisdictional limit is basically designed to guarantee the predictability of international 
adjudications.331 As opposed to the ad hoc international tribunals affiliated with the UN and 
	
326 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 38 (citation omitted). 
327 KOLB, supra note 255, at 184 (citing ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 36, art. 38, para. 1(a)). 
328 KOLB, supra note 255, at 184 (citing Serbian Loans, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20 (July 12); Brazilian Loans, 
1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 21 (July 12)). 
329 KOLB, supra note 255, at 184. 
330 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 792 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2013) 
(alteration in original). 
331 Id. 
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the ICC,332 however, the ICJ is not especially restricted by the doctrine since the ICJ Statute 
stipulates no such restrictive provision as to the range of its temporal jurisdiction. In practice, 
the Court’s jurisdiction will be limited if States that are party to certain types of international 
legal instruments explicitly designate the specific boundary of their consent to the 
jurisdiction.333  
 




 The consensual/consent-based jurisdiction is the most fundamental basis of state 
consent in the ICJ proceedings—i.e., the international judicial bodies are entitled to review 
issues only where both contesting and defending States have consented to the exercise of their 
jurisdictional power.334 This is absolutely necessary for the operation of international courts 
and tribunals. Technically speaking, the Court does not express its judicial opinion in the 
absence of state consent to the exercise of its jurisdiction.335 However, since the Court does not 
raise an issue of state consent ex officio, a State must raise a preliminary objection against the 
Court’s jurisdiction over a case at hand to avoid the presumption of consent under the rule of 
	
332  Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, art. 1 (Nov. 8, 1994) 
(authorizing the ICTR to review only cases involving crimes which allegedly occurred in 1994); Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, art. 1 (May 25, 1993) (limiting 
the ICTY’s temporal jurisdiction with cases involving crimes which allegedly occurred in 1991); but see Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 11, adopted on July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force 
July 1, 2002) (providing the ICC with a temporal jurisdiction that covers only crimes which have occurred after 
July 1, 2002, i.e., the date of entry into force, or any later date in which jurisdiction over the crime was established, 
e.g., the date of entry into force for new ratifying state parties) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
333  THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION, supra note 331, at 792 (citing European 
Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes art. 27, June 29, 1957, E.T.S. 23). 
334 KOLB, supra note 255, at 185. 
335 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, at 101 (June 30). 
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forum prorogatum.336 Considering that a State gives its consent to the Court’s jurisdiction 
through additional channels, it is by nature an extraordinary and case-specific special 
consent.337 Therefore, neither ratification of the ICJ Statute nor participation in it should be 
automatically deemed a blanket acceptance of jurisdiction over all types of cases brought 
before it. 
 
b. Establishing Ex Ante Compulsory Jurisdiction by Adopting a Compromissory Clause 
 
 In principle, the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ may be established on the basis of 
the state consent given before a particular dispute arises; i.e., it is thus ex ante by nature. By 
consenting to the Court’s jurisdiction in advance in either a compromissory clause or optional 
clause, a State will be subject to it in any future dispute arising from its relationship with 
another State or States. However, to prevent exposure to an unexpected lawsuit, many State 
parties also adopt a reservation clause limiting the sphere of compulsory jurisdiction. 
 By inserting a compromissory clause into an agreement or a treaty, a State may confer 
compulsory jurisdiction over the interpretation or application of the agreement or treaty on the 
ICJ.338 Under certain conditions provided by the legal text, the Court may rule on any subject-
matter insofar as it is related to its interpretation and application. However, compulsory 
jurisdiction established by the compromissory clause is essentially specific, being confined to 
matters regarding the interpretation and application of that specific agreement or treaty only.339 
 
	
336 KOLB, supra note 255, at 186—7 (pointing out that the Court may raise an issue of the absence of state consent 
on its own initiative in order to ensure the proper administration of justice). 
337 Id. at 187. 
338 See, e.g., General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1928, Sep. 26, 1928, 71 U.N.T.C. 
912; Inter-American Treaty on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.C. 449; European 
Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 29, 1957, 320 U.N.T.C. 4646; Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 9, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021. 
339 KOLB, supra note 255, at 189. 
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c. Establishing Ex Ante Compulsory Jurisdiction by the Declaration of the Optional 
Clause 
 
 Prior to the emergence of an actual dispute, any State party to the ICJ Statute may 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ by unilaterally declaring the optional clause embodied in the 
ICJ Statute.340 Therefore, it is ex ante jurisdiction by its nature. Once compulsory jurisdiction 
has been established by the declaration, the declaring State may at any time institute a 
proceeding before the Court against any other State party that has made the same declaration. 
For the Court to exercise such jurisdiction, both State parties’ declarations must be concurrent 
at the time of institution. Since the ICJ Statute does not specifically mandate State parties to 
declare the optional clause, compulsory jurisdiction may only be established for those State 
parties that have accepted it in advance. However, the optional clause mechanism is reserved 
for State that are parties to the ICJ Statute, so a non-party State is not subject to that compulsory 
jurisdiction established. Currently, there are 72 declarations that have been deposited and filed 
with the Secretary-General of the UN.341 
By including a single reservation or a series of reservations in the declaration of the 
optional clause, a State is able to limit the scope of the accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ. In so doing, the reserving State may exclude sensitive or inappropriate issues from being 
automatically adjudicated by the Court.342 Under the optional clause system, the declaration 
with reservation may limit the Court’s temporal, personal, and subject-matter/material 
jurisdiction. For instance, even though a State has accepted compulsory jurisdiction through 
	
340 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 36, § 2 (stipulating that “the State parties to the present Statute may at any 
time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other 
State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes.”). 
341 Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). 
342 KOLB, supra note 255, at 191. 
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the optional declaration, it may exclude in advance an issue of armed conflict from being 
decided by the Court.343  
 At the preliminary stage, if a claim is brought against a State declaring the optional 
clause with reservations, it may raise the relevant reservation in its own defense. So long as the 
ICJ finds that the conditions set out in the ICJ Statute, Article 36, paragraph 6 are met, a 
preliminary objection based on the reservation will cause the Court to declare that it lacks 
jurisdiction in the case at hand.344 However, the Court will not raise this issue on behalf of the 
State that benefits from the reservation. If the State does not raise this objection in defense of 
itself, this will constitute a waiver, thereby establishing the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction 
over the case. 345  For example, in Fisheries Jurisdiction, the Court held that it lacked 
jurisdiction over Spain’s claim to seek the release of its fishing vessels arrested by the Canadian 
authority, inasmuch as it upheld Canada’s preliminary objection based on its reservation: “Any 
dispute arising out of or concerning conservation and management measures taken by Canada 
with respect to vessels fishing in the NAFTO Regulatory Area shall not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”346  
 Notably, the ICJ has upheld the defending State’s offensive use of such reservations 
based on the notion of “equality and reciprocity.”347 Under the optional clause system, a State 
declaring the optional clause without making any reservations may avail itself of a claiming 
State’s reservation, if relevant, to obtain a dismissal. In other words, a State may raise its 
opponent’s reservation for its own benefit in order to defeat the establishment of compulsory 
jurisdiction. In Norwegian Loans, for example, Norway invoked France’s reservation of 
domestic jurisdiction as a shield to prevent the Court from adjudicating the French claim.348 
	
343 See id. 
344 Id. at 192. 
345 Id.  
346 Id. (quoting Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4)) (alteration in original). 
347 KOLB, supra note 255, at 192. 
348 Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6), cited in id. at 193. 
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Among the declaring States with reservations, some have declared their reservations as 
“automatic or self-judging,” meaning that they retain the right, and some use the subjective 
standard to determine whether a particular case falls within the scope of the reservations. For 
example, a declaring State may reserve its right to determine whether disputes of domestic 
nature are excluded from ICJ jurisdiction.349 However, this automatic/self-judging reservation 
is often criticized since it does not impose any obligation on the reserving State to be bound by 
the optional declaration.350 In other words, the reserving State has merely given its limited 
consent to the establishment of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Thus, based on its own 
judgment on the nature of the case, that State would decide whether to raise its reservation to 
defeat the jurisdiction.351 In this regard, this special form of reservation is often criticized for 
its inconsistency with the object and purpose of the optional clause system represented by the 
ICJ Statute, Article 36, paragraphs 2 and 6.352 
In principle, an optional declaration becomes effective from the moment it is filed with 
the Secretary-General, and any reservation made in tandem with such a declaration cannot have 
a retroactive effect to later defeat ICJ jurisdiction established under the optional clause system. 
Due to the instantaneous effect of the declaration, any declaring State may be exposed to a 
claim against it even before it has any knowledge of a claiming State’s deposition of its 
declaration. 353  Therefore, in order to protect themselves, some declaring States with 
reservations have used the optional clause mechanism to limit the temporal jurisdiction of the 
Court.354 Once a claimant has properly instituted a case, however, no reserving State can raise 
	
349 KOLB, supra note 255, at 194 (mentioning the optional declaration of Malawi as an example). 
350 Id.  
351 Id. 
352 Id (arguing in particular that the ICJ Statute Article 36, paragraph 6 reserves the right to decide e jurisdiction 
to the Court itself). 
353 Id (citing Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Preliminary Objections, 1957 I.C.J. 125 (Nov. 
26) (Portugal initiated the proceeding against India only three days after its deposition of the optional declaration 
and even before India received any notification of the deposition). See also Territorial and Maritime Boundary 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 291 (June 11). 
354 KOLB, supra note 255, at 195 (quoting the Australian Declaration made in 2002 as an example). 
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any reservation to reject jurisdiction. A reservation may only be invoked to prevent the Court 
from proceeding on the merits in a future lawsuit.355 Under the optional clause system, a 
reserving State may not be able to defend itself from a surprise action by another State that has 
declared the optional clause for the purpose of instituting proceedings against the defendant. 
Thus, a reservation limiting the temporal jurisdiction may be the only shield for the defending 
State to defeat such surprise action. 
 Considering the ICJ’s practices, it is possible for the declaring States to withdraw from 
their obligations, although no requirement for a notice period has yet been recommended. 
Therefore, under the current law of the Court, a declaration may be renounced, provided a fixed 
period of time for withdrawal is given and adhered to. This is allowed even if this practice runs 
contrary to the immediate effect of the declaration, as well as the purpose of the optional clause 
system stipulated in the ICJ Statute, Article 36, paragraph 2.356 In other words, a declaring State 
may in theory withdraw its binding obligation under the optional clause system at any time in 
anticipation of a claim against it. In cases where the declarants had not provided any fixed 
period for the notice requirement, the Court held that such withdrawal would take place after a 
“reasonable time” had passed as was standard practice357 in renunciation of an international 
treaty.358 However, declarants should not abuse the Court’s allowance of such withdrawal or 
unilateral denunciation to manipulate the purpose of the optional clause system, which was 
originally designed to reinforce the binding effect of such declarations.359  Accordingly, a 
declaring State cannot withdraw its declaration of obligation after the Court’s proceedings have 
	
355 Id. at 191—2. 
356 KOLB, supra note 255, at 196. 
357 See Territorial and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 291 (June 
11). 
358 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 204, at art. 56. 
359 KOLB, supra note 255, at 196. 
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properly commenced, inasmuch as the establishment of jurisdiction is a matter to be decided 
at the time a case is filed.360 
 
d. Establishing Ex Post Optional/Voluntary Jurisdiction by Concluding a Special 
Agreement 
 
ICJ jurisdiction may be established if a State gives its consent after the formation of a 
concrete dispute: ex post optional/voluntary jurisdiction. The scope of the state consent 
required for this jurisdiction is much narrower since a State specifically agrees to the Court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction only in relation to that particular dispute. The sphere of jurisdiction, 
therefore, should not be arbitrarily extended beyond the scope of the consent given.361 Indeed, 
a State has more discretion and opportunity to consider surrounding legal or political issues, 
e.g., a claimant, an obligation, the respective position of each party, prior efforts for negotiated 
settlement, anticipated legal outcome, and potential risk,362 when determining whether to give 
its consent. In contrast with the case of compulsory jurisdiction, this ex post optional/voluntary 
jurisdiction leaves a State at liberty to choose between accepting this jurisdiction and refraining 
from doing so. 
After a dispute has arisen, State parties to the ICJ Statute in dispute may specifically 
agree to submit it to the ICJ, thereby accepting optional jurisdiction by concluding a special 
agreement or treaty. 363  Although this specific form of international legal document is 
universally required, governments of disputing States may also take more informal 
	
360 KOLB, supra note 255, at 196 (citing Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Preliminary 
Objections, 1957 I.C.J. 125, at 142 (Nov. 26)). 
361 Id. at 187—8. 
362 Id. at 188. 
363 E.g., Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, supra note 117, at 49—53. 
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governmental actions, such as a joint press communiqué signed by their foreign ministers364 or 
the signed minutes of a negotiation,365 with the intent of establishing this type of optional 
jurisdiction. In cases established under this jurisdiction, the Court will not simply dismiss an 
applying State’s general and abstract formulation of its legal claim—which is not sufficiently 
supported by established rules and principles of law—in the hopes of promoting compromise 
over an international dispute.366 Therefore, albeit insufficiently constructed, the Court will 
accept the application and proceed to determine the applicable law. Nonetheless, the State is 
still required to formulate a diligent contention to avoid being rejected by the Court and to 
follow the generally applicable rule relating to the burden of proof.367 Moreover, it is still 
possible for applying States to highlight certain applicable laws in their special agreement or 
treaty.368 
 
e. Establishing Ex Post Optional/Voluntary Jurisdiction by the Doctrine of Forum 
Prorogatum 
 
 In the absence of any prior consent to the ICJ jurisdiction, the doctrine of forum 
prorogatum may be used to confer judicial power upon the Court in situations where a 
defending State has expressly or even implicitly given its consent in response to a claiming 
State’s unilateral application. Although neither the ICJ Statute nor the Rules provide any 
explicit basis of this doctrine, it has been developed as an important part of the Court’s 
	
364 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Interim Protection, Order of 11 September 1976 (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 
3, ¶¶ 107—8 (holding that the Brussels Communiqué, the alleged basis of jurisdiction relied on by Greece, did 
not amount to an “immediate and unqualified commitment” on the part of both Greece and Turkey to accept the 
optional jurisdiction of the Court.). 
365 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
(Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 112, ¶¶ 25—9, 30—42. 
366 KOLB, supra note 255, at 197—8. To some extent, this joint submission system has caused a blurred distinction 
between a claimant and a defendant in each case relied on the special agreement jurisdiction. 
367 Id. at 198. 
368 Id. at 197. 
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expansion of its jurisdictional reach. Notwithstanding the absence of ex ante consent, the 
doctrine leaves open the possibility for the Court to exercise its jurisdictional authority in 
conjunction with the fundamental principle of consensual/consent-based jurisdiction employed 
in international judicial proceedings. In multiple precedents, it has been established that the 
supplementary nature of the principle not only confers judicial power on the Court in a case of 
non-existing jurisdiction, but also “subsequently enlarges a pre-existing defective or narrowly 
confined title of jurisdiction.”369 Therefore, the jurisdiction established by the doctrine is by 
nature an ex post optional/voluntary jurisdiction since it is formed after a specific dispute has 
arisen and after an application has been filed. Once jurisdiction has been established based on 
the presence of ex post consent on the part of a defending State, neither of the disputing parties 
are allowed to withdraw or unilaterally denounce the jurisdiction. 
 First, under the principle, the jurisdiction of the ICJ may be established when there is 
an “express but informal consent” on the part of a defending State.370 Since its inception, the 
Court has deemed several types of state actions constituting an “express but informal consent” 
acceptance of its jurisdiction. In Corfu Channel, for instance, the Court upheld that the highest 
level of international authority of a State, such as the Head of State, may have the power to 
voluntarily consent to the establishment of the ex post optional/voluntary jurisdiction even 
without any explicit legal basis in the ICJ Statute.371 In Corfu Channel, when the British 
government unilaterally instituted a proceeding before the Court upon the recommendation of 
the Security Council urging a peaceful resolution of the dispute, the Albanian government at 
first contested the jurisdiction, arguing that both governments had never reached any special 
agreement in conformity with the ICJ Statute, Article 36, paragraph 1 and Article 40, paragraph 
1.372 Moreover, Albania contended that being a UN Member State should not be automatically 
	
369 KOLB, supra note 255, at 200. 
370 Id. at 198. 
371 See Corfu Channel (Alb. v. U.K.), Preliminary Objection, 1948 I.C.J. 15, at 27. 
372 Id. at 21. 
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understood as an acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.373 Nevertheless, the majority of judges 
affirmed that Albania had voluntarily consented to the establishment of jurisdiction on the basis 
of the United Kingdom’s transmission to Albania as well as Albania’s response letter written 
to the Court.374 In Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Court also 
upheld a means to establish its ex post optional/voluntary jurisdiction when Djibouti 
unilaterally initiated a proceeding while admitting the lack of basis of the Court’s jurisdiction 
and simultaneously inviting France to give its consent to the proceeding.375 In this case, the 
Court found its jurisdiction was established based on the French government’s later consent. 
 Second, under the doctrine of forum prorogatum, the Court will establish its jurisdiction 
if an implied consent could be inferred by the act of a defending State. For example, if a 
defending State is “voluntarily proceeding on the merits without raising any preliminary 
objection,”376 or is “tacitly accepting the competence of the Court while expressly indicating 
an intention to contest it,” that is a contradiction.377 Throughout the proceedings of Rights of 
Minorities in Upper Silesia, the PCIJ upheld a tacit enlargement of the scope of its jurisdiction 
since Poland proceeded on the merits without raising any preliminary objection against 
Germany’s claim, thus expanding the jurisdictional scope.378 However, the Court needs to 
carefully examine and construe the intention, purpose, general direction, and relevance of 
procedural actions taken by the responding State rather than simply applying the doctrine 
through inference.379 In other words, if a State simply argues to negate the jurisdictional basis 
of a claim as part of its defense plan, the Court should not infer such intent as a way to establish 
forum prorogatum jurisdiction.380  Through this approach in Anglo-Iranian Oil, the Court 
	
373 Id. at 21—2. 
374 Id. at 27—9. 
375 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. 179, cited in KOLB, 
supra note 255, at 199. 
376 KOLB, supra note 255, at 198—9. 
377 Id. 
378 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 15 (Apr. 26). 
379 KOLB, supra note 255, at 200—1. 
380 Id. 201. 
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rejected the British argument that the Iranian preliminary objection against the admissibility of 
the British claim was ipso facto based on its implicit acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction in 
terms of the doctrine. 381  Rather, the Court held that Iran’s preliminary objection against 
admissibility should not be interpreted as voluntary and indisputable consent to the Court’s 
jurisdiction since it raised the objection as part of its defense measures and consistently 
challenged jurisdiction. 382  The Court’s position on the interpretation of an “unequivocal 
indication of a voluntary and disputable acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction” 383  was 
reaffirmed in Case Concerning Application of the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
 
D. The ICJ Advisory Jurisdiction for International Disputes Involving Legal 
Questions 
 
1. Commencing Advisory Proceeding 
 
In addition to establishing consensual/consent-based contentious jurisdiction,384  the 
Court may give its non-binding advisory opinion upon the request of the authorized 
international organizations and specialized agencies. These entities must be authorized by the 
	
381 Anglo-Iranian Oil (U.K. v. Iran), Preliminary Objections, 1952 I.C.J. 93, at 101 (July 22). In its preliminary 
objections, Iran also contested the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the claim. The UK asserted this on 
the basis that the admissibility issue should not be determined without establishing the Court’s jurisdiction as 
priority. 
382 Id. at 114. However, the Court admitted that governmental consent might be presumed on the basis of the 
forum prorogatum doctrine by looking to its conduct or statements involving an “element of consent.” Id. 
383  Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 419 (Apr. 8) (holding that “Yugoslavia’s overall conduct showed it 
had constantly disputed the Court’s jurisdiction and therefore its communication, including provisional measures 
against Bosnia, cannot, even prima facie, be interpreted as an ‘unequivocal indication of a voluntary and 
indisputable acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.’”) (alteration in original), cited in KOLB, supra note 255, at 
202. 
384 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 36, para. 1 (providing that “the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases 
which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties 
or conventions in force.”). 
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UNGA with respect to specific questions of law under the ICJ Statute, Article 65, paragraph 1 
in conjunction with the UN Charter, Article 96.385 However, on the basis of the principle of 
compétence de la competence, a situation can arise where the Court decides not to proceed with 
the request. In other words, even in the absence of any interested party’s objections against 
advisory jurisdiction, the Court may still refrain from giving its advisory opinion due to a lack 
of personal jurisdiction and/or subject-matter/material jurisdiction.386 Moreover, as will be 
discussed below, the Court has drawn an obvious line between a request from the political 
organs of the UN and a request from other specialized agencies authorized by the UNGA. 
Specifically, the Court has interpreted the purposes and functions of the requesting specialized 
agencies very narrowly, being more “restrictive and cautious” so as to establish its advisory 
jurisdiction.387 Conversely, the Court has been quite liberal in allowing other political organs 
of the UN to request an advisory opinion.388  
 
2. Personal Jurisdiction in Advisory Proceeding 
 
After either an organ or agency has filed an advisory request with the ICJ, the Court 
must decide its jurisdictional scope and competence in relation to such a request, examining 
the requesting body’s standing as a precondition, i.e., personal jurisdiction.389 According to the 
UN Charter, Article 96, paragraph 1, only the UNGA and the UNSC are entitled to exercise an 
“original right” to make a request an advisory opinion on “any legal question.”390 With respect 
	
385 Id. at art. 65, para 1 (providing that “the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the 
request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make 
such a request.”). 
386 See ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 36, para. 6 (providing that “in the event of a dispute as to whether the 
Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.”), cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 
241, at 37—8. 
387 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 38. 
388 Id. 
389 See Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Pleadings, 
1982 I.C.J. 325, at 333—4; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 294, at 232. 
390 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 40. 
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to this original right, international legal scholars and experts offer a variety of opinions. For 
example, Judge Schwebel focuses on the permissive wording of the term to assert that the 
UNGA may request an advisory opinion on an international legal question arising from 
domestic judicial proceedings, hence serving as a “conduit” for national courts. 391  This 
broadened interpretation of the words “any legal question” seems to originate from the 
extensive powers of the UNGA and the UNSC provided in Chapter IV of the UN Charter.392 
By contrast, Rosenne and Kelsen disagree with such a broad interpretation of the term, arguing 
that both the UNGA and the UNSC must request an advisory opinion within the scope of their 
activities as determined by the relevant legal instrument institution—the UN Charter, Article 
96.393 In line with this, Judge Higgins also emphasizes the strong connection between request 
and activities, citing the recent practice of the UNGA in Alvarez-Machain Case.394 
In response to several ultra vires objections to the personal jurisdiction over UN 
organizations, 395  the Court has rendered a relatively broad interpretation regarding their 
competence and activities in light of advisory proceeding. In Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“Israeli Wall Case”), the Court 
differentiated a request for an advisory opinion from a recommendation for a dispute or 
situation stated in the UN Charter, Article 12, paragraph 1.396 Therefore, the Court held that 
the UNGA’s request was consistent with the article, notwithstanding Israel’s ultra vires 
	
391 Stephen Schwebel, Relations between the International Court of Justice and the United Nations, in JUSTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL 18—9 (1994). 
392 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 41. 
393 Id. at 40—1. Kelsen further argued that the phrase “arising within the scope of their activities” in the UN 
Charter, Article 96(2) is not necessary because Article 96(1) the Court does not seem to be drafted to enlarge the 
scope of the activities of the UNGA and the UNSC. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 546 (1951). 
394 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 41. 
395 The ultra vires objection refers to a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction ratione personae, claiming that 
the requesting organ does not possess competence to request an advisory opinion “as it acted ultra vires in making 
the request.” ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 41. 
396 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
2004 I.C.J. 136, at ¶ 25 [hereinafter Israeli Wall Case]. 
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objection and the UNSC’s active engagement in the event. 397  In Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties Case (First and Second Phase, collectively “Peace Treaties Case”), the Court also 
rejected the ultra vires objection, stating that “clarifying the applicability of the procedure for 
dispute settlement provided for in the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania is 
a question of international law laying within the Court’s jurisdiction.”398 Moreover, in Certain 
Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) Case (“Expenses 
Case”), when the former Soviet Union and France invoked ultra vires to contest the UNGA’s 
decision to establish peace-keeping operations, the Court clarified the presumption: “When the 
Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the 
fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that such 
action is not ultra vires the Organization.”399 In 1971 Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970) Case (“Namibia Case”), the Court consistently upheld that “a resolution of a UN’s 
properly constituted organ which is passed in accordance with that organ’s rules of procedure, 
and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presumed to have been validly 
adopted.”400 In spite of the ultra vires objections raised, the Court’s jurisprudence clearly 
indicates that, as long as there is no compelling reason to refuse, the Court will entertain a 
request for an advisory opinion.401 As the Court has clarified in Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons Case, this wide discretion of the Court is grounded upon multiple 
	
397 Id. at ¶¶ 26—8. 
398 Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 70—1 (alteration in original). 
399 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 
151, at 168 (alteration in original) [hereinafter Expenses Case]. 
400 1971 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Case, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, at 22 [hereinafter Namibia Case], 
cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 44. 
401 See also Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organisations, in CAMBRIDGE 
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD MCNAIR 100 (1965), cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra 
note 241, at 45. 
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provisions in the UN Charter; e.g., Article 10,402 Article 11, paragraph 1,403 and Article 13, 
paragraph 1.404 
Under the ICJ advisory jurisdiction, UN organs and specialized agencies affiliated with 
the UN may also seek the Court’s advisory opinion. This is the so-called “Derivative Right.” 
It is derivative since it is required to have an authorization from the UNGA, which has the 
power to authorize other organs or specialized agencies with respect to a “legal question arising 
within the scope of their activities.”405 Although this authorization is subject to the unilateral 
revocation by the UNGA, the authorized organs or agencies are generally allowed to request 
an advisory opinion “within the scope of the activities” or relating to “legal questions arising 
from a concerned convention.”406 In other words, as long as the authorization is given to either 
organs or agencies, their derivative right to make such a request is not confined to a particular 
case at hand. Rather, the right can be exercised broadly. 
Throughout the decades of the ICJ system, several organs of the UN and specialized 
agencies have been authorized to request an advisory opinion for the purpose of resolving 
international disputes and conflicts. As the practice of the UNGA has confirmed, the term 
“authorized organs” embraces both the principal and subsidiary entities in the sphere of “other 
organs of the UN” under the UN Charter, Article 96, paragraph 2.407 Above all, in relation to 
the settlement of international disputes, withholding authorization from the UN Secretary-
	
402 U.N. Charter art. 10 (providing that “The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within 
the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided in the present 
Charter….”). 
403 U.N. Charter art. 11, para.1 (providing that “The General Assembly may consider the general principles of 
cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles of governing 
disarmament and the regulation of armament….”). 
404  U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1 (providing that “The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of…encouraging the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”). 
405 U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2. 
406 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 45. 
407 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 46. There are two subsidiary organs that have been authorized by the General 
Assembly to seek an advisory opinion: The Interim Committee of the General Assembly and the Committee for 
Applications for Review of Judgments of the Administrative Tribunals. 
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General (“UNSG”) is a controversial issue.408 Indeed, international scholars and experts debate 
whether the UNSG is legally permitted to make a request on any legal question within the 
boundary of his/her activities. Within the scope of the UNSG’s administrative and political 
functions, the majority admits the necessity of such permission to authorize him/her to seek an 
advisory opinion from the Court on the basis of a liberal interpretation of the UN Charter, 
Articles 98 and 99.409 However, others refute this idea, contending that authorizing the UNSG 
might give rise to an intensified conflict of power with the UNGA or the UNSC.410 Furthermore, 
some even argue that allowing the UNSG to utilize the Court’s opinion is inconsistent with the 
spirit of the UN Charter, which restricts his/her autonomy vis-à-vis the UNGA or the UNSC, 
over-strengthening his/her political influence.411 Nevertheless, by reading the UN Charter, 
Article 96, paragraph 2 in context, the proper interpretation is that the UNSG may be legally 
authorized by the UNGA inasmuch as he/she is certainly one of the principal organs affiliated 
with the UN. Indeed, the UNSG has on occasion made several attempts to obtain the 
authorization from the UNGA: e.g., the Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace 
Making, and Peace Keeping.412 However, it is always possible that the UNSG may make such 
requests by taking a detour in cooperation with the UNGA or the UNSC without mentioning 
any specific case or issue. 
	
408 The Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council were authorized to request an advisory opinion 
in 1946 and in 1947, respectively. 
409  See e.g., Paul Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 531—2 (L. Gross ed. 1976); MOHAMED BEDJAOUI, THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL: TESTING THE LEGALITY OF ITS ACTS 78 (1994), cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 
241, at 50. 
410 BEDJAOUI, supra note 410, at 78; Derek Bowett, The Court’s Role in Relation to International Organizations, 
in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 187—
8 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice ed., 1996), cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 51. 
411 BEDJAOUI, supra note 410, at 78. 
412 U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: Rep. 
of the Secretary-General, 14, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/2411 (June 17, 1992) (claiming that “I recommend that the 
Secretary-General be authorized, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, to take advantage of the 
advisory competence of the Court.”). 
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As long as a particular legal question, which arises within the sphere of activities of the 
authorized specialized agencies, is related to a particular international legal dispute, it is also 
possible that one of the agencies would seek the ICJ’s advisory opinion on that issue. Currently, 
16 specialized agencies, 413  defined as “international organizations of limited competence 
linked to the UN by special agreements under Articles 57, paragraph 1 and 63 of the UN 
Charter,”414 have been authorized to ask the Court’s advisory opinion. Although each agency 
has the power to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction in the first place,415 the Court will 
ultimately decide whether the requested subject-matter falls within the scope of the activities 
and competence of that particular agency.416 However, as indicated in Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case (“WHO Nuclear Weapons Case”), the Court 
is reluctant to give a broad interpretation of the scope and competence of a specialized agency. 
In other words, in response to objections against the World Health Organization (“WHO”), 
which had requested an advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, the 
Court found that the request was beyond WHO’s scope of activities and competence, relying 
on the doctrine of ultra vires.417 In this case, moreover, the Court suggested a guideline to 
determine the scope of activities and competence of an international organization in relation to 
requesting an advisory opinion from the Court. First, the relevant rules of that organization, 
	
413 According to ICJ Yearbook 1990-1991, the list of the authorized agencies is as follows: International Labor 
Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Development 
Association (IDA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
414 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 51—2. 
415 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, at 82 
(stating that “each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.”) [hereinafter WHO 
Nuclear Weapons Case]. 
416 JO N PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 40 
(2003), cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 52. 
417 WHO Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 416, at 74, 82 (ruling that “…the mere fact that a majority of States, 
in voting on a resolution, have complied with all the relevant rules of form cannot in itself suffice to remedy any 
fundamental defects, such as acting ultra vires, with which the resolution might be afflicted.”). 
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e.g., the constitution, must be the starting point in preference to the determination.418 Second, 
as governed by the “principle of specialty,” every international organization is allowed to have 
a limited competence rather than a general competence, which only States possess. 419 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the “doctrine of implied powers” allows an assumption of 
competence for a particular organization where a constituting legal instrument of that 
organization does not provide any express provision for such competence.420  
 
3. Subject-Matter/Material Jurisdiction in Advisory Proceeding 
 
The UN Charter, Article 96 in conjunction with the ICJ Statute, Article 65, states that, 
for the establishment of subject-matter/material jurisdiction in advisory proceeding, the next 
condition is that a requested question must be concerned with legal controversies arising within 
the scope of the activities of the organ or agency. If the legal character of the question raised 
by an organ or an agency is not certain, the Court may reject that request based on the lack of 
subject-matter/material jurisdiction. In Western Sahara, the Court defined the subject-
matter/material jurisdiction in light of its advisory proceeding: “legal questions are framed in 
terms of law and raising problems of international law…are by their very nature susceptible of 
a reply based on law…and appear…to be questions of a legal character.”421 More importantly, 
in Expenses Case, the Court made clear that it must refuse to give an advisory opinion in cases 
where the question does not pertain to a legal issue.422 However, it is obvious from those 
	
418 Id. at 74—5 (referring to 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 204, art. 31). 
419 Id. at 78. 
420 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 55. 
421 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, at 18—9 (Oct. 15, 1975), cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 
241, at 39 [hereinafter Western Sahara Case]; see also Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 117 (separate 
opinion of Judge Dillard) (defining that “…the notion that a legal question is simply one that invites an answer 
‘based on law’ appears to be question-begging and it derives no added authority by virtue of being frequently 
repeated.”). In some other cases, the Court had a chance to examine the legal nature of the questions raised. See 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 233—4; WHO Nuclear 
Weapons Case, supra note 416, at 71—2. 
422 Expenses Case, supra note 400, at 155. 
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precedents that the Court will still respond to certain legal questions even if they include 
political and factual issues, or even if that question is equivocally drafted as to its legal 
character.423 However, the precedents of the PCIJ424 raise the issue as to whether the Court has 
subject-matter/material jurisdiction, not only over a legal question, but also a legal dispute. 
Nonetheless, despite the restrictive use of the term “legal question,” the Court has broadly 
interpreted its subject-matter/material jurisdiction as encompassing both “legal question” and 
“legal dispute”. In this sense, UN organs or agencies may request an advisory opinion on a 
particular “legal dispute” between two or more States or between a State and organizations 
once said opinion deals with a legal question pertaining to the interests of the UN.425  
Even if a question is properly brought before the ICJ, an objection to subject-
matter/material jurisdiction in advisory proceeding may be raised at any time to try and prevent 
the Court from exercising advisory jurisdiction. First, the Court’s jurisdiction may not be 
established over a particular legal question if it might risk “politicizing the Court.” 426 
Accordingly, the Court will disregard the “political nature of the motives inspiring the request 
for an advisory opinion and the political implications” 427  in establishing its subject-
matter/material jurisdiction in advisory proceeding. However, given that nearly every question 
contains a political element, the Court can reformulate the given question into a legal construct 
by using its wide discretionary power to achieve the peaceful settlement of international 
	
423 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 57. 
424 The PCIJ noted that its opinion on a legal question is sought “to obtain authoritative guidance on a question of 
a legal nature arising during the activities of the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations.” Further, it 
distinguished, defining a dispute as a legal dispute actually pending between two or more states. ROSENNE, supra 
note 239, at 280. 
425 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 57—8. 
426 Id. at 58—9. See Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 
1948 I.C.J. 57, at 61 [hereinafter Admission Case] (holding that “…The Court cannot attribute a political character 
to a request which, framed in abstract terms, invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation 
of a treaty provision….”); see also Expenses Case, supra note 400, at 155; Interpretation of Agreement of 25 
March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, 1980 I.C.J. 73, at 87 (Dec. 1980). 
427 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 234. 
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disputes or conflicts.428 Second, the Court is not likely to reject a request, even if it mixes 
factual with legal issues. The Court has held that the term “legal question,” which is embodied 
in the UN Charter, Article 96, should not be understood as an opposing term to “factual 
question,” given that some factual issues would not affect the legal issues raised by the 
requested question. 429  The Court has consistently allowed the possibility of coexistence 
between factual and legal issues, stating that “a mixed question of law and fact is nonetheless 
a legal question.” 430  Lastly, an objection may be raised to block the Court’s advisory 
jurisdiction, attacking the abstractness of a legal question. On occasion, involved States raised 
an objection that the abstract nature of the question might lead the Court to conclude a purely 
hypothetical answer that might lie outside the sphere of the judicial function of the Court. In 
response, the Court consistently rejected such lack-of-concreteness-objections, holding that it 
will render its advisory opinion on any legal questions by applying legal rules relevant to a 
particular situation, regardless of whether it is abstract or otherwise.431 All things considered, 
although a legal question is not necessarily required to be “narrowly defined and confined to a 
very specific point,” it should nevertheless be carefully drafted to conclude a generally 
applicable answer to future questions.432 
  
4. Consensual/Consent-based Jurisdiction and the Role of the Doctrine of Forum 
Prorogatum in Advisory Proceeding 
 
	
428 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 60 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, 8, U.N Doc. A/41/1 (1991) (stating that 
“Even those disputes which seem entirely political have a clearly legal component. If, for any reason, the parties 
fail to refer the matter to the Court, the process of achieving a fair and objectively commendable settlement and 
thus defusing an international crisis situation would be facilitated by obtaining the Court’s advisory opinion.”)). 
429 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 27. 
430 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 19. See also Eastern Carelia Case, supra note 304, at 28. 
431 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 237; Israeli Wall 
Case, supra note 397, at 236. See also Admission Case, supra note 427, at 61; Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 
27. 
432 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 63. 
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The pertinent legal instruments lack any provision as to whether the state consent to the 
exercise of the advisory jurisdiction is necessarily required. As such, international scholars and 
experts present a diverse range of views where the state consent is in absentia, particularly in 
relation to a pending dispute between States or between a State and an international 
organization. On one hand, the argument that the state consent is a necessary precondition433 
stresses that advisory jurisdiction should not be used to circumvent the right, independence, 
and sovereignty of an individual State in an international adjudication system by forcefully 
bringing them before the Court in the absence of prior consent.434 A contrary view, based on 
the collective interpretation of the UN Charter Articles 14, 37, and 96, asserts that a pending 
dispute should not be an excuse to prevent the establishment of advisory jurisdiction,435 given 
that both the UNGA and the UNSC can request the Court to render an advisory opinion on 
certain international disputes regardless of an objection raised by the State parties concerned.436  
Notwithstanding the fundamental requirement of the state consent to the exercise of the 
ICJ contentious jurisdiction, the Court has consistently rejected all objections arguing that the 
state consent is a required precondition for advisory proceedings. In most of these precedents, 
the Court emphasized its role as the principal judicial organ of the UN, holding that it should 
therefore not refuse to consider a request for an advisory opinion even if there is an ongoing 
dispute between States or between a State and an international organization. The Court’s 
approach appears to be based on its institutional relationship with other organizations of the 
UN: “The Court’s answer to requests for advisory opinions represents its participation in the 
	
433 ROSENNE, supra note 241, at 1014; Michala Pomerance, The Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice 
and its ‘Judicial’ Character: Past and Future Prisms, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE 
ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 318—9 (A. S. Muller & D. Raic et al. ed., 1997). 
434 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 98. 
435 BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 270 (2000). 
436 Benedetto Conforti, Observations on the Advisory Function of the International Court of Justice, in UN 
LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TWO TOPICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979). 
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activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused.”437 Consistent with this 
approach, the Court holds that only compelling reasons can prevent the exercise of its advisory 
jurisdiction. 438  It appears that the Court’s reasoning originates from its long-standing 
reluctance to adopt the notion of judicial restraint, at least with respect to the establishment of 
its advisory jurisdiction.439  
Regardless of whether a given dispute is in progress between States or between a State 
and an international organization, the ICJ has ruled that the state consent does not constitute a 
necessary condition precedent for the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction. In the interest 
of its status as a principal organ of the UN, the Court has tried to maintain balance between its 
obligation to administer justice and to conduct proper judicial function.440 In fact, despite 
objections pointing out the absence of the state consent, the Court tends to uphold its advisory 
jurisdiction and render its opinions on most requests. This is in direct contrast to the principle 
of Eastern Carelia of the PCIJ, which holds that “no State can, without its consent, be 
compelled to submit its dispute with other States to adjudication.”441 In Peace Treaties Case, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary argued over the interpretation of the agreement. Specifically, 
the States argued that domestic matters, such as human rights and fundamental freedoms, were 
not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. However, the Court rejected this argument, holding that 
sovereign States were not allowed to prevent the Court from exercising its advisory jurisdiction 
since this instrument was originally designed to produce a non-binding judicial interpretation 
	
437 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights, 1999 I.C.J. 62, at 78; Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 71, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra 
note 241, at 95. 
438 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 235; Expenses Case, 
supra note at 400, 155. 
439 There is a view encouraging the political organs of the UN to exercise “political restraint” at the stage of 
requesting an advisory opinion. Pomerance, supra note 434, at 318—9. 
440 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 112. 
441 Eastern Carelia Case, supra note 304, at 27—9. The only exception where the Court declined to consider the 
request is the case of the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 235—6 (pointing out “…the very particular 
circumstances of the case, among which were that the question directly concerned an already existing dispute….”), 
cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 101. 
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for the proper operation of the UN, Member States, and its organs.442 Consistently, in Western 
Sahara Case, the Court declined Spain’s objection, referring to the principle achieved in Peace 
Treaties Case:443 
 
“The Court affirmed that its competence to give an opinion did not depend on the 
consent of the interested States, even when the case concerned a legal question 
actually pending between them…However, the Court recognized that lack of 
consent might constitute a ground for declining to give the opinion requested if 
considerations of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse an opinion.” 
 
 
By introducing the consideration of judicial propriety, however, the Western Sahara Court 
acknowledged one unusual circumstance where it might refrain from giving an advisory 
opinion. This is where responding to a request for an advisory opinion would circumvent the 
principle of the consensual/consent-based jurisdiction in international adjudication. 444 
Nevertheless, in multiple precedents dealing with pending legal disputes between a State and 
an international organization, the Court did not admit the necessity of the state consent, 
accordingly refusing the Eastern Carelia approach.445  
 In spite of debates over the role of the doctrine forum prorogatum in advisory 
proceedings, it is logical to conclude that the doctrine plays a minimal part. As discussed above, 
in situations where the state consent is not given, the doctrine allows the Court to presume that 
	
442 Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 70—1, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 102. See 
also Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, at 19 (May 28) [hereinafter 
Genocide Case]; Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, ¶¶ 46—9 (explaining that “the subject matter of the request is 
concerned with the powers and responsibilities of the UN in relation to international peace and security.”) 
(alteration in original). 
443 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 24—5, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 104 (alteration in 
original). 
444 Id. at 25. 
445 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 23—4 (holding that “it would not only remain faithful to the requirements 
of its judicial character…but also discharge its functions as the principal judicial organ of the UN.”) (alteration in 
original); Applicability Case, supra note 306, at 188—9 (finding that “the advisory opinions on legal questions 
are advisory, not binding. As the opinions are intended for the guidance of the United Nations, the consent of 
States is not a condition precedent to the competence of the Court to give them…In the present case, the Court 
thus does not find any compelling reasons to refuse an advisory opinion after considering the principle of the 
jurisdiction ratione consensus.”) (alteration in original). 
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the concerned State parties have acquiesced to the exercise of jurisdiction by inferring consent 
from their subsequent actions. 446  However, given the jurisprudence of the Court, the 
establishment of its advisory jurisdiction is not typically affected by the presence of the 
concerned State’s consent, except where the Court voluntarily refrains due to judicial propriety. 
Thus, the Court does not have to rely on the doctrine to infer the state consent in a given case. 
In advisory proceedings, the doctrine may find its place “when the Court exercises discretion 
to decline a request for an advisory opinion, either because of the Court’s judicial character or 
because of its special status as a principal organ of the United Nations.”447 
 
5. Objections Challenging the Admissibility of a Request 
 
In an attempt to challenge the jurisdictional authority or competence of the ICJ, 
concerned States have objected to the admissibility of a request. Except in the case of Eastern 
Carelia adjudicated by its predecessor, however, the Court has never accepted any 
admissibility objection in relation to its advisory jurisdiction on other UN organs’ activities.448 
The accepted objection was based on “non-availability of essential factual information.”449 The 
examples of the declined objections are as follows:450 
 
Regarding the reserved domain of national jurisdiction;451 the lack of the necessary 
factual information;452 the existence of a pending dispute; the fear of damaging the 
principle of equality; 453  the abuse of advisory proceedings to circumvent the 
	
446 JAMES FOX, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 26 (2003). 
447 See Sienho Yee, Forum Prorogatum and the Advisory Proceedings of the International Court, 95 AM. J. INT’L. 
L. 381 (2001). 
448 KOLB, supra note 255, at 270. 
449 Eastern Carelia Case, supra note 304, at 28—9. 
450 See KOLB, supra note 255, at 270. 
451 Eastern Carelia Case, supra note 304, at 25; Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 70. 
452 Eastern Carelia Case, supra note 304, at 28—9; Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 28—9; Israeli Wall 
Case, supra note 397, 160—2. 
453 Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. 166, 
at 170—80. 
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restrictive use of contentious proceedings;454 possible interference with the States’ 
sole authority to interpret a convention; 455  possible interference with on-going 
political negotiations; 456  the political pressures threatening the Court’s judicial 




As noted previously, there is no time limit for States to raise an admissibility objection in 
advisory proceedings. Thus, the Court will examine every raised objection on a case-by-case 
basis, ensuring a balance between its advisory function as a principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations and possible interference with a State’s sovereignty.460  
 
6. The Court’s Judicial Discretion in Responding to a Request: Another Issue of 
Admissibility 
 
As indicated in the ICJ Statute, Article 65, the ICJ, if it finds any compelling reasons 
to do so, may decide to refrain from rendering its advisory opinion on the requested question 
even after having established the personal jurisdiction as well as the subject-matter/material 
jurisdiction.461 In Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court affirmed its 
judicial discretionary power over the advisory requests: “The Court may give an advisory 
opinion…the ICJ Statute leaves a discretion as to whether or not it will give an advisory opinion 
that has been requested of it, once it has established its competence to do so.”462 However, the 
Court throughout its operation of advisory jurisdiction has never exercised this discretion in 
	
454 Id. at 171—2 (arguing that “appeals against UN Administrative Tribunal would avoid the restrictive use of the 
contentious procedure to States alone as provided in the ICJ Statute, Article 34(1).”), cited in KOLB, supra note 
255, at 271. 
455 Genocide Case, supra note 443, at 19—20. 
456 Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, at 159—60. 
457 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 29. 
458 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 29. 
459 Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, at 162—3. 
460 See KOLB, supra note 255, at 272. 
461 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 35. 
462 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 234—5, quoted in 
KOLB, supra note 255, at 272. 
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rejecting advisory requests, although it has occasionally declined to give an answer based on 
other grounds.463 Furthermore, the Court is unlikely to decline a request for an advisory opinion, 
even in future advisory proceedings, since it has recognized its institutional obligation to 
participate in the activities of the UN’s organizational works,464  as well as the need for 
compelling reasons as a precondition to refusal.465 More significantly, as the principal judicial 
organ of the UN, the Court must protect its “judicial function and integrity” by applying legal 
norms and principles without arbitrary or opportunistic interpretation of the requests and 
surrounding circumstances.466 Nevertheless, the Court with its discretionary power may still 
be able to decline a request in circumstances where exercising advisory jurisdiction would 
substantially or procedurally interfere with the contentious function of the Court, which is a 
priority as a judicial organ of the international community.467 
 
E. Conclusion of This Chapter 
 
Based on the understanding of the jurisdictional mechanism of the ICJ, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the Court’s advisory jurisdiction is expected to serve as a judicial forum for 
the settlement of the NLL Conflict. Given that the contentious jurisdiction of the Court is 
	
463 In the cases of Eastern Carelia and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court refused to 
answer, explaining that it had no jurisdiction at all over the requested matters. 
464 Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 71 (holding that “its participation in the activities of the 
Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused.”), quoted in KOLB, supra note 255, at 273. 
465 Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO in Complaints against UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 
1956 I.C.J. 77, at 86 (Oct. 23) (announcing that “only compelling reasons could lead it to refuse a request for an 
advisory opinion.”), quoted in KOLB, supra note 255, at 273. See also Expenses Case, supra note 400, at 155; 
Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 27; Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 21; Applicability Case, supra note 
306, at 191; Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, at 156. 
466 See KOLB, supra note 255, at 274. 
467 The following is a list of expected situations where the Court may refuse to exercise its advisory jurisdiction 
due to the concerns over its principal function over contentious cases: a case is about to be submitted to the 
contentious procedure; advisory proceedings are premature; there is a risk that third parties will lose some of their 
procedural rights; the proceedings are, given the circumstances, a method of directly bypassing the contentious 
procedure; it irremediably lacks the necessary facts to be able to deliver a judicial act deserving that name; and 
the advisory proceedings will in some other way oblige the Court to act contrary to its prestige and integrity. 
KOLB, supra note 255, at 275. 
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operated on basis of the state consent, the establishment of such jurisdiction appears to be 
unattainable under the current circumstance surrounding the Conflict where the decades-long 
efforts to draw a negotiated settlement have achieved no meaningful result. Of course, 
according to the UN Charter Article 93, paragraph 1, any State concerned in the Conflict may 
be subject to the Court’s personal jurisdiction in its contentious proceeding. Besides, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the existence of an international dispute between States 
involving a disagreement on a point of law or fact, or a conflict of legal views or of interests 
may be affirmed by the Court in establishing its subject-matter/material jurisdiction in a given 
contentious proceeding of the Conflict. Nonetheless, an initiation of such contentious 
proceeding is not possible in the case of the Conflict, considering the essential requirement of 
the state consent; i.e., both contesting and defending States must consent to the Court’s exercise 
of its contentious jurisdiction over their disagreement on a disputed issue. In that sense, not to 
mention the ex ante compulsory jurisdiction, the establishment of either of the ex post 
optional/voluntary jurisdictions seems achievable in the context of the Conflict. It is because, 
while the doctrine of forum prorogatum may be applicable in an exceptional circumstance, the 
execution of a special agreement between the States concerned in the Conflict unlikely, given 
past experience.  
As discussed above, it must be noted that the Court has never accepted any of the 
objections asserting the absence of the state consent throughout the operation of its advisory 
proceedings, despite being able to exercise its discretionary power in regard to the 
establishment of its advisory jurisdiction. Given the Court’s jurisprudence on the ultra vires 
objections raised in the preceding advisory proceedings, the Court tends not to decline an 
advisory request made by either the UNGA or the UNSC in the absence of a compelling reason 
to do so. Moreover, even assuming any requested question is intermixed with political, factual, 
or abstract issues, the Court tends to reformulate such issues in terms of law so as to make it a 
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question of a legal nature. Hence, in a case of this Conflict, it is reasonable to argue that the 
satisfaction of the requirements of both personal and subject-matter/material jurisdiction for 
the establishment of the advisory jurisdiction will be theoretically possible. Most importantly, 
note for the following discussion that the Court does not regard the state consent as a necessary 
condition precedent for the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction. 
 
III. CASE ANALYSIS ON PRECEDENTS OF THE ICJ COMPARABLE TO 
THE NLL CONFLICT 
 
 
A. Introduction to This Chapter 
 
On the premise that the resolution of international disputes is connected with the 
understanding of relevant precedents to be referred to, this Chapter will examine a selection of 
advisory opinions that have implications for an alternative to construct a dispute-resolution 
framework for the NLL Conflict. Since its founding as a principal judicial organ of the UN, 
the ICJ has given its judicial interpretation of international law on various questions submitted 
by duly authorized organs and special agencies. As will be discussed below, although the 
advisory opinions were not binding by its nature, the Court in some of the cases has contributed 
to the ultimate settlement of these international controversies by its clarification of related legal 
issues. The Court was able to achieve this because, although its advisory opinion has no binding 
effect, Member States, authorized organs, and special agencies have a tendency to 
acknowledge the ICJ’s rulings as either persuasive or even substantively authoritative. With 
that in mind, among the preceding rulings and rationales that have become the cornerstone of 
the Court’s advisory proceeding, this Chapter will review the rulings and rationales of six 
selected cases that share comparable backgrounds with the NLL Conflict. Precisely speaking, 
the similarities between the legal controversies involved in those six cases and the NLL 
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Conflict arise out of a variety of factors: analogous factual and procedural history, controversial 
legal issues, and international efforts to attract voluntary participation from the States 
concerned. In addition to such parallels, the Court’s holdings and rationales, as well as the 
international reaction in the aftermath of the Court’s final decisions, are also of relevance to 
this doctrinal project. 
 This Chapter will provide a case analysis for six advisory cases with each analysis 
structured in the following order: facts, issues, holding, rationale, and other additional 
considerations. The first part of each case analysis on the selected advisory opinions will 
therefore cover the facts, such as titles of the cases and the State parties involved; what 
happened factually and procedurally throughout the proceedings; and the opinions rendered by 
the Court. This includes a discussion about what occurred before the commencement of the 
advisory proceeding, as well as the procedural history. The events that led the involved State 
parties to appear before the Court will also be introduced. Additionally, this part will deal with 
what the Court determined and whether it decided in favor of or against the State parties 
involved, e.g., whether affirmed or dismissed. The second part of each case analysis will 
consider the legal questions at the center of these international controversies between the States, 
organs, and agencies. The third part of each case analysis will examine the holdings. Through 
its holdings, the Court elaborated the applied rules of international law that served as the basis 
for its final opinions and the rationales which the Court relied on to support its reasons leading 
to the conclusion. The final part of each case analysis will extract the key dictum in which the 
Court provided its additional commentaries about its judgments. Also, some of the dissenting 
opinions will be introduced to the extent that they have an implication on the development of 
this doctrinal project. The final part will contain the parties’ conflicting arguments made in the 
aftermath of the Court’s opinions and the international responses for and against such opinions. 
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B. Case Brief of the Preceding Advisory Opinions: Focused on Their Implications for 
This Doctoral Project 
 
1. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo (2010) (“Kosovo Opinion”) 
 
 In response to a question about whether the unilateral declaration of independence for 
Kosovo violated any applicable rule of international law, the ICJ and the UN Member States 
actively participated in mediating a dispute between the Republic of Serbia and Kosovo to a 
pacific resolution. The declaration, which had been adopted at a meeting of the Assembly of 
Kosovo on February 17, 2009, resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo and 
instigated a heated disagreement over the legality of such a unilateral action and the separating 
of the territory of Kosovo.468 Serbia believed that the adoption of the declaration by the Kosovo 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (“KPIS”) was beyond the authority conferred 
upon it by the UN Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”) and the Constitutional Framework 
promulgated thereunder.469  Therefore, by calling for the Court’s advisory opinion on this 
matter, the Serbian government sought international support for its stance in the hope of 
invalidating Kosovo’s independence. On October 8, 2008, the UNGA adopted Resolution 63/3, 
with a vote of 77 in favor of Serbia’s Initiative seeking the Court’s judicial interpretation on 
the declaration.470 In the subsequent procedures, more than 30 Member States, along with the 
	
468 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 57—77 (July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo Opinion]. 
469 Id. 
470 UN seeks World Court Kosovo view, BBC NEWS, Oct. 9, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7658103.stm. 
In the vote, 6 Member States opposed the initiative, while 74 Members abstained from voting procedure. See 
Press Release, General Assembly, Backing Request by Serbia, General Assembly Decides to Seek International 
Court of Justice Ruling on Legality of Kosovo’s Independence, U.N. Press Release GA/10764 (Oct. 8, 2008). 
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then-UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, filed written statements with the Court to state 
whether they viewed the declaration as illegal by the tenets of international law. 
Prior to producing its final opinion, the ICJ delivered its decisions and judgments on 
the given procedural matters, e.g., jurisdiction and discretion, and the substantive legal issues 
in dispute that were expected to largely affect other separatist movements across the world. As 
a procedural issue, the Court first answered the question of whether it possessed jurisdiction to 
give an advisory opinion, as requested by the UNGA. Ultimately, the Court found that the 
requested question was within the scope of the UNGA’s competence to discuss “any question 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member 
of the UN,” and that it did not contravene the UNSC’s exercise of its institutional function.471 
Furthermore, in light of the UN Charter, Article 96 and the ICJ Statute, Article 65, the Court 
also clarified that the requested question was a legal issue, adding that neither the political 
aspects nor the political motives driving the request were sufficient to deprive the question of 
its legal character.472 After noting the discretionary power reserved to it,473 the Court state that, 
although its interpretation and application of the UNSC Resolution 1244 could turn on the 
UNSC’s decision, this did not constitute a compelling reason to refrain from answering a 
question in which the UNGA had a legitimate interest.474  In a series of public hearings, 
substantive legal arguments were presented by Member States, demonstrating their stances for 
	
471 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 469, at ¶ 18—25 (citing the U.N. Charter art. 10 (stipulating that “The General 
Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the 
powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter.”), art. 11, para. 2 (prescribing that “The 
General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
brought before it by any Member of the United Nations…and may make recommendations…”) and art. 12, para. 
2 (providing that “While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions 
assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to 
that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”)).  
472 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 469, at ¶ 26—7. 
473 Id. at ¶ 29—35 (noting that “the fact that it has jurisdiction does not mean that it is obliged to exercise it so as 
to protect the integrity of its judicial function and its nature as the principal judicial organ of the UN…it has 
therefore given careful considerations as to whether, in the light of its previous jurisprudence, there are compelling 
reasons for it to refuse to respond to the request from the General Assembly.”). 
474 Id. at ¶ 35—48. 
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or against the legality of the declaration. The States that were in favor of the declaration 
emphasized the values of civil and human rights, territorial integrity, and the right of self-
determination. Simply speaking, the question raised was whether the declaration made by the 
KPIS, which had restricted authority conferred by the framework of the UNSC Resolution 
1244, was legitimate under international law. In its judgment, however, the Court stressed that 
the institutions had not been the subject who had made that declaration, given the absence of 
legislative process or proper publication thereafter.475  In so doing, the Court found that a 
declaration of independence had been reserved for the authors, i.e., representatives of the 
people of Kosovo, to act outside the Constitutional Framework created under the UNMIK.476 
In its final ruling, the Court answered that the declaration had not violated international law, 
explaining that international law has no explicit prohibition on the unilateral declaration of 
independence.477 Afterward, the Court’s opinion on the legality of the declaration significantly 
affected other separatist movements who were seeking support and understanding from the 
international community.478  
 
2. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (2004) 
 
During the Second Intifada, Israel built the Israeli West Bank Barrier (“Wall”), which 
serves as an artificial barrier along and beyond the 1945 Green Line. The Wall has led to 
heightened tensions between Israel and Palestine, with even the international community to 
debating its justiciability. In defense of the legal status of the Wall, the Israeli government 
	
475 Id. at ¶ 101—21. 
476 Id. 
477 Id. at ¶ 122. However, the Court did not address Kosovo’s achievement of statehood or whether Kosovo was 
entitled by international law to unilaterally declare its independence. Id. at ¶ 51—6, 82—3. 
478 See Heiko Krueger, Implication of Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia for International Law – The Conduct 
of the Community of States in Current Secession of Conflicts, 3(2) CAUCASIAN REV. INT’L. L. 121 (2009). 
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argued that it was a necessary measure spurred by terrorist acts committed inside the territory 
of Israel.479 Palestinians who objected to the measure as a “racial segregation or apartheid wall” 
contended that it was part of Israel’s efforts to annex Palestinian territory.480 The Palestinian 
authorities contended that the construction of the Wall severely impaired their efforts to 
conclude peaceful negotiated settlements. In an emergency special session held in December 
2003, the UNGA adopted Resolution ES-10/14 by 90 votes in favor to 8 votes against, along 
with 74 abstentions. The Resolution made an urgent request for the Court to render its advisory 
opinion on whether the construction of the Wall could be considered legal under the principles 
of international law.481  
 In an opinion rendered on July 9, 2004, the ICJ responded to several procedural 
contentions raised with the intention of preventing the establishment of its jurisdiction on the 
ground of judicial propriety. The Court first stated that the UNGA had authority to request its 
opinion as stipulated in the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 1482 and that the UNGA also 
acted within the scope of its qualified activities, in spite of the restriction on its competence 
provided in the UN Charter Article 12, paragraph 1.483 Then, based on Resolution 377A (V), 
the Court affirmed that the UNGA may consider the matter immediately to make 
recommendations to Member States in cases where “the UNSC fails to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”484 Finally, the Court 
rejected the argument that the political nature embedded in the question blocked its advisory 
	
479 DONA J. STEWART, THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY: POLITICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 223 
(2013). 
480 Id. 
481  G.A. Res. 10/14, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/14 (Dec. 12, 2003) (asking that “What are the legal 
consequences of the Wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Security-General, considering the rules 
and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security 
Council and General Assembly resolution?”). 
482 Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, at ¶ 14—23. See U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1 (prescribing that “The General 
Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on 
any legal question.”). 
483 Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, at ¶ 24—5. 
484 Id. at ¶ 26—40.  
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capacity, referring to its established jurisprudence: “The fact that a legal question also has 
political aspects does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a legal question and to deprive 
the Court of a competence.”485  
In response to the argument requiring the Court to exercise its discretionary power, the 
Court found that there was no compelling reason to refrain from giving its advisory opinion. 
First, the Court ruled that the absence of Israel’s consent to contentious jurisdiction had nothing 
to do with the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction given that the requested matter was of 
direct concern to the UNGA.486  Second, the Court rejected the contention that giving its 
opinion would impede the conclusion of a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict,487 explaining that the expected outcome and influence of its advisory opinion on that 
negotiation was equivocal.488 Finally, the Court made clear that it was not the one to assess the 
use of the opinion, so long as said opinion was based on sufficient information and evidence.489 
 In its opinion on the substantive issues, the Court held that “the construction of the Wall 
and its associated regime, together with the establishment of settlements,” were contrary to the 
rules and principles of international law, declining Israel’s assertions, which were based on a 
right of self-defense and a state of necessity. After determining the relevant rules and 
principles,490 the Court found flagrant breaches of international obligations on Israel’s side to 
respect the right of self-determination: first, Israel’s policy of establishing settlements, along 
	
485 Id. at ¶ 41. 
486 Id. at ¶ 43—50. 
487 On November 19, 2003, the UNSC adopted resolution 1515 in order to endorse the Quartet Performance-based 
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. 
488 Id. at ¶ 51—4. 
489 Id. at ¶ 55—8. 
490 The cited rules and principles of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights 
law, are as follows: The U.N. Charter Article 2, paragraph 4; the principle of self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in the U.N. Charter and reaffirmed by the GA resolution 2625 (XXV); the principles of the prohibition 
of the threat or use of force and the illegality of any territorial acquisition by such means; the Hague Regulation 
1907; the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949 [hereinafter 
Fourth Geneva Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. See id. at ¶ 
86—113. 
Hyun Jin Kim 
S.J.D. Dissertation 122	
with other previous measures taken, illegally included 80 percent of the inhabitants living in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, thus altering the demographic composition therein;491 
second, the Court expressed its concern that the construction of the Wall would create a fait 
accompli’ leading to de facto annexation insofar as it could be fixed permanently as the future 
frontier between Israel and Palestine.492 Furthermore, the Court held that Israel’s measures 
would significantly impede the Palestinian inhabitants’ fundamental rights, which had been 
bestowed by customary international law.493 Also, in terms of international humanitarian law 
and human rights law, the Court observed that “a right of self-defense and military exigencies, 
and a state of necessity and the needs of national security or public order,” which were invoked 
by Israel to defend the legal status of the Wall, were not sufficient to offset its wrongfulness.494 
 Having found the breaches on the part of Israel, the ICJ stated the legal consequences 
of those breaches, thereby advising Israel to correct its wrongful act and other Member States 
and the UN to act in accordance with international law. First of all, the Court stressed that Israel 
must respect the Palestinian peoples’ right to self-determination and must stop violating its 
international obligations under humanitarian law and human rights law. To this end, the Court 
requested Israel to “cease the construction, dismantle the structure, repeal all legislative and 
regulatory acts, and make reparations for all damage suffered.”495 Second, having observed 
that obligations under international law and international humanitarian law are essentially of 
	
491 Id. at ¶ 115—20; ¶ 122. 
492 Id. at ¶ 121. 
493  According to the Court’s opinion, the fundamental rights of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory that were infringed upon by the construction and its associated regime, coupled with the establishment 
of settlements, are as follows: destruction or requisition of private property, restrictions on freedom of movement, 
confiscation of agricultural land, cutting-off of access to primary water sources, the right to work, to health, to 
education and to an adequate standard of living. The sources of the rules and principles of international law that 
the Court referred to were as follows: the Hague Regulation of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the relevant SC resolutions. Id. at ¶ 123—34. 
494 Id. at ¶ 135—41. 
495 Id. at ¶ 149—54. 
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an erga omnes character,496 the Court advised other Member States not to recognize the illegal 
actions taken by Israel and not to provide any support for the illegal situation created by the 
construction.497 Third, in regard to the UNGA and the UNSC, the Court advised them to 
consider how they should act to end the situation and its associated regime on the basis of its 
opinion. 498  Finally, the Court concluded its opinion by highlighting that international 
obligations would be respected only through implementing the relevant UNSC resolutions in 
good faith and that a negotiated solution based on international law should be achieved for 
regional peace and security.499 
 
3. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) 
  
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons delivered on July 8, 1996 suggested 
an important guideline on the procedural and other institutional issues that the ICJ had to 
confront before moving forward to the substantive matters; e.g., the ICJ’s advisory function, 
and the proper role and competence of international organizations. Prior to this case, the same 
question was raised in WHO Nuclear Weapons Case, which was handed down on July 8, 1996, 
although the Court refused to proceed to the substance of the issue due to the WHO acting ultra 
vires in raising the question. Amidst a growing concern about the use of nuclear weapons or 
the threat to use nuclear weapons, the UNGA adopted resolution A/RES/49/75, asking the 
Court to clarify its advisory opinion as to whether “the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any 
circumstances permitted under international law.”500  
	
496 The Court specifically cites the UN Charter and the Fourth Geneva Convention as the sources of those 
international obligation bearing by Member States. 
497 Id. at ¶ 154—9. 
498 Id. at ¶ 160. 
499 Id. at ¶ 161—2. 
500 G.A. Res. 49/90, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/90 (Dec. 15, 1994). 
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To provide its opinion on the legality of the use and the threatened use of nuclear 
weapons, the Court had to refer to multiple sources of relevant international obligations and 
the interaction of branches of conventional international laws, while adhering to its long-
standing jurisprudence, e.g., the principles of non liquet and Lotus Case. First of all, as regards 
the legality of the practice of “nuclear deterrence,” the Court replied that “so long as a 
threatened retaliatory attack with nuclear weapons” was in compliance with “military necessity 
and proportionality,” international law would not find it illegal.501 Then, with respect to the 
legality of the possession of nuclear weapons, the Court, which had based its opinion on the 
legal principle of non liquet, decided that there was no specific language in any legal 
instruments prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons.502 In this view, moreover, the Court 
rejected the argument that nuclear weapons should be treated in the same way as bacteriological 
or chemical ones in the absence of specific prohibition thereof, albeit admitting a hypothetical 
possibility of a “comprehensive and universal conventional prohibition” at some point.503 
Importantly, in terms of customary international law, the ICJ found no sufficient basis 
to universally define the possession of nuclear weapons as illegal, thus advising Member States 
to pursue the conclusion of negotiated settlements in good faith. Above all, the Court ruled that 
there was no new and clear opinio juris under the law to outlaw the possession of nuclear 
	
501 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at ¶ 37—50. 
502 Id. at ¶ 39 (stating that “These provisions of the UN Charter do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to 
any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the 
use of any specific weapon, including nuclear weapons. A weapon that is already unlawful per se, whether by 
treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason of its being used for a legitimate purpose under the Charter.”) 
(alteration in original).  
503 Id. at ¶ 54—6 (saying that “it does not seem to the Court that the use of nuclear weapons can be regarded as 
specifically prohibited on the basis of …the provisions of the Second Hague Declaration of 1899, the Regulations 
annexed to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 or the 1925 Protocol.”); at ¶ 57 (concluding that “the Court does 
not find any specific prohibition of recourse to nuclear weapons in treaties expressly prohibiting the use of certain 
weapons of mass destruction.”); and ¶ 62 (noting that “the treaties dealing exclusively with acquisition, 
manufacture, possession, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons, without specifically addressing their threat 
or use, do not constitute a prohibition by themselves, even though they certainly point to an increasing concern in 
the international community with these weapons.”); ¶ 63 (pointing out that “While those testify to a growing 
awareness of the need to liberate the community of States and the international public from the dangers resulting 
from the existence of nuclear weapons, the Court does not, however, view these elements as amounting to a 
comprehensive and universal conventional prohibition on the use, or the threat of use, of those weapons as such.”) 
(alteration in original). 
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weapons, despite the fact that a number of UN resolutions were adopted to condemn it.504 
However, the Court admitted the possibility of applying universal humanitarian laws, e.g., “a 
combatant is not legally allowed to target specific civilians and use certain types of weapons 
to cause indiscriminate damage,” to the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflicts.505 Besides, 
the Court did not come forward to determine whether the matter of deploying nuclear weapons 
as “a last resort in extreme circumstances of self-defense” is disallowed under the law.506 To 
conclude, the Court advised Member States to construct “strict and effective international 
control” over nuclear weapons to achieve total nuclear disarmament through negotiations.507 
This advisory opinion, including both its procedural history and the reasoning leading 
the ICJ to reach its holding, has many valuable implications for the operation of the advisory 
proceeding, as well as offering a chance to predict the Court’s rulings on similar legal questions 
in the future. First, by declining the previous request made by the WHO, the Court crystalized 
its jurisprudence that international organs of the UN may only make such a request within the 
scope of their activities, i.e., competence. Second, regardless of its decision on the use and 
possession of nuclear weapons under conventional international law, the Court highlighted that 
Member States should abide by international humanitarian laws at all times. Third, the Court 
also underscored an obligation imposed on Member States to pursue the peaceful settlement of 
disputes through negotiations. Last, but not least, in the face of the post-colonial period, the 
outcome of the case suggests an enterprising way to utilize the advisory proceeding to produce 
the pacific resolution of international controversies, given that developing states showed a 
growing awareness and willingness to engage in international judicial proceedings. 
 
	
504 Id. at ¶ 65—73 (adding that even those resolutions were not universally adopted due to the nuclear powers’ 
objections). 
505 Id. at ¶ 86. 
506 Id. at ¶ 97. 
507 Id. at ¶ 105. 
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4. Western Sahara (1975) 
  
The decades-long conflict over the territory of Western Sahara, which was then called 
Spanish Sahara, eventually led the relevant States to submit their conflict to the ICJ, seeking 
its advisory opinion on the right of self-determination of the decolonized countries and the 
sovereignty and rightful ownership over the disputed territory. While Morocco had considered 
the territory part of its pre-colonial land since its independence in 1956, Spain retained the area 
in spite of its large-scale decolonization. In the aftermath of the Ifni War, the UNGA adopted 
resolution 2229 in 1966, asking Spain to hold a referendum on self-determination for the people 
living in the territory.508 Although Spain finally announced its plan to hold the referendum in 
1975, the referendum plan was suspended since Morocco decided to bring the matter to the 
Court. In December 1974, the UNGA adopted resolution 3292 requesting the Court to answer 
the following legal questions: 1) “Was Western Sahara at the time of colonization by Spain a 
territory belonging to no one?” and 2) “What were the legal ties between this territory and the 
Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?”509 In the course of the hearings, the Court 
gave permission, not only to Spain and Morocco, but also Algeria and Mauritania to participate 
and present evidence to support their respective positions. 
Spain argued against both Morocco and Mauritania’s claims, both of which were 
attempting to demonstrate their legal ties to Western Sahara in order to establish their own 
historical sovereignty to the territory, while undermining the Sahrawis’ right to self-
determination. That is, Morocco and Mauritania separately and independently claimed their 
competing sovereign rights to the territory based on historical, legal, ethnic, and cultural ties.510 
In particular, Morocco set forth to prove its sovereign right and legal ties to the territory before 
	
508 G.A. Res. 2229 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., (Dec. 20, 1966). 
509 G.A. Res. 3292 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., (Dec. 13, 1974). 
510 Gary Jay Levy, Case Comments: Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, 2 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 289, at 291—
4 (1975). 
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the Court, relying on the principles and theories of territory acquisition under international law: 
“immemorial possession, geographical continuity, internal and external displays of 
sovereignty.”511 Spain contested Morocco’s claim, claiming that the Sultan’s authority over the 
territory had never been recognized.512 Although it did not make any territorial claim, Algeria 
defended Sahrawis’s rightful and distinct ownership, asserting that they should not be subject 
to either Morocco or Mauritania.513  
In the face of those conflicting claims and arguments, the ICJ answered the questions 
raised by the UNGA regarding the legal status of the territory of Western Sahara and the 
rightful ownership thereof. In its lengthy opinion, the Court first decided that the territory was 
not terra nullius, i.e., no man’s land, when Spanish colonization began in 1885, noting that 
“the territory was inhabited by who, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in 
tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them.”514 Second, notwithstanding the existence 
of legal ties of allegiance between the territory and the Kingdom of Morocco¾and even 
between the territory and the Mauritanian entity¾the Court declared that such ties did not 
imply “strong ties of territorial sovereignty” amounting to sovereignty or rightful ownership 
over the area.515  The Court refused to acknowledge the historical evidence presented by 
Morocco and Mauritania, stating that such evidence did not constitute legal ties of territorial 
sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the 
Mauritanian entity.516 Further, it affirmed “the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the 
	
511  Jacob Mundy, Address at International Conference of the Jurists for Western Sahara: The Question of 
Sovereignty in the Western Sahara Conflict § 3, 4 (June 27, 2008). 
512 Id. 
513 U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 4th comm. 247, at 250, U.N. Doc. A/C.4/SR.2125. 
514 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at ¶ 75—83. See also Levy, supra note 511, at 295—7; Mundy, supra 
note 512, at § 2. 
515 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at ¶ 90—129; ¶ 130—52. See also Levy, supra note 511, at 297—302; 
Mundy, supra note 512, at § 3, 4. 
516 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at ¶ 162. 
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decolonization of Western Sahara and of the principle of self-determination through the free 
and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory.”517  
In contrast to efforts made by the international community, the ICJ’s opinion was 
disregarded creating a negotiated settlement by the contesting States under the supervision of 
the international bodies. This was because the inconsistency of the Court’s reasoning created 
interpretational discrepancy among the interested States.518 Although Spain officially ceded 
the northern two-thirds of the territory to Morocco and the southern third to Mauritania in 
compliance with the Madrid Accords concluded between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania in 
1975, it could not ultimately prevent the engaged parties from military confrontations. Indeed, 
the Western Sahara conflict has still not been settled. Morocco governs most of the territory 
since Mauritania renounced its ownership to the southern part, even though the UN and other 
Member States have never recognized its sovereignty. However, 82 Member States have 
recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, established by the Polisario Front, as a 
legitimate sovereign State. In spite of international efforts, the advisory proceeding has not 
played the expected role of peacefully resolving the territorial dispute, mostly because of the 
lack of a definitive, binding, and authoritative effect of the Court’s judgment and ruling.519 
 
5. Advisory Opinions Concerning South West Africa (now Namibia) 
 
a. International Status of South West Africa (1949) 
	
517 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at ¶ 129, 162. 
518 Morocco and Mauritania argued that the Court’s opinion recognized their legitimate sovereign right to the 
territory on the basis of history. On the other hand, Algeria and the Polisario Front argued against them, saying 
that the Court’s opinion supported the application of self-determination of the people of Western Sahara through 
the Spanish referendum. 
519 The Court basically believes its non-binding advisory opinion would ultimately help the UNGA to mediate 
international disputes by providing the clarification of the legal issues disputed between the involved States. In 
this respect, the both consider the Court’s opinions “persuasive and substantive authority” as “judicial 
pronouncements and authoritative expression of law rendered by the highest international tribunal equal to the 
authority of its judgment.” Levy, supra note 511, at 305. 
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 In the wake of World War II, the Union of South Africa asked the UN to recognize its 
integration of the Territory of South West Africa, contending that the League of Nations’ 
Mandate declaring the Union to be responsible for administering the Territory had lapsed. 
South West Africa was the old name for modern-day Namibia and was colonized by the 
German Empire in 1884. After World War I, the Union, entrusted with the League of Nations 
Class C Mandate under the Treaty of Versailles, took over its administration and began to rule 
it as the agent (or mandatory) of the League.520 Under that mandate, the Union, though it was 
obliged to promote the well-being and social progress of the Territory, enjoyed exclusive 
administrative authority over it and was allowed to apply its laws therein. 521  With the 
dissolution of the League, the States debated whether the UN, as the successor to the League, 
would be able to enforce the mandate.522 Despite the absence of any explicit provision on 
whether the effect of the mandate would continue, the UN was also supposed to take over the 
Territory as a UN Trust Territory since the UN Charter accepted the system of international 
trusteeship to “administer and supervise non-self-governing undeveloped countries.” 523 
Nevertheless, the transition of administration never occurred in the Territory because South 
Africa feared that the UN would take control and the Territory would be granted 
independence. 524  In 1946, the question as to whether the Territory should be granted 
independence or be placed under the trusteeship was discussed in the UNGA. As against the 
UNGA’s proposal made in 1949, however, South Africa unilaterally declared its incorporation 
into the Union as its fifth province in the same year.525  
	
520 The South West Africa Cases, 1967 Wash. U. L. Q. 159, 159—67 (1967) (citing League of Nations Covenant 
art. 22) (stipulating “a permanent mandate system under which former enemy territory was to be entrusted to 
certain individual nations which acted as mandatories and were accountable directly to the League.”). 
521 Id. at 159—61. 
522 Id. at 164.  
523 Id. 
524 Except for the case of South West Africa, the other mandated territories were either granted independence or 
were controlled by the UN’s trusteeship system. Id. at 164. 
525 See id. at 159—67. 
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 South Africa’s continued presence and extensive application of its apartheid laws in the 
Territory of South West Africa gave rise to a number of UN resolutions, as well as a series of 
the ICJ’s rulings after International Status of South West Africa as part of international efforts 
for the settlements of the South West Africa issue. Even if the Union expressed its 
dissatisfaction with the Court’s finding due to its non-binding nature, the UNGA formed an ad 
hoc committee on South West Africa aimed at achieving effective resolution of the problem.526 
Amidst the Union’s continuing enforcement of its apartheid laws within the Territory, the Court 
issued another advisory opinion, holding that the League’s voting procedure was not binding 
upon the UNGA in deciding issues related to the Territory.527 However, the Union continued 
annexing the Territory into South Africa, thereby resulting in a report from the committee that 
called on Member States to consider possible legal action to meet the mandatory obligations.528 
Although Ethiopia and Liberia filed a case with the Court in 1960 alleging that South Africa 
had not fulfilled its mandatory obligations, they were found in 1966 to be improper parties 
lacking any legal right to bring the case before the Court.529 In spite of the UNGA resolution 
2145 (XXI) in 1966, which officially terminated the mandate, South Africa persisted its 
administration in Namibia.530 In Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970) (“Namibia Case”), responding to the UNSC’s request for an advisory opinion, the Court 
answered that the continued presence of the Union in the Territory was illegal and South Africa 
was obliged to immediately withdraw from Namibia.531 Furthermore, the Court advised that 
there was an obligation for the UN Member States not to recognize any actions the Union 
	
526 See G.A. Res. 449-A (2), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775, at 55 (Dec. 13, 1950). 
527 Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South West Africa, 
Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June 7, 1955) [hereinafter South West Africa-Voting Procedure Case]. 
528 U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/3626, at 4 (Jan. 1, 1957). 
529 South West Africa (Eth. & Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 6. 
530 In 1968 the UNGA officially changed the name of South West Africa to Namibia through the adoption of 
resolution 2372 (XXII). U.N. Doc. A/RES/2372 (XXII) (June 12, 1968). 
531 Namibia Case, supra note 401, ¶ 117—27, 133. 
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performed on behalf of Namibia as a valid act.532 In 1973, the UNGA recognized the South 
West Africa People’s Organization (“SWAPO”) as a sole legitimate representative of the 
Namibian people and granted them UN observer status. With the Union’s approval of 
Namibia’s independence in 1988, Namibia became the independent Republic of Namibia on 
March 21, 1990.  
 In International Status of South West Africa, the ICJ, acting on a request of the UNGA 
for its advisory opinion, elaborated the “international status of the Territory of South West 
Africa” and the “international obligations of the Union of South Africa arising therefrom.”533 
First of all, the Court determined that the Union, as the appointed Mandatory, was obligated to 
accept its compulsory jurisdiction in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate,534 Article 37 
of the ICJ Statute,535 and Article 80, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter.536 Second, even though 
the Court found no legal obligation on the part of the Union to convert the Territory into the 
UN trusteeship system, it ruled that the Union was not competent to unilaterally modify the 
legal status of the Territory, which should properly be placed under international mandate.537 
In this view, the Court further made it clear that the Union was still under an obligation to 
comply with the League’s Mandate. 538  Third, the UNGA was competent to require the 
mandatory nation, i.e., the Union, to submit reports and to receive petitions from the inhabitants 
	
532 Id. 
533 International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 128, at 131, 138 (July 11). 
534 The article provided that “The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever shall arise between the Mandatory 
and another member of the League of Nations relating to the terms of the Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be 
settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice,” quoted in Ronald Segal, 
South West Africa: An International Responsibility, Int’l Conf. S. W. Afr. Mar. 26, 1966, at 4, 5. 
535 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 37 (prescribing that “Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for 
reference of a matter to a tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, be referred to the International 
Court of Justice.”). 
536  U.N. Charter art. 80, para. 1 (stipulating that “Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship 
agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until 
such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Charter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any 
manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to 
which Member of the United Nations may respectively be parties.”). 
537 International Status of South West Africa, supra note 534, at 138, 143—4. 
538 Id. 
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of the mandate, i.e., South West Africa, 539  thus empowering the UNGA to establish a 
supervisory committee acting on its behalf. 
 In constructing its opinion, the ICJ interpreted the legal meaning of “sacred trust of 
civilization” and applied “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” in 
particular the principles of the English trust, as provided in the ICJ Statute Article 38, paragraph 
1(c).540 In the English common law, the legal concept of trust was based on the conscience of 
the trustee and the possibility of legal enforcement.541 Other legal systems also have legal 
institutions similar to the English trust to protect the property or persons who are weak and 
dependent, such as minors.542 Therefore, the Court stressed that, when creating a trust, an entity 
who is responsible should be appointed as a trustee. Sir McNair generalized in his separate 
opinion the common principles of the trust as follows:543 
 
1. The control of the trustee over the property is limited in one way or another; he 
is not in the position of the normal complete owner, who can do what he likes 
with his own, as he is precluded from administering the property for his own 
personal benefit; 
2. The trustee is under some kind of legal obligation, based on confidence and 
conscience, to carry out the trust or mission confided to him for the benefit of 
some other person or for some public purposes; and 
3. Any attempt by one of these persons to absorb the property entrusted to him 
into his own patrimony would be illegal and would be prevented by the law. 
 
 
In other words, the Court held that the League entrusted the Union with the mandate to 
administer the Territory until it could become an independent nation. In this regard, the Court 
ruled that the Union’s attempt to absorb the Territory obviously violated the mandate, which 
was based on trust law. 
	
539 Id. at 137—8. 
540 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 38, paragraph 1(c) (prescribing that “The Court, whose function is to decide 
in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.”). 
541 International Status of South West Africa, supra note 534, at 148—9 (July 11) (separate opinion of Sir McNair). 
542 Id. at 149. 
543 Id. 
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b. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
 
 In 1970, the UNSC instituted an advisory proceeding since South Africa continued to 
occupy Namibia¾formerly South West Africa¾even after the UNGA adopted Resolution 
2145 (XXI) terminating the mandate. The UNSC, accordingly, passed Resolution 276, 
condemning the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia as illegal. In justification of 
its annexation, South Africa claimed that the Namibian people wished to be ruled as part of the 
territory of South Africa. 544  Aside from that, however, South Africa’s application of its 
apartheid laws had intensified, thus leading the UNGA to issue Resolution 2145 (XXI) to 
terminate South Africa’s mandate, given by the League of Nations, to administer Namibia.545 
Since South Africa, which was a registered UN Member State, was prohibited from taking 
physical control of other territories, the UNGA concluded in its resolution that South Africa’s 
institution of its apartheid policy was a breach of the mandate and of international law. South 
Africa did not respond to this resolution, thereby provoking the UNSC to declare South 
Africa’s refusal to withdraw from Namibia as illegal.546 South Africa’s defiance of the above 
resolutions continued, so the UNSC finally requested an advisory opinion to the ICJ on the 
legal consequences for States, given the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia. 
 In Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (“Namibia Case”), the ICJ’s answers 
were all affirmative, setting forth its reasoning to define the meanings of international 
obligations and relationships created by the mandate. First, the Court found that all UN 
	
544  Advisory Opinion on Namibia, CASE BRIEFS, http://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/international-
law/international-law-keyed-to-damrosche/chapter-3/advisory-opinion-on-namibia/. 
545 G.A. Res. 2145 (XXI), U.N. GAOR 13th Sess. (Oct. 27, 1966). 
546 S.C. Res. 276, U.N. Doc. S/RES/276 (Jan. 30, 1976). 
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Member States were bound by UN mandate, so any violator of such mandate was legally 
obligated to rectify any breaches or violations thereof.547 Second, the Court found that Member 
States, other than the violating State, were also bound by UN mandate to make the violators 
recognize their conduct as a violation of international norms and to decline any requests for 
assistance.548 In this respect, the Court ruled that all States assumed the international obligation 
to preserve the rights of other States and its people when becoming a Member of the UN.549 
Therefore, whenever any Member State deviates from its obligations in this regard, “that State 
cannot be recognized as retaining the rights which it claims to derive from the relationship,” 
according to the Court’s holding.550 
 Based on its finding of the binding effect of the mandate, the ICJ held that South Africa 
had deliberately and consistently violated the resolutions and decisions adopted by both the 
UNGA and the UNSC. According to the Court, the mandate adopted by the UN had binding 
effects on all Member States, thereby legally obligating any violator of the mandate to rectify 
its violations or breaches.551 Hence, the Court ruled that other Member States were also obliged 
to recognize its conduct as a violation, hence mandating the States to refuse to give any aid to 
that recalcitrant State.552 Therefore, the UNGA reaffirmed the violation of the mandate on the 
part of South Africa since it had been occupying the territory of Namibia, notwithstanding the 
continued requests from the international community, thus adopting resolution 2145 (XXI) to 
terminate the mandate.553 The Court found the UNGA had acted within its competence when 
deciding to terminate the mandate.554 Furthermore, the Court found that the resolutions and 
decisions adopted by the UNSC to enforce the termination were binding upon the Member 
	
547 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at ¶ 117—27, 133. 
548 Id.  
549 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, supra note 545 (quoting Namibia Case, supra note 401, at ¶ 90, 129). 
550 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at ¶ 91. 
551 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, supra note 545. 
552 Id. 
553 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, supra note 545. 
554 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at ¶ 69—77. 
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States “regardless of how they voted on the measure when adopted.”555 With this reasoning, 
the Court ruled that South Africa was obligated to follow “the dictates of the mandate, the 
resolutions terminating it, and the enforcement procedures adopted by the UNSC.”556  
 Despite South Africa’s continued refusal to withdraw from the territory of Namibia, 
international efforts eventually resulted in the establishment of the independent republic of 
Namibia in 1990. Indeed, even after the advisory opinion was rendered in 1971, South Africa 
continued to occupy Namibia until agreeing in 1988 to relinquish its control in exchange for a 
total Cuban military withdrawal from Angola.557 In the following year, the UNSC decided to 
implement Resolution 435, which was adopted in 1978 and contained a roadmap for the 
independence of Namibia, and to establish the UN Transition Assistance Group (“UNTAG”) 
as part of its peace-keeping operation in this newly established republic. In November 1989, 
the vote to elect members of the Constituent Assembly of Namibia was held under the 
supervision of UNTAG. In 1990, Namibia finally became an independent republic and joined 
the UN membership. Although South Africa refused to relinquish control over Namibia due to 
the lack of binding effect and effective enforcement measures of the advisory opinion, the 
collective efforts of the international community impelled by the Court’s rulings eventually 
contributed to the independence of the new republic. 
 
6. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (1950) 
 
a. The First Phase Delivered on Mar. 30, 1950 
 
	
555 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, supra note 545 (citing Namibia Case, supra note 401, at ¶ 113). 
556 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, supra note 545. 
557 The Agreement among the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South 
Africa, Angl.-Cuba-S. Afr., Dec. 22, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 959 (1989). 
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The Paris Peace Treaties with the Axis Satellites (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Finland) had originally been drawn up to recognize these countries as sovereign States to allow 
them to join the UN membership. However, the settlement of dispute provisions in the treaties 
posed great difficulties throughout the drafting process. Despite the Paris Peace Conference, in 
which there was agreement to have the ICJ oversee any disputes, other Allied Powers preferred 
inter-governmental dispute settlement for political, diplomatic, and other conciliatory 
matters.558 They were reluctant to utilize either the Court or international arbitral tribunals in 
potential disputes since such international judicial bodies might produce binding decisions. At 
the foreign minister-level talk held in New York on December 5, 1946, the Allies finally 
reached an agreement to adopt the arbitration mechanism as a last resort for the ultimate 
settlement of disputes should a negotiated settlement prove unsuccessful.559 Also, the parties 
to the Treaties chose to utilize a special ad hoc commission for the resolution of future disputes, 
rather than relying on the Court, which at that time was viewed as an immature judicial 
institution affiliated with the UN. 
On March 30, 1950, the ICJ gave its advisory opinion on the interpretation and 
application of the settlement-of-disputes provisions embedded in the Paris Peace Treaties, 
particularly with regards to the process of international arbitration. In fact, the US and the UK 
governments had initiated this advisory proceeding to charge Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania 
with infringing upon their peoples’ human rights and fundamental freedoms, which had been 
prescribed in the Treaties.560 Notwithstanding the exhaustion of the prescribed procedure of 
settlement-of-disputes, the three governments had not complied with the request to form a 
	
558  Kenneth S. Carlston, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, Advisory 
Opinion of the International Court of Justice, 44(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 728, 728—9 (1950) (quoting Martin Domke, 
Settlement-of-Disputes Provisions in Axis Satellite Peace Treaties, 41(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 911, 911 (1947)). 
559 Carlston, supra note 559, at 728. 
560 Id. at 729.  
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commission, arguing that there was no existing dispute between them.561 On October 22, 1949, 
the UNGA, adopted a resolution to request the Court’s advisory opinion on the issue. 
Of the four questions requested for the ICJ’s advisory opinion, the Court answered only 
the first two in the initial phase of the proceeding. The first question submitted was whether 
“the diplomatic exchanges between Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, and certain Allied and 
Associated Powers disclose disputes subject to the provisions for the settlement of disputes 
contained in the Treaties.”562 The second question asked whether “the three States are obligated 
to carry out the provisions of the articles in the Treaties for the settlement of disputes, including 
the provisions for the appointment of their representatives to the Commissions in the event of 
an affirmative reply to the first question.”563 
For the first two questions, the ICJ affirmed by eleven votes to three the existence of 
its jurisdictional authority over the issue, the existence of the dispute concerning the settlement-
of-disputes provisions contained in the Peace Treaties, and the existence of an obligation to 
carry out such a settlement procedure on the part of the three States. The Court first decided 
that, in the present case, the interpretation of the terms of the Treaties did not essentially fall 
within the domestic jurisdiction of each State since the object of the request was “directed 
solely to obtain certain clarification of a legal nature regarding the application of the settlement 
of disputes procedures.”564 Furthermore, the Court clarified that the request, by its very nature, 
was a question of international law lying within the competence of the Court given that UN 
Charter Article 55 called on the UN to “promote universal respect for and observance of human 
rights.”565  
	
561 Id (citing the Minister in Bulgaria to the Secretary of State of the United States, Sept. 1, 1949, at 63). 
562 Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 67 (alteration in original). 
563 Id. 
564 Id. at 70. 
565 Id. at 70—1. 
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Second, the Court confirmed that the dispute that was subject to the settlement-of-
disputes provisions, since “certain charges had been brought against certain States.”566 In 
relation to this, the Court added that it would not decline to give its opinion since it had not 
been asked to adjudicate on the merits of the dispute but, rather, to “enlighten the UNGA on 
the applicability of the procedure” prescribed in the Treaties.567 Lastly, the Court ruled that the 
three States were obligated to appoint their representatives to the Commission based on the 
settlement-of-disputes provisions to deal with issues over human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as the US and the UK had charged.568 According to the Court, all the required 
conditions to commence the appointment and dispute settlement procedure were satisfied when 
the three States had been tasked to take remedial measures.569 
 
b. The Second Phase Delivered on July 18, 1950 
 
 As the governments of the three States had refused to comply with the ICJ’s judgment, 
the Court proceeded to answer the remaining questions that had been requested at the outset by 
the UNGA on October 22, 1949. The Second Phase started with the Acting Secretary-General’s 
action on May 1, 1950, notifying the Court of the fact that the three States had not appointed 
their representatives to the Treaty Commission even after the delivery of the advisory opinion. 
In June 1950, the representatives of the US, the UK, and the UNSG submitted a series of oral 
and written statements, expressing their opinion on the remaining questions and asking the 
Court for its advisory opinion therein. 
	
566 Id. at 70 (alteration in original). 
567 Id. at 72. 
568 Id. at 74. 
569 Id. at 77 (finding that “the Treaties provide that any dispute shall be referred to a Commission ‘at the request 
of either party,’ thereby either party being obligated, at the request of the other party, to co-operate in constituting 
the Commission, in particular by appointing its representative.”). 
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 The main issue in the second phase was whether the UNSG was authorized to appoint 
the third representative to the Treaty Commission under the Treaties of Peace with Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Romania in circumstances where their governments had not carried out the 
procedure set out in the Treaties. In fact, by its resolution adopted on October 22, 1949, the 
UNGA submitted another question to the Court as to “whether a Treaty Commission composed 
of a representative of one party and a third member appointed by the UNSG would constitute 
a Commission, within the meaning of the relevant treaty articles, competent to make a 
definitive binding decision in the settlement of a dispute.”570 Simply put, since the Court did 
not give an affirmative answer to the previous question as to whether the UNSG was authorized 
to make the appointment, the Court did not have to render its judgment on this last question on 
the competence of a tribunal so constituted. 
 Based on the natural and ordinary meanings of the terms employed by the dispute-of-
settlement clauses of the Treaties, the ICJ concluded that the UNSG was not authorized to 
appoint the third member to the Treaty Commission, even though he was not completely 
prohibited from doing so.571 According to the Court, the intention of a party to an international 
arbitration should not be inferred in a contrary way if there is no clause expressly permitting 
that inference within a given arbitration agreement.572 In line with that approach, the Court 
further highlighted that “a change in the normal sequence of the appointment” might only be 
justified when the parties had so desired to facilitate the constitutional process provided by the 
Treaties.573 In accordance with the basic rules and principles of international arbitration, the 
Court drew this approach based on its rationale that the UNSG might be authorized to appoint 
a third member only if there was an explicit agreement between the parties. Moreover, even if 
	
570 Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 221, at 224 (July 18) (second phase) (alteration 
in original) [hereinafter Peace Treaties Case, Second Phase]. 
571 Id. at 227. 
572 Id. 
573 Id. at 227—8. 
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a two-member Commission had been constituted without a third member being appointed by 
the prescribed terms, the Court held that such an incompletely composed Commission would 
not have “the same degree of moral authority” given that any one national Commissioner could 
prevent a unanimous decision.574 More significantly, the Court justified its holding, stating that 
the practical difficulties created by the three States’ violation of the Treaty obligation and 
international responsibility would not allow the Court to alternatively interpret the “conditions 
contemplated in the Treaties” to advocate “the exercise of the UNSG’s power of 
appointment.”575 As the Court articulated in this case, even if there is a need to remedy the 
absence of an express provision for greater ends, this need does not automatically allow the 
Court to make such an alternative and analogical interpretation, because doing so would 
encourage the Court to exceed its judicial competence.576 
 Although the ICJ voiced its concern about improving the well-being of the international 
community as a whole, the Court manifestly maintained its impartiality as an international 
judicial body and demonstrated its tendency to follow established laws and legal practices, 
including arbitral practice in this case in particular.577 Specifically speaking, as a court of law, 
the Court’s opinion was to give its confidence to Member States that it would always reach its 
decision on the basis of established rules and principles of international law.578 In this case, the 
Court elaborated that the appointment of a third member by the UNSG, other than stipulated 
in the Treaties, would infringe upon “the initial validity of the constitution of the 
Commission”;579  furthermore, even assuming that a two-member Commission constituted 
without a third member gave a binding decision, it would be a breach of “fundamental 
	
574 Id. at 228. 
575 Id. at 228—9. 
576 Id. at 229—30. 
577 Carlston, supra note 559, at 737. 
578 Id. at 731. 
579 Peace Treaties Case, Second Phase, supra note 571, at 229. 
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principles of jurisdiction and procedural rule of the right to be heard,” according to the Court.580 
However, as Judge Azevedo made clear in his separate opinion, this case brought up the 
decades-old problem of how the classic international order of sovereign States could be 
harmonized with the powers and functions of the UN. To do so would require the solidarity of 
the international community rather than the anarchic tendency that originated from the 
conventional concept of sovereign States. 
 
C. Conclusion of This Chapter 
 
Considering the gravity of the NLL Conflict in the inter-Korean relations and complex 
legal controversies therein, it can be concluded from the case analysis that the Court is 
competent to set up a judicial guideline for the two Koreas through its advisory proceeding. In 
some precedents, the ICJ could not draw the final resolution of the disputes at hand. However, 
the precedents examined in this chapter certainly offer a route for the States concerned in the 
Conflict to construct a dispute-resolution framework for it under the present international 
judicial system. It is also noteworthy that, in such precedents, the Court did not accept any 
ultra vires objections raised by the States involved nor did it exercise its judicial discretion 
dismissing the requests on the pretext of a compelling reason to do so.  
The takeaway of Kosovo Opinion in relation to this doctrinal project is that it 
demonstrates how active participation of the international community as a whole affected the 
establishment of advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ over such disputes. In fact, the UNGA with 
the support of 77 Member States in its favor adopted a resolution to initiate the advisory 
proceeding, which was accompanied by support from the UNSG. With respect to subject-
matter/material jurisdiction-related issues in advisory proceeding, the Court reaffirmed that the 
	
580 Carlston, supra note 559, at 734—5. 
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establishment of its jurisdiction should not be hindered by certain underlying political aspect 
or motive so long as a given dispute genuinely involves a question of legal character. More 
importantly, the Court in this case clarified the matters related with its personal jurisdiction, 
coordinating the competence of the UNGA and the UNSC by referring to the UN Charter. The 
Court also reconfirmed its long-standing jurisprudence on an issue over judicial restraint, 
highlighting that it should be cautious in not exercising such restraint, given its mission and 
role as the principal judicial organ of the UN.  
The advisory opinion over the legality of the border-type wall in Israeli Wall Case is a 
good example of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the jurisdiction-related matters— 
especially, how its advisory jurisdiction could be established and utilized in such thorny 
international conflict. In this case, the proceeding was commenced at the request of the UNGA, 
adopting a resolution with the support of 90 Member States. While acknowledging the 
UNGA’s competence in relation to this conflict, the Court found that the mechanism of the 
UNGA could be operated in a complementary sense to that of the UNSC in certain 
circumstances where the latter has failed to exercise its role to maintain international peace and 
security. In this case, the Court also held that certain political elements intermixed with legal 
questions should not be interfering with the establishment of its subject-matter/material 
jurisdiction in advisory proceeding. Most significantly, the Court reaffirmed in this case that 
the absence of the state consent in relevant contentious proceeding should not be considered a 
mitigating factor insofar as a requested issue directly concerns the requesting organization. 
Regarding the purpose of this doctrinal study, moreover, this opinion is noteworthy since the 
Court suggested a guideline based on international humanitarian law for the States involved as 
well as other Member States which were not directly involved therein¾albeit not binding¾ 
on how they should be acting in compliance with the legal obligation identified through its 
advisory proceeding. 
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The case analysis of this Chapter has also explored Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons with reference to WHO Nuclear Weapons Case, underscoring the point that 
the ICJ through those two cases drew a sharp dividing line between the competence of the 
UNGA and that of other international organizations, such as the WHO, in the context of 
personal jurisdiction in its advisory proceedings. The Court had not moved forward to the 
merits stage in WHO Nuclear Weapons Case by reason of the doctrine of ultra vires, whereas 
it responded to the UNGA’s resolution requesting for its advisory opinion on the same legal 
question. Therefore, this case is a good example of why the UNGA or the UNSC, which may 
exercise their original right to request an advisory opinion of the Court pursuant to the UN 
Charter, Article 96, paragraph 1, should be considered a primary and practical option for the 
purpose of this doctrinal project. 
Western Sahara and a set of advisory cases relating to the South West Africa issues 
demonstrates that collective and continuing efforts of the international community as a whole, 
including both the UNSC and UNGA, in accordance with an advisory opinion of the ICJ on a 
given international dispute play a pivotal role in the ultimate settlement thereof. Due to the lack 
of a definitive, binding and authoritative effect of advisory opinion rendered by the Court, the 
conflict over the legal status of the territory of Western Sahara and the rightful ownership 
thereof has not yet been resolved. Furthermore, although Namibia managed to acquire the 
status of an independent republic in 1990, what occurred in the cases concerning South West 
Africa indicates that the lack of enforceable means under the international judicial system with 
the Court at its center has fundamental limits to execute its opinion for the ultimate resolution. 
Nevertheless, the role and influence of the Court’s advisory proceeding should not be 
undermined, inasmuch as the opinions rendered in such cases offered a neutral and equitable 
direction forward for the State involved therein.  
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As one of the early precedents of the ICJ’s advisory proceeding, the case analysis of 
this Chapter III has analyzed Peace Treaties Case, since the Court in this case came to the fore 
as a fair and reliable advisor for the judicial settlement of an international dispute involving a 
legal controversy. Rather than suggesting a solution based on analogical interpretation of the 
international treaties at issue, the Court chose to maintain its impartiality as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN, which was taking its place in the international community as the 
newly established international judicial authority in the wake of the Second World War. The 
Court made clear in this case that it would interpret and apply the established rules and 
principles of international law to an extent not exceeding its judicial competence so as not to 
infringe upon a sovereignty of an independent nation. This case is noteworthy in relation to 
this doctrinal project, since the Court provided an outline on how it would be harmoniously 
blended within the international order that was being formed with the sovereign nations so as 
to contribute to the pacific settlement of international disputes or conflicts that would be 
emerging. 
 
IV. OPERATING THE ICJ ADVISORY JURISDICTION FOR THE NLL 
CONFLICT: HYPOTHETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PROSPECT 
 
A. Introduction to This Chapter 
 
Grounded in the discussions in the previous sections, Chapter IV of this dissertation 
will simulate the operation of the jurisdictional mechanism of the ICJ in order to verify the 
advisory proceeding of the Court as the most promising judicial option for the States concerned 
in the NLL Conflict to construct the dispute-resolution framework. To this end, Section B of 
this chapter will deal with several issues concerning the establishment of the advisory 
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jurisdiction that is expected to arise from or in relation to this hypothetical case. By assuming 
an initiation by one of the primary organs of the UN, this section will give priority to proving 
how each type of jurisdiction can be affirmed in this case. Additionally, in this regard, it will 
also be determined in Section C as to how the Court, before proceeding to the merits stage, is 
expected to respond to a conceivable objection that may be raised by any party involved in this 
Conflict on the basis of issues not related to jurisdictional matters, i.e., the admissibility 
objection. 
Establishing the ICJ advisory jurisdiction in a hypothetical case concerning the NLL 
Conflict also requires revisiting the conceptual understanding of the relevant notions, the 
international legal instruments, and the jurisprudence achieved in the advisory precedents 
rendered by the Court throughout its decades of operation. In this sense, based on an 
understanding of the conceptual difference between the notion of jurisprudence and that of 
competence in the context of the ICJ jurisdictional mechanism, it is necessary to comprehend 
what it means for the Court to have jurisdictional authority in this hypothetical case. Moreover, 
in addition to considering conceivable problems concerned with the Conflict that may arise in 
the course of establishing each type of jurisdiction, it is also necessary to recapitulate the 
jurisdictional elements comprising the advisory proceeding for a better understanding of the 
discussion in this chapter. 
The research questions that have initially triggered this doctrinal project will be 
addressed by reference to the relevant legal instruments and the holdings of the precedents. 
This will support the argument that it is doctrinally possible to establish the ICJ’s advisory 
jurisdiction as a judicial forum for the peaceful settlement of the NLL Conflict. First, with 
respect to the identification of the personal jurisdiction in this hypothetical case, a request made 
by one of the competent primary organs of the UN will be assumed as against any ultra vires 
objection that may be raised by any of the parties involved. Second, authorizing the UNSG or 
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the Secretariat will also be explored as an extension of the discussion on the establishment of 
the Court’s personal jurisdiction. Third, an analysis will be conducted as to whether 
controversies surrounding the Conflict are of a sufficient legal nature to fall within the subject-
matter/material jurisdiction of the Court. Last but not least, it will be affirmed for the purpose 
of this doctrinal project whether the lack of any state consent on the part of the States concerned 
in the Conflict affects the establishment and authority of the Court’s jurisdictional power. 
In addition to the jurisdictional matters aforementioned, Section C of this chapter will 
also go through other issues regarding the admissibility of a request and judicial discretion that 
the ICJ may encounter in this hypothetical case. Considering that the Court may be stymied 
with an objection asserting the lack of admissibility on the basis of diversified grounds even 
after the establishment of its jurisdiction over this case, this is certainly a matter to be addressed 
along with the jurisdiction-related matters for the purpose of this doctrinal research. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the preceding opinions rendered by the Court, this section will 
contemplate whether this hypothetical case is to be dismissed before being moved forward to 
the merits stage if the Court exercises its discretionary power to refrain from considering this 
Conflict.  
 
B. Establishing the ICJ Jurisdiction over a Hypothetical Request for Advisory Opinion 
on the NLL Conflict 
 
1. Jurisdiction in Terms of Advisory Proceeding 
 
For ease discussion in this Chapter, the legal concept “jurisdiction” will be briefly 
revisited to clarify its role and function in a hypothetical advisory request concerning the NLL 
Conflict instituted by a competent organ of the UN, i.e., the UNGA, UNSC or, if allowed, 
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UNSG. Although there is a debate about the conceptual difference between the legal concepts 
of “jurisdiction” and “competence,” it is, in practice, not necessary to distinguish them in 
understanding the ICJ’s advisory proceeding, given the jurisprudence of the Court. Indeed, the 
Court has interchangeably used these concepts throughout its operation. The Court is presumed 
to be based on the idea of linguistic difference, since it explained its judicial capacity over the 
requested legal questions under the heading of “jurisdiction” in the English version of its 
opinions, whereas it dealt with the same type of questions under the heading of “competence” 
in the French version.581 Nor do any of the relevant legal instruments, which provide the basis 
for the Court’s structure and operation, such as the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute, have any 
independent term or language to distinguish the concepts. Nevertheless, as Fitzmaurice, Griesel, 
and Dubisson assert, there is at least certain linguistic nuance for the concept of “competence,” 
indicating that a more definite, concrete, and specific capacity of the Court is required, in 
particular, with regard to the merits of a given case.582 In this respect, it is to be noted that the 
concept “jurisdiction” has been used more frequently in the advisory proceedings to describe 
the judicial capacity of the Court, as Rosenne points out.583 As Fitzmaurice suggests that the 
concept “competence” should be specifically used to describe the capacity of an authorized 
organ or agency empowering them to make a request for an advisory opinion from the Court 
in relation to its activities.584 Finally, in furtherance of this doctrinal project, the notion of 
advisory jurisdiction in the context of the Court’s advisory proceeding should be simply 
defined as follows: the general/specific capacity of the Court necessarily required to answer a 
definite factual/legal question requested by a competent organ or agency affiliated with the UN, 
seeking a non-binding but substantively persuasive interpretation of international law on a legal 
question arising from the scope of their activities. 
	
581 SZAFARZ, supra note 239, at 2. 
582 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 243, at 8. 
583 See ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 36. 
584 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 243, at 8—9. 
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2. Overview of Jurisdictional Requirements Necessary to Establish the ICJ 
Advisory Jurisdiction 
 
 The ICJ must contemplate on its own motion its jurisdictional competence to determine 
whether a requesting international body has standing in making an advisory request as a 
precondition to the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction over a given case. To that end, the 
Court explores litigants, subject-matter, extent, and limit of its judicial capacity in relation to a 
given claim or request in either of contentious or advisory proceedings.585 When it comes to its 
advisory proceeding, in particular, only the UNGA, the UNSC, other authorized UN organs, 
and specialized agencies are eligible to make a request for an advisory opinion from the Court, 
according to the UN Charter Article 96. Specifically, as far as the operation of its advisory 
jurisdiction is concerned, the Court is not generally entitled by the UN Charter to exercise its 
personal jurisdiction on its own motion over Member States, even if there is an ongoing 
international dispute. In other words, as a necessary precondition, a request for the Court’s 
advisory opinion must be made by any of the qualified international organs and agencies. As 
stipulated in Article 96, paragraph 2, the agencies whose competence is connected with the UN, 
albeit limitedly, by the special agreements concluded under the UN Charter Article 57, 
paragraph 1, and Article 63 may find its standing in an advisory proceeding.586 This is the most 
distinct difference between advisory and contentious proceedings of the Court, inasmuch as a 
	
585 KOLB, supra note 255, at 166. 
586  U.N. Charter art. 57, para. 1 (providing that “The various specialized agencies, established by 
intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, 
in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the 
United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.”; at art. 63, para. 1 (providing that “The Economic 
and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms 
on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall 
be subject to approval by the General Assembly.”); at art. 63, para. 2 (providing that “It may co-ordinate the 
activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and 
through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.”). 
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contentious proceeding is instituted by the submission of an application by a sovereign State 
or States. More to the point, in terms of the personal jurisdiction of an advisory proceeding, the 
primary organs of the UN and other authorized and/or affiliated international organs and 
agencies have different capacities: Both the UNGA and UNSC are allowed to exercise an 
original right to make an advisory request, while the other organs and agencies are entitled to 
a derivative right requiring an authorization from the UNGA to be allowed to make such 
requests. Unless such an organ or agency submits a legal question arising out of its competence 
connected with its activities, the UNGA may unilaterally revoke the authorization that allowed 
it to file an advisory request with the Court.587  
 Having identified its personal jurisdiction over a given advisory request, the ICJ must 
proceed to examine whether such request is concerned about any legal question stemming from 
the scope of the competence of a requesting organ or agency in connection with its activities, 
as set forth in the UN Charter 96, paragraph 2 and the ICJ Statute Article 65, paragraph 1. To 
confirm its subject-matter/material jurisdiction over a request at hand, the Court must scrutinize 
the subject-matter of such requests by applying the following perspectives. First, a requesting 
organ or agency must seek an advisory opinion of the Court on “a question of a legal character,” 
which is “framed in terms of law and raising problems of international law.”588 Although the 
Court may refuse to adjudicate on a non-legal question through its advisory proceeding, it has 
a pattern of accepting a legal question even if it is intermixed with political and/or factual 
elements or is drafted equivocally into the proceeding.589 Second, the Court renders its advisory 
opinion on a legal question arising within the scope of competence in connection with activities 
of a requesting organ or agency. In this respect, therefore, the UNGA is conferred upon broader 
competence by the UN Charter Article 10 in making a request for an advisory opinion, even 
	
587 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 45. 
588 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 18—9. 
589 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 57. 
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though its Article 96, paragraph 1 does not contain any specific provision explicitly 
discriminating against it in favor of the UNSC in terms of the parameters of the subject-
matter/material jurisdiction of the Court in its advisory proceeding. However, the other organs 
or agencies of the UN may be narrowly authorized to request an advisory opinion of the Court 
insofar as their legal question is rooted in the scope of their competence linked with their 
activities. As pointed out above, such authorization is still subject to the UNGA’s 
determination. In practice, the Court tends to restrict the scope of the competence of such 
organs or agencies, holding that they should not be treated equally with an independent 
sovereign State.590 In other words, although such organs and agencies are allowed to have an 
independent authority to determine the sphere of their competence, such authority is 
subordinate to the UNGA and the Court, which retains the ultimate authority to decide its 
subject-matter/material jurisdiction over an advisory request. 
 Notwithstanding the essential role of the state consent for the establishment of the ICJ 
contentious jurisdiction, it is not considered a necessary prerequisite for its advisory proceeding, 
as identified in the jurisprudence of the Court regarding the consensual/consent-based 
jurisdiction.591 Since a sovereign State is deemed to be the most salient pillar upholding the 
contemporary international order, international courts and tribunals may be entitled to express 
their judicial opinion in a particular case only where disputing States have submitted their 
issues to the jurisdictional authority of such courts and tribunals. However, as discussed above, 
the Court advisory jurisdiction is regarded as an extraordinary judicial proceeding, requiring 
distinct elements to be given establishment over a given advisory request. Namely, irrespective 
of whether a given advisory request involves a particular sovereign State, the Court will find 
that the state consent should not be a condition precedent for the establishment of its advisory 
	
590 WHO Nuclear Weapons Case, supra note 416, at 82. 
591 E.g., Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 70—1; Genocide Case, supra note 443, at 19; Israeli 
Wall Case, supra note 397, ¶¶ 46—9; Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 24—5; Namibia Case, supra note 
401, at 23—4; Applicability Case, supra note 306, at 188—9. 
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jurisdiction. In tandem with this approach, the Court has also consistently refused to accept any 
objections relying on the absence of the state consent to its advisory jurisdiction on the part of 
a State concerned, emphasizing its role and responsibility as the primary judicial organ of the 
UN. The ICJ bears an obligation to administer global justice by conducting its judicial function 
appropriately for the development of international law for the international community. 
Furthermore, the legal instruments relevant to this issue are all silent on whether the state 
consent is a prerequisite for exercising of the Court’s advisory function. Therefore, unless there 
is a compelling reason for the Court to refrain from expressing its advisory opinion, such as 
judicial propriety592 or judicial restraint, the state consent will not be considered by the Court 
a necessary precondition. In this sense, despite the role of the doctrine of forum prorogatum as 
a supplementary basis for the establishment of contentious jurisdiction of the Court, the 
doctrine is not likely to play an important role in the operation of advisory proceedings of the 
Court. 
 Throughout the decades-long operation of its advisory proceedings, the Court was 
reluctant to accept the objections raised against its exercise of jurisdictional power, mostly 
finding no compelling reasons to refrain from moving forward to the merits stage. In multiple 
advisory proceedings explored above, such as Wall Case, Peace Treaties Case, Expenses Case 
and Namibia Case, the Court consistently held that none of the ultra vires objections 
constituted any compelling reason. The Court specifically mentioned this in Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case that the UN Charter Article 10, Article 1, paragraph 
11, and Article 13, paragraph 1 supported its reasoning in deciding so. Furthermore, it is to be 
noted that the Court was also hesitant in accepting the objections raised against the 
establishment of its subject-matter/material jurisdiction in the advisory proceedings. For 
example, the States interested in the aforementioned cases argued that the matters brought 
	
592 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 24—5. 
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before the Court were mixed with political and factual elements and hence were not within the 
subject-matter/material jurisdiction of the Court. Those States also held that the requests were 
drafted too abstractly. However, the Court decided to apply its discretion to reformulate those 
legal questions, even though they were intermixed with political and factual components, rather 
than dismissing the requests. With regard to its consensual/consent-based jurisdiction in those 
preceding advisory cases, the Court also rejected all objections, finding that the requirement of 
the state consent should not be invoked to obstruct the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction. 
Even in cases where the ongoing international disputes were involved, i.e., Peace Treaties Case 
and Western Sahara Case, the Court did not accept the objections against its jurisdictional 
authority, instead stressing its role and responsibility as the principal judicial organ obligated 
to provide the UN, Member States, and other organs and agencies with proper legal 
assistance.593 In accordance with the ICJ Statute Article 36, paragraph 6, nevertheless, the 
Court may still withdraw from proceeding to the merits stage at a given advisory request on its 
sole motion even in the absence of any objection raised against the establishment of its 
jurisdiction. 
 
3. Establishing Each Type of Jurisdictions in This Case 
 
This dissertation will focus on answering the following research questions it has sought 
to demonstrate through the previous chapters in support of its thesis. First, which organ or 
agency among the organs and agencies affiliated with the UN is the most suited to submit its 
request for the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the NLL Conflict for its pacific settlement? Second, 
in what ways can such a body achieve that goal under the present international justice system? 
Third, what kind of objections are anticipated against the operation of the advisory jurisdiction 
	
593 Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 70—1; Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, ¶¶ 46—9. 
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in this case? Last, considering its jurisprudence, what is the expected response of the Court to 
such objections? To answer these research questions, the following parts of this Section will 
explore pertinent issues, provisions prescribed in the relevant international legal instruments, 
rulings, and reasoning rendered by the Court through its precedents. With due consideration of 
the provisions, rulings, and reasoning, in particular, this dissertation will focus on verifying the 
doctrinal grounds for its thesis. This can be stated as follows: Advisory proceeding of the Court 
instituted by a competent organ of the UN is the most promising alternative to construct a 
dispute-resolution framework under the present international judicial system for the settlement 
of the Conflict. 
 
a. Upholding Personal Jurisdiction over This Case: Expected Response of the Court to 
Ultra Vires Objections 
 
The first and foremost issue to be addressed is whether the ICJ will exercise its personal 
jurisdiction over this hypothetical advisory request, once requested by a competent organ of 
the UN, in spite of an ultra vires objection raised against it. As discussed above, the UN Charter 
Article 96, paragraph 1 provides that the UNGA may exercise its original right to request for 
an advisory opinion,594 as being conferred upon the Court by the ICJ Statute 65, paragraph 1, 
on any legal question. When it comes to the material scope of the competence, the UN Charter 
Article 10 empowers the UNGA to “discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of 
the present Charter….”595 In addition, the UN Charter Article 11, paragraph 2 allows the 
UNGA to discuss a wide range of “questions relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security brought before it by any Member State.”596 More to the point, the UN Charter 
	
594 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 40. 
595 U.N. Charter art. 10 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
596 Id. at art. 11, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
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Article 1, paragraph 1 stipulates the purpose of the UN as follows: “maintaining international 
peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace…or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.”597 
In practice, the Court has been reluctant to accept the ultra vires objections raised against its 
personal jurisdiction in the course of its advisory proceedings, broadly interpreting the material 
competence and activities of the UNGA. As identified in Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons Case, the Court, in its discretion, has established its jurisprudence that a 
compelling reason should exist to restrain from establishing its advisory jurisdiction. 598 
Starting with Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case, 599  the Court has also developed its 
jurisprudence to uphold its personal jurisdiction, while acknowledging a presumption against 
such ultra vires objections based on diversified grounds.600 In both Israeli Wall Case and 
Kosovo Opinion, the Court was faced with the claim that proceeding its advisory proceeding 
at the request of the UNGA would infringe upon the UNSC’s authority.601 Having dismissed 
this ultra vires objection, the Court clarified that “any question relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security…” may be discussed by the UNGA without contravening the 
	
597 Id. at art. 1, para. 1 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
598 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 235. See also 
Expenses Case, supra note at 400, at 155. 
599 Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 70—1 (holding that “clarifying the applicability of the 
procedure for dispute settlement provided for in the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania is a 
question of international law laying within the Court’s jurisdiction.”). 
600 Expenses Case, supra note 400, at 168 (holding that “when the Organization takes action which warrants the 
assertion that it was appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the state purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.”); Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 22 (holding 
that “a resolution of a UN’s properly constituted organ which is passed in accordance with that organ’s rules of 
procedure, and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presumed to have been validly 
adopted.”). 
601 The Court dismissed the ultra vires objection raised by Israel by finding that a “recommendation” prescribed 
in the UN Charter Article 12(2) must be distinguished from an “advisory request.” Israeli Wall Case, supra note 
397, at ¶ 25 (highlighting that the Article 12(2) prohibits the UNGA from making any “recommendation” without 
the UNSC’s request). 
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UNSC’s function and authority.602 Furthermore, the Court made clear that even if its judicial 
interpretation and application of the UNSC’s resolutions to certain international disputes or 
situations may affect the UNSC’s decision in any way whatsoever, it should not be deemed a 
compelling reason for the Court to refrain from moving forward in its advisory proceeding, so 
long as the UNGA was found to have a legitimate interest in such proceeding and its 
outcome.603 
 Considering the provisions and holdings discussed above, the ICJ is likely to establish 
its personal jurisdiction over this case instituted by the UNGA’s request seeking its advisory 
opinion on legal issues surrounding the NLL Conflict despite certain ultra vires objections 
raised against it. First, the Conflict certainly involves legal questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security, which the UNGA is allowed to discuss at its 
meetings pursuant to the UN Charter Article 11, paragraph 2. Furthermore, based on the 
collective interpretation of the UN Charter Articles 10 and 1, paragraph 1, there is no doubt 
that the Conflict is a decades-long conflict between sovereign States that must be settled 
peacefully in conformity with international law so it does not escalate. Therefore, it should be 
concluded that the UNGA will have a greater chance of success in requesting an advisory 
opinion from the Court on the Conflict. Considering the fact that the Court decided to render 
its opinion in both Israeli Wall Case and Kosovo Opinion, where the contradictory positions 
of the States involved caused heated confrontation between them, it is highly likely that the 
Court will also find a reason to establish its advisory jurisdiction over the Conflict based on its 
concerns about legal controversies affecting the peace and security in the region, which is also 
	
602 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 469, at ¶ 18—25 (citing U.N. Charter art. 10 (stipulating that “The General 
Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the 
powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter.”), art. 11, para. 2 (prescribing that “The 
General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security 
brought before it by any Member of the United Nations…and may make recommendations…”) and art. 12, para. 
2 (providing that “While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions 
assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to 
that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”)). 
603 Id. at ¶ 35—48. 
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the primary concern of the UNGA. This conclusion is consistent with Rosenne and Kelsen’s 
approach limiting the scope of personal jurisdiction in advisory proceedings. Moreover, this is 
also consistent with Judge Higgin’s view requiring “the strong connection” between an 
advisory request and activities of a requesting organ. 
 Assuming that the UNSC makes a request for the ICJ’s advisory opinion on a question 
relating to the NLL Conflict, it should also be discussed whether the Court will establish its 
personal jurisdiction over UNSC’s advisory request; whether there is any discrepancy between 
the competence of the UNGA and that of the UNSC in making such request; and whether the 
Court will accept any ultra vires objections raised over such UNSC’s request. Grounded upon 
the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 1, the UNSC may also exercise its original right to request 
the Court’s advisory opinion—the jurisdictional authority conferred upon the Court by the ICJ 
Statute Article 65, paragraph 1—on any legal question. More significantly, the UNSC is 
entrusted with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” 
as prescribed in the UN Charter Article 24, paragraph 1.604 Furthermore, the UN Charter 
Chapter VI confers a special competence upon the UNSC with respect to the settlement of 
international disputes or situations: the UNSC’s right to investigate any dispute or situation 
under Article 34;605 to recommend appropriate procedures or methods for the settlement of a 
dispute or a situation under Article 36;606 to take action or make appropriate recommendations 
	
604 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1 (providing that “In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on 
their behalf.”). 
605 U.N. Charter art. 34 (providing that “The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which 
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the 
dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”). 
606 U.N. Charter art. 36, para. 1 (providing that “The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature 
referred to in Article 33 or a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment.”); id. at art. 36, para. 2 (providing that “The Security Council should take into consideration any 
procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.”); Id. at art. 36, para. 
3 (providing that “In making recommendations under this article the Security Council should also take into 
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of 
Justice in accordance with provisions of the Statute of the Court.”). 
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under Article 37, paragraph 2 in the event that the parties to a dispute or a situation has failed 
to conclude a pacific settlement;607 and to make recommendations without prejudice upon the 
request of the parties to a dispute or situation.608 As indicated in the UN Charter Article 24, 
paragraph 2, such powers and responsibilities granted solely to the UNSC is deemed essential 
for its role to maintain international peace and security in pursuit of the purposes and principles 
of the UN.609  
To answer the second and third issues, the pertinent provisions of the UN Charter 
should be revisited; the ICJ’s jurisprudence related with the ultra vires objections established 
in its preceding advisory proceedings should also be revisited with a priority given to the 
UNSC’s competence to make this hypothetical advisory request. When it comes to the different 
scope of the competence of the UNGA and that of the UNSC, the first argument is that the 
UNGA is generally allowed to exercise a broader range of authority on the basis of the UN 
Charter Article 10. Nevertheless, aside from the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 1 which has 
no separate language to differentiate the Court’s personal and subject-matter/material 
jurisdiction over the primary organs in the context of its advisory proceeding, the UNSC is 
permitted to exercise a more specific authority, at least in relation to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Second, the Court is unlikely to reject the UNSC’s advisory 
request insofar as there are no compelling reasons to accept an ultra vires objection raised to 
prevent the establishment of its personal jurisdiction over this case. Significantly, in Namibia 
Case where the UNSC requested the Court’s advisory opinion on its own, the Court affirmed 
	
607 U.N. Charter art. 37, para. 1 (providing that “Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 
33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.”); Id. at art. 37, 
para. 2 (providing that “If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 
36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.”). 
608 U.N. Charter art. 38 (providing that “Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security 
Council may, if all the parties to a dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific 
settlement of the dispute.”). 
609 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2 (prescribing that “In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security 
Council for the discharge of theses duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.”). 
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a presumption that “a resolution of a UN’s properly constituted organ which is passed in 
accordance with that organ’s rules of procedure, and is declared by its President to have been 
so passed, must be presumed to have been validly adopted.”610 More importantly, based on the 
UN Charter Article 12, paragraph 2, the Court in both Israeli Wall Case and Kosovo Opinion 
recognized that the UNSC had preference over the UNGA in dealing with disputes or situations 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.611 
 Judging from the relevant articles of the UN Charter defining the UNSC’s authority 
and responsibility, the Court is likely to affirm the establishment of its personal jurisdiction 
over a hypothetical advisory request instituted by the UNSC in this instance. As the UNSC is 
authorized to make a request for the Court’s advisory opinion based on the UN Charter Article 
96, paragraph 1 and the ICJ Statute Article 65, paragraph 1, the Council’s request is not likely 
to be turned down by reason of the lack of the Court’s personal jurisdiction. In addition to this, 
since the UN Charter Article 24, paragraph 1 confers primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security on the UNSC, seeking a solution to the 
Conflict falls within the scope of its responsibility. Given the UN Charter Chapter VI, there is 
a path anticipated for the UNSC to lead the two Koreas to a peaceful settlement of the Conflict 
through the Court’s advisory proceeding. First, the UNSC exercises its authority to investigate 
the Conflict since the continuance of the conflict in the disputed waters has endangered and 
will pose a constant threat to the peace and security in the region, according to its Article 34. 
Then, based on its Article 36, paragraph 1, the UNSC may recommend the two Koreas to 
consider the Court’s advisory proceeding for the settlement of the long-lasting issue. Aside 
from an obligation borne by the two Koreas as a Member State of the UN to refer their issue 
	
610 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 22, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 44. 
611 Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, at ¶ 25 (highlighting that the Article 12(2) prohibits the UNGA from making 
any “recommendation” without the UNSC’s request); Kosovo Opinion, supra note 469, at ¶ 18—25 (citing U.N. 
Charter art. 12, para. 2 (providing that “While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or 
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.”)). 
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to the UNSC in compliance with the UN Charter Article 37, the UNSC bears its own obligation 
to deal with the Conflict based on its threat to the peace and security in the region. Lastly, based 
on its Article 38, the UNSC may also recommend the two Koreas to request for the Court’s 
advisory opinion on the legal questions arising from the Conflict without prejudice. By taking 
these steps, the UNSC will fulfill its duty set forth in the Purposes and Principles of the UN in 
compliance with the UN Charter Article 24, paragraph 2. 
 Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the ICJ pertaining to the ultra vires objection against 
the establishment of its personal jurisdiction clearly indicates that the Court has a tendency to 
proceed to the merits stage no matter what basis is invoked to raise an ultra vires objection. As 
discussed above, the Court has been reluctant to accept the ultra vires objections against the 
establishment of its advisory jurisdiction over the requests made by the UNGA, holding that 
there was no compelling reason to refrain from. In Israeli Wall Case and Kosovo Opinion 
where the maintenance of peace and security of the region at issue was dealt with,612 the Court 
rendered its opinions as to whether the UNGA’s requests had infringed upon the UNSC’s 
competence guaranteed by the UN Charter. As mentioned above, the UNSC is entrusted with 
a primary authority and responsibility in maintaining the peace and security regionally and 
globally. To that extent, it is reasonable to categorize the UNSC as having a more direct 
concern in reaching a peaceful resolution of the Conflict. Therefore, all things considered, it is 
not plausible for the Court to accept any kind of ultra vires objection raised against the 
establishment of its personal jurisdiction over a hypothetical advisory request made by the 
UNSC seeking its opinion on the Conflict. 
 
b. Problems with Authorizing the Secretariat or the UNSG to Make This Hypothetical 
Advisory Request 
	
612 See id. 
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Another scenario for the establishment of the ICJ advisory jurisdiction over the NLL 
Conflict would be the Secretariat or the UNSG—the chief administrative officer of the 
Secretariat through his/her name the Secretariat may take an official action—being authorized 
to make a hypothetical advisory request. For decades, it has been debated whether the UNGA 
should confer either entity with the authority to request an advisory opinion from the Court. 
On the basis of the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 2, the UNGA has given its authorization 
to organs and specialized agencies affiliated with the UN613  but, despite its legal status, 
authorizing the Secretariat has always been controversial. Except for the Court itself, the 
Secretariat is deemed to be the only principal organ of the UN that has not been officially given 
this authority.614 As will be discussed below, international lawyers and politicians suggest that 
both the Secretariat and the UNSG as its chief administrative officer should be authorized to 
make an advisory request. Therefore, in this respect, the first issue that will be covered in the 
following discussion is whether the UNGA may give a legal entitlement to either the Secretariat 
or the UNSG so that either of them can make a request for the Court’s advisory opinion on the 
Conflict; and second, assuming that such authority may be legally vested in either the 
Secretariat or the UNSG, it should be also discussed whether the UNGA will be willing to vest 
such authority in either of them. 
 Notwithstanding the controversy, the relevant legal instruments provide a theoretical 
foundation supporting the authorization of the Secretariat or the UNSG. First, pursuant to the 
UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 2, which defines the scope of the personal jurisdiction and 
subject-matter/material jurisdiction, the UNGA may authorize the “other organs of the UN and 
	
613 For instance, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Interim Committee of the UNGA, 
the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, and several specialized agencies of the UN have been afforded to make such requests. 
614 Stephen M. Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions 
of the International Court of Justice, 78(4) AM. J. INT’L. L. 869, at 869 (1984). 
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specialized agencies” to make a request for the Court’s advisory opinion on “legal questions 
arising within the scope of their activities.”615 As stipulated in the ICJ Statute Article 65, 
paragraph 1, moreover, the Court may express its non-binding judicial view “on any legal 
question at the request of whatever body may be authorized.”616 The functions and activities of 
the Secretariat and the UNSG, which might be relevant to determine the subject-
matter/material jurisdiction of the Court over their advisory request, are prescribed in the UN 
Charter Articles 97 through 102;617 especially Article 99 that legally entitles the UNSG to 
“bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten 
the maintenance of international peace and security” insofar as such issues involve a legal 
question related to the scope of his/her functions and activities.618  Also, according to the 
Convention on the Privileges and the Immunities of the United Nations (“Geneva Convention”) 
Article 8, Section 30, the Court has jurisdiction to clarify any difference between the UN and 
a Member State arising from or in connection with the interpretation and application thereof.619  
	
615 U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
616 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 65, para 1 (emphasis added). 
617 U.N. Charter art. 97 (prescribing that “The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the 
Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.”); id. 
at art. 98 (prescribing that “The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General 
Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall 
perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual 
report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.”); id. at art. 100, para. 1 (prescribing that “In the 
performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any 
government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which 
might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.”); id. at art. 100, 
para. 2 (prescribing that “Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international 
character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the 
discharge of their responsibilities.”); id. at art. 101, para. 1 (prescribing that “The staff shall be appointed by the 
Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.”); id. at art. 101, para. 2 (prescribing 
that “Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship 
Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.”); 
id. at art. 101, para. 3 (prescribing that “The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the 
determination of the conditions of service shall be necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, 
competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a 
geographical basis as possible.”). 
618 U.N. Charter art. 99. 
619 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 8, sec. 30, opened for signature Feb. 
13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force Sept. 17, 1946) (stipulating that “…If a difference arises between the 
United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion 
on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the 
Court. The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties.”). 
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 In international practice pertaining to the authorization of the Secretariat and the UNSG 
to legally entitle either of them to file an advisory request with the ICJ, the tendency has been 
to uphold such authorization. Having considered the practices of the UNGA, it becomes clearer 
that the concept of “authorized organs” embraces both the principal and subsidiary entities 
affiliated with the UN when interpreting “other organs of the UN” provided in the UN Charter 
Article 96, paragraph 2.620 Furthermore, the UNSG has on occasion expressed an intention to 
utilize the advisory proceeding of the Court in handling international legal disputes and 
situations; e.g., An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: 
Rep. of the Secretary-General.621 Indeed, this intention was also identified in the UNSG’s 1950 
report sent to the Commission on Human Rights when he was confident of the capacity of the 
UNGA to authorize him to make an advisory request, contrary to the Human Rights 
Committee.622 After contemplating a list of possible entities that could be authorized by the 
UNGA, the UNSG further claimed that, based on the UN Charter Articles 96, paragraph 2 and 
98, the Secretariat and the UNSG as its chief administrative officer may be entrusted by the 
UNGA as a principal organ of the UN to make a request for the Court’s advisory opinion.623 
Analogous to this opinion, the UNSG in 1955 also issued his view, asserting that the UNGA 
may at any time authorize the UNSG as the head of the principal organ of the UN (which in 
this matter meant the Secretariat) to make a request for the Court’s advisory opinion and that 
	
620 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 46.  
621 U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: Rep. 
of the Secretary-General, supra note 413, ¶ 14. 
622 Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 870 (asserting in the report that “as the Committee was not a 
subsidiary organ of the UN but a body established by a separate and distinct international instrument, it would not 
be deemed an organ entitled by the UNGA to request advisory opinions.”). 
623 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. E/1732 (June 26, 1950) (contending that “A fourth possibility 
would be the Secretariat, which can be authorized under Article 96 since it is a principal organ of the United 
Nations…The answer to this may be found by reference to Article 98 which provides that the Secretary-General 
shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by the General Assembly and the Councils of the 
Organization. Accordingly, it would be necessary for the General Assembly to entrust the Secretary-General with 
the function of considering suggestions of the Human Rights Committee in regard to requests for advisory 
opinions on questions arising out of that Committee’s work. Pursuant to this, the General Assembly could then 
extend an authorization to the Secretary-General under Article 96(2) in the same terms as those suggested in the 
preceding paragraph for the Commission on Human Rights.”). 
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doing so would embody a proper division of duties between them.624 In some of the advisory 
cases, such as Peace Treaties Case and Kosovo Opinion, though the UNSGs did not file those 
advisory requests, the UNSG actively participated during the course of those proceedings—for 
example, filing oral and written statements to clarify his point of view and notifying the Court 
of non-compliance of the involved State parties. Throughout the operation of the Court, several 
Member States have suggested to authorize the UNSG to make a request for an advisory 
opinion of the Court on a legal question arising within the scope of the competence in 
connection with his/her activities, whereas no strong objection has yet been raised against such 
suggestion.625 
 Aside from a debate over whether the Secretariat or the UNSG should be authorized to 
make an advisory request, most international legal scholars and lawyers generally acknowledge 
that at least one of them should be. Having interpreted the UN Charter Article 98 in a relatively 
permissive way, these jurists focuse on the administrative and political capacity of the 
Secretariat and the UNSG that are obligated to participate in meetings of the other principal 
organs of the UN.626 However, there are some concerns about a potential conflict of authority 
between the Secretariat and the UNSG on the one hand and the UNGA and the UNSC on the 
other.627 It is also argued that authorizing the Secretariat or the UNSG might unnecessarily 
strengthen their political influence contrary to the drafters’ intention to limit their autonomy 
	
624 Judicial Review of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Judgments, Working Paper submitted by the 
Secretary-General, 10 UN GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 49) at 17, 23, UN Doc. A/AC.78/L.1 and Corr.1 (1955) 
(asserting that “…It would appear to be too cumbersome a procedure for the General Assembly, itself, to request 
advisory opinions in each case. Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, however, provides that organs of the United 
Nations which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly may request advisory opinions of the 
Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. The General Assembly could therefore 
authorize the Secretary-General, who is the head of a principal organ of the United Nations, to request advisory 
opinions on legal questions.”). 
625 See Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 871. 
626 See e.g., Szasz, supra note 410, at 531—2; BEDJAOUI, supra note 410, at 78, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 
241, at 50. 
627 BEDJAOUI, supra note 410, at 78; Bowett, supra note 411, at 187—8, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 
51. 
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vis-à-vis the UNGA or the UNSC.628 With respect to the subject in which such authority may 
be vested, it is debated whether it is the Secretariat or the UNSG that is entitled to make an 
advisory request. Focusing on the conceptual conflict emerging from the different wording 
between the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 2 and the ICJ Statute Article 65, paragraph 1, 
Professor Kelsen points out that the UNSG may not be competent to receive the Court’s 
advisory opinion under the ICJ Statute in which the term “body” is employed,629 even if he/she 
might be authorized to make an advisory request under the UN Charter.630 In response, Szasz 
argues that “Kelsen’s narrow understanding of the ICJ Statute could be overcome by simply 
vesting the authority in the Secretariat, whose political functions are embodied in the Secretary-
General.”631 Similarly, Jessup asserts that “although under Article 7 it is the Secretariat and not 
the Secretary-General which is the ‘organ,’ any power of the Secretariat would be exercised by 
or under the authority of the Secretary-General.”632 On the same bent, Keith also offers a 
solution to the conceptual conflict, arguing that “it would be resolved in practice by authorizing 
the Secretariat to make requests. If the Secretariat were so authorized the Secretary-General, 
as head of that organ, would be constitutionally and ultimately responsible for any requests.”633 
	
628 BEDJAOUI, supra note 410, at 78. 
629 ICJ Statute, supra note 281, at art. 65, para 1 (providing that “the Court may give an advisory opinion on any 
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations to make such a request.”) (emphasis added). 
630 KELSEN, supra note 394, at 546 (pointing out that “As to the question to whom advisory opinions may be given, 
Article 65 of the Statute is not quite in conformity with Article 96 of the Charter. Under Article 65 of the Statute 
the Court is authorized to give advisory opinions only to a “body,” that is to say, to a collegiate organ, 
consequently not to the Secretary-General, who—under Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter—may be 
authorized by the General Assembly to request such advisory opinions of the Court.”). 
631 Szasz, supra note 410, at 499, 541 n.88, quoted in Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 875 (alteration in 
original). 
632 Phillip C. Jessup, To Form a More Perfect United Nations, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, at 187 (1970), 
quoted in Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of 
the International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 875 (alteration in original). 
633 K. KEITH, THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 38 (1971), 
quoted in Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of 
the International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 875—6 (alteration in original) (adding that “…It was surely 
the intention of the draftsmen of the Charter and Statute that the word ‘body’ in Article 65 of the Statute should 
be shorthand for ‘authorized organs of the United Nations (including the General Assembly and the Security 
Council) and of the specialized agencies.”). 
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 In conclusion, either the UNSG or the Secretariat acting under his/her name should be 
regarded as a competent subject that can be authorized to make an advisory request in the NLL 
Conflict where the disputed waters appear to be connected with their activities. First of all, 
based on the collective construction of the relevant rules, i.e., the UN Charter Article 96, 
paragraph 2, Articles 97—102, and the ICJ Statute Article 65, paragraph 2, it should be 
concluded that the Court will have its personal jurisdiction and subject-matter/material over 
this hypothetical advisory request, if made by the UNSG or the Secretariat. Crucially, it should 
be noted that the Article 96, paragraph 2 does not require any specific qualification regarding 
the authority of a requesting body, but only its scope of activities.634 As articulated in the UN 
Charter Articles 97—102, the Conflict should be deemed a type of international dispute or 
situation that requires attention from the UNSG and the Secretariat. Although Article 96, 
paragraph 2 provides a restricted sphere for the subject-matter/material jurisdiction over the 
UNSG’s request, he/she may take into account a broad area of international disputes or 
situations given his/her competence to participate in all meetings of the other organs of the 
UN.635 Indeed, the UNSG may at any time bring the Conflict before the UNSC so the latter 
could make a request for an advisory opinion, insofar as he/she determines that the Conflict 
poses a serious threat to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region due 
to the complex legal controversies, e.g., territorial acquisition, historic title, maritime 
sovereignty, boundary delimitation, and the law of the sea. Given the fact that the UNSG has 
from time to time conducted independent field investigations to gather relevant information 
without the authorization of the UNSC,636 it is conceivable that he/she could refer the Conflict 
to the Court for its advisory opinion on its own motion at a certain point. In the event that any 
difference of opinion occurs between the UNSG and any Member States concerned in the 
	
634 Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 869—70. 
635 But see id. at 874. 
636 Id. at 872—3. 
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Conflict over making such independent request, the UNSG may rely on the Geneva Convention 
Article 8, Section 30 to bring the Conflict to the Court anyway, inasmuch as the provision 
allows him/her to be authorized to make such a request as long as it emerges from the scope of 
his/her activities.  
 Second, considering the efforts to authorize the Secretariat and/or the UNSG to make 
an advisory request made through the practices of the UN, it is conceivable that their request 
to institute an advisory proceeding be supported by the international community. As mentioned 
above, the concept “other organs of the UN” provided in the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 
2 has been construed as embracing both principal and subsidiary organs affiliated with the UN, 
thus including the Secretariat into the concept.637 More significantly, it is also to be noted that 
the UNSGs have expressed confidence in requesting an advisory opinion on the premise that 
it would contribute to preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peacemaking. Indeed, it is 
undeniable that the Conflict is an international dispute and situation in which the UN has a 
direct concern, since it poses a security threat regionally and globally. Such confidence in the 
capacity of the UNGA to authorize him/her and his/her legal status as the chief administrative 
officer of one of the principal organs of the UN is effectively displayed in the series of the 
reports prepared by reference to the UN Charter Articles 96, paragraphs 2 and 98.638 In practice, 
even without him/her making an advisory request, the UNSG has actively participated in the 
cited advisory proceedings, such as Peace Treaties Case and Kosovo Opinion. It should also 
be noted that the Second Phase of Peace Treaties Case was initiated by the then-Acting 
UNSG’s filing a notification to the Court with respect to the non-compliance on the part of the 
States involved in the First Phase. On the one hand, it is very likely that some of the Permanent 
Members of the UNSC will express their dissatisfaction with a request made by either the 
	
637 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 46. 
638 E.g., U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: 
Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 413, ¶ 14; U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 631, ¶ 7. 
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UNSG or the Secretariat for an advisory opinion on the Conflict; on the other hand, it is likely 
that such a request will receive ample support from other Member States, given the absence of 
any strong objection raised at any time in the history of the UN. If such authorization is granted 
to the UNSG or the Secretariat, international legal scholars and experts are likely to give their 
support by relying on the political capacity influence that has been recognized for decades. 
 Notwithstanding the debate over who may be authorized to do so, it appears to have no 
practical relevance in terms of this hypothetical advisory request concerning the NLL Conflict. 
Even if the ICJ Statute Article 65, paragraph 1 uses the term “body”,639  there are many 
convincing alternatives to construe this usage in a manner consistent with the UN Charter 
Article 96, paragraph 2. First, in cases where the Secretariat has been authorized by the UNGA, 
it may vest its authorization in the UNSG so that he/she may file a request for an advisory 
opinion on the Conflict, since its political functions have been exercised through him/her.640 
Second, in addition to the political authority, all authorities retained to the Secretariat have 
been exercised by and under the UNSG’s direction and supervision.641 Although the UNSG 
cannot be technically defined as an organ under the UN Charter Article 7, it is not conceivable 
in actual practice for the Secretariat to independently request an advisory opinion on the 
Conflict without the UNSG’s approval. Last but not least, it should be noted that the UNSG 
will be constitutionally and ultimately in charge of whatever actions and decisions made by the 
Secretariat.642 In this regard, Keith’s argument is persuasive: “It was surely the intention of the 
draftsmen of the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute that the word ‘body’ in Article 65 of the ICJ 
Statute should be shorthand for ‘authorized organs of the UN, including the General Assembly 
	
639 As Professor Kelsen points out, this usage of the term gives rise to the disparity over the draftsmen’s intention 
as taking only collegiate organ into consideration, thus not including the UNSG, if narrowly construed. See supra 
KELSEN, supra note 394, at 546. 
640 Szasz, supra note 410, at 541 n.88. 
641 Jessup, supra note 633, at 187. 
642 KEITH, supra note 634, at 38. 
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and the Security Council, and of the specialized agencies’.” 643  Even assuming that the 
Secretariat has acquired an authorization of the UNGA to make an advisory request in pursuit 
of the judicial resolution of the Conflict, it is still the UNSG who has the final say.  
 Considering the attitudes of Member States toward the authorization of the Secretariat 
and the UNSG, the UNGA may be willing to vest its authority to make an advisory request in 
the UNSG in this case, based on the UNSG’s prudence in discharging his/her responsibilities. 
However, it might be argued that, because the Secretariat does not represent any sovereign 
State, granting such authorization might significantly deviate from the “fundamental postulate 
of all the ICJ’s judicial activities.”644 Moreover, under international law, the UNSG should not 
represent or advocate any interest of an individual sovereign State, nor is he/she able to act as 
a subject of international law as a natural person. Thus, to a certain extent, it might be seen as 
a significant exception to the basic rules and principles of the contemporary international 
judicial system in which only sovereign States and/or authorized international bodies are 
subject to the jurisdiction.645 However, to “increase the likelihood that requests for advisory 
opinions be addressed to the Court, it is necessary to increase the number of entities empowered 
to approach its jurisdiction.”646 To this end, the UNSG acting on behalf of the Secretariat, 
which falls into the scope of the principal organs under the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 
2 that does not have an explicit authorization therefrom, should be so empowered.647 In so 
doing, the Secretariat and the UNSG might be able to deal with political pressures and practical 
needs more properly by relying on the Court’s authoritative judicial opinion since they are in 
charge of everyday administrative works. In practice, they are often faced with direct and 
	
643  Id., quoted in Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory 
Opinions of the International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 876 (alteration in original). 
644 Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 877 (alteration in original). 
645 Id. 
646 Szasz, supra note 410, at 513 (footnotes omitted), quoted in Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 877. 
(alteration in original) 
647 Id. 
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indirect pressures from other political organs and from Member States,648 and it is needless to 
say that they are also required to take on “delicate and complicated assignments” in relation to 
the maintenance of international peace and security.649 Thus, authorizing the UNSG appears to 
be a good starting point for referring the Conflict to the Court advisory jurisdiction so as to call 
the attention of other Member States concerned with the achievement of peace and stability in 
the disputed waters. 
 Although granting such authorization to the UNSG, whose legal status is debatable in 
the context of this hypothetical advisory request, is a major departure from the fundamentals 
and precedents of the ICJ jurisdictional mechanism, the UNSG’s political status and 
responsibility as the head of the principal organ of the UN is in itself a fair guarantee against 
any possibility of abusive or excessive use. In defense of such authorization, it can be argued 
that, according to the UN Charter Article 99, the UNSG may still “seize the UNSC, not merely 
of questions of international law within the scope of activities, but of ‘any matter which in his 
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security’.’”650 Throughout the 
operation of advisory proceedings, such authority was granted to the UNSG, thereby allowing 
him/her to touch upon very delicate and complicated international disputes and situations in 
which critical national interests of sovereign States were at stake.651 Thus, it seems paradoxical 
for the UNSC to be reluctant in authorizing the UNSG to make an advisory request in a case 
that has been defined as the regional security threat, in spite of the possibility of escalation, so 
that he/she lobbies the international community to pursue a peaceful settlement of the Conflict. 
Indeed, since the UN was created, there has been no abusive or excessive use of the authority 




650 Schwebel, Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 615, at 878. 
651 Id. 
652 Id. 
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Historically, the UNSGs have been extremely cautious in exercising their authority under 
Article 99.653 Rather, it can be said that the UNSGs have been neglectful in using their authority 
to contribute to the resolution of the Conflict. Inasmuch as the internal decision-making process 
of the Secretariat is less complicated than that of the UNSC or the UNGA,654 authorizing the 
UNSG to make this hypothetical advisory request will be an easier route to the construction of 
a dispute-resolution framework for the two Koreas in this case and in other disputes between 
them. 
 
c. Clarifying Subject-Matter/Material Jurisdiction over This Case 
 
Having established the personal jurisdiction of the ICJ over this hypothetical advisory 
request seeking for the Court’s opinion on the NLL Conflict, it is necessary to identify its 
subject-matter/material jurisdiction. The issues to be addressed are whether a controversy 
contained in the Conflict is a legal question as set forth in the relevant institutional documents; 
whether the Court is entitled to give its opinion on such a controversy involving legal disputes 
between sovereign States through its advisory proceeding; and whether the Court will accept 
any objections raised to prevent the establishment of its subject-matter/material jurisdiction. 
 For the ICJ to exercise its subject-matter/material jurisdiction over an advisory request, 
a question contained in such request must be legal by its nature. According to the UN Charter 
Article 96, both the UNGA and the UNSC may request for an advisory opinion on “any legal 
question”; in contrast, other organs of the UN and specialized agencies are confined to “the 
scope of their activities” in the light of the subject-matter/material jurisdiction of the Court. As 
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question” insofar as it is properly submitted under the UN Charter. In fact, in advisory 
precedents like Kosovo Opinion and Interpretation of Peace Treaties (First Phase), the Court 
reviewed the legality of the material issues therein.655 However, in Western Sahara, the Court 
made its position clear on this issue: “Legal questions are framed in terms of law and raising 
problems of international law…are by their very nature susceptible of a reply based on 
law…and appear…to be questions of a legal character.”656 
 In terms of advisory proceeding, then, it is essential to clarify whether a dispute or a 
situation occurring between sovereign States or between international organizations contains 
an issue that can fall into the scope of the term “legal question.” As indicated in the 
aforementioned provisions and precedents, the ICJ has widely construed the term, stating that 
its subject-matter/material jurisdiction encompasses a “legal dispute” within the boundary of 
advisory proceeding.657 The Court once exercised its subject-matter/material jurisdiction in 
Israeli Wall, in which the dispute between the State of Israel and the Palestinian was the central 
topic, involving a variety of legal issues under international law, such as self-defense right, 
state of necessity, military exigencies, national security, freedom of movement and blockade 
of access. Similarly, in Western Sahara where issues over the legal status of the territory in 
question, sovereignty claim, and rightful ownership were disputed, the Court also moved 
forward to the merits stage to render its advisory opinion. 
 However, since an objection against the subject-matter/material jurisdiction of the ICJ 
may at any time be raised, the Court has established its jurisprudence to deal with cases where 
political, factual, and abstract features were intermixed with legal one.658 First, though the 
	
655 In Kosovo Opinion, the central issue was the legality of the unilateral declaration. In Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties (First Phase), the central issue was the existence of the concerned States’ obligation to follow the 
settlement-of-disputes provisions, thus requiring legal deliberation. 
656 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 18—9, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 39. 
657 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 57—8. 
658 See, e.g., Expenses Case, supra note 400, at 155. 
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Court is wary of “politicizing,”659 the Court tends not to be interrupted by “the political nature 
of the motives.”660 Contrary to domestic judiciaries, the Court has not been reluctant to handle 
political features, nor has it been hesitating to generate its political influence through its 
advisory proceedings. Given that most international disputes and situations are complicated 
and have been composed of such intermixed factors, the Court tends to deduce legal component, 
if necessary, from such intermixture in its discretion.661 Second, the Court in Namibia Case 
affirmed that the term “legal” provided in the UN Charter Article 96 should not be construed 
as a contradictory one to the term “factual” in establishing the subject-matter/material 
jurisdiction of its advisory proceeding.662 Even if some factual elements are blended in a given 
advisory request, the Court is likely to take them altogether into account with legal ones in 
constructing the legal question that needs to be adjudicated.663 Third, although the lack of 
concreteness might cause an issue over the abuse of jurisdictional competence of the Court, it 
should be remembered that the Court has always been reluctant to accept any of objections 
based on such claim. The Court once found that it would apply relevant legal rules to render 
an advisory opinion on a particular question concerning an international dispute or situation 
regardless of whether it is abstract or concrete.664 As long as an advisory request is cautiously 
drafted to require a generally applicable legal opinion on certain legal controversy concerning 
	
659 Id. at 58—9. See Admission Case, supra note 427, at 61 (holding that “…The Court cannot attribute a political 
character to a request which, framed in abstract terms, invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the 
interpretation of a treaty provision….”); see also Expenses Case, supra note 400, at 155; Interpretation of 
Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, supra note 427, at 87. 
660 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 234. 
661 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 60 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, 8, U.N Doc. A/41/1 (1991) (stating that 
“Even those disputes which seem entirely political have a clearly legal component. If, for any reason, the parties 
fail to refer the matter to the Court, the process of achieving a fair and objectively commendable settlement and 
thus defusing an international crisis situation would be facilitated by obtaining the Court’s advisory opinion.”)). 
662 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 27. 
663 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 19. See also Eastern Carelia Case, supra note 304, at 28. 
664 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 237; Israeli Wall 
Case, supra note 397, at 236. See also Admission Case, supra note 427, at 61; Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 
27. 
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a dispute or situation, such requests are not necessarily required to be “narrowly defined and 
confined to a very specific point.” 665 
 As mentioned above, the first issue to be answered for this sub-section is whether a 
question included in this hypothetical advisory request can be regarded as a “legal” one over 
which a competent organ of the UN is entitled to seek an advisory opinion of the ICJ. 
Considering the fact that the two Koreas have debated over the legal status of the NLL and 
equitable maritime delimitation for decades, a competent organ of the UN will be able to frame 
an advisory request in terms of law, raising concerns of international law, as explored in 
Chapter I. Therefore, the legal character of the question in this hypothetical advisory request 
seems to be apparent to uphold the establishment of the subject-matter/material jurisdiction of 
the Court over this case. 
 In determining the subject-matter/material jurisdiction of the ICJ in this case, the 
second issue to be answered is whether the Court is eligible to discuss the NLL Conflict through 
its advisory proceeding even though such conflict between sovereign States might be more 
appropriately handled in its contentious proceeding to secure effectiveness. Above all, it should 
be noted that a competent organ of the UN may make an advisory request on an international 
dispute or situation involving legal controversies insofar as it is linked with the interest of the 
UN.666 The relevant jurisprudence of the Court is that its subject-matter/material jurisdiction 
in advisory proceeding covers the concept “a legal dispute” over which it can render its judicial 
opinion for the maintenance of international peace and security. In practice, the Court 
proceeded in both Israeli Wall and Western Sahara where the disputes were concerned about 
complex legal controversies between sovereign States and international entities. By the same 
token, given that the Conflict contains legally disputable controversies pertaining to, for 
	
665 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 63. 
666 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 57—8. 
Hyun Jin Kim 
S.J.D. Dissertation 174	
instance, territorial sovereignty and maritime boundary delimitation, there is a strong 
possibility that the Court will establish its subject-matter/material jurisdiction over this case. 
 The last issue to be answered is whether the ICJ will accept any objection claiming the 
intermixed political or factual elements or abstract assertions contained in this hypothetical 
advisory request. First, since it is undeniable that the Conflict has been used as a political 
leverage via diplomatic negotiations by the States concerned therein, the Court is not likely to 
put so much emphasis on either political motives, political elements, or anticipated political 
impacts on the political dimensions in the East Asian region. Thus, once this request is lodged, 
the Court will be able to reformulate a question contained therein into a legal one, e.g., whether 
the NLL has acquired its legal status as a de facto demarcation line in the disputed waters under 
international law, whether South Korea has acquired any sovereign right over the Line and its 
vicinity under international law, or how to introduce an equitable maritime delimitation to the 
disputed waters. Second, as the Conflict has caused actual armed clashes between the forces of 
both sides, as well as diplomatic turmoil, factual components must be inseparably blended in 
this request. Nevertheless, given its jurisprudence, the Court is expected to find that such facts 
will not affect the legality of the request brought before it,667 because any mixed question of 
law and fact will be deemed a legal question.668 Last, the abstractness will not be a formidable 
basis of an objection in this case, since there is very low possibility that the question contained 
in this hypothetical advisory request will be purely hypothetical. Given that the UNGA and the 
UNSC cautiously drafted their requests to attenuate the abstractness of questions, as examined 
in the case analysis on the precedents in Chapter III, an organ seeking an advisory opinion of 
the Court on this case is likely to reconstruct its quest by reference to substantive legal issues 
	
667 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 27. 
668 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 19. See also Eastern Carelia Case, supra note 304, at 28. 
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involved therein.669  Most importantly, it should be remembered that the Court has never 
accepted any of the objections claiming the abstract nature of questions. 
 In conclusion, the ICJ is expected to establish its subject-matter/material jurisdiction in 
this hypothetical advisory request seeking its opinion on legally disputable issues related to the 
NLL Conflict. Inasmuch as a competent organ of the UN has the most potential of asking the 
legal status of the NLL or equitable maritime delimitation for the disputed waters, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the legal character of the question contained in this request 
conforms to the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 1 and the ICJ Statute Article 65, paragraph 
1. In addition, as seen in Israeli Wall and Western Sahara, it is also expected that the Court 
will find the interest of the UN pertinent¾seeking the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Furthermore, in the absence of any compelling reason to do so, any objection claiming 
political, factual, and abstract features is not likely to be accepted. 
 
d. Matters Relating to Consensual/Consent-based Jurisdiction in This Case 
 
To establish the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ over this case concerning the NLL 
Conflict, it should be determined whether the state consent is required: an issue over the 
consensual/consent-based jurisdiction. Considering the complex politico-military 
circumstance surrounding the Korean Peninsula, it is highly probable that any of the States 
involved in this Conflict may contest the exercise of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction in this 
case. As discussed above, it is the established principle, under the international justice system, 
that an international court or tribunal is not generally entitled to render its judgment on a 
	
669 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 237; Israeli Wall 
Case, supra note 397, at 236. See also Admission Case, supra note 427, at 61; Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 
27. 
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particular issue unless the state consent is submitted by all of the litigating States to their 
judicial authority.670 
 Based on its institutional status as the principal instrument of law for the UN and by 
reference to the non-binding effect of its advisory opinion, the ICJ has established its 
jurisprudence as follows: Consensual/consent-based jurisdiction should not be a prerequisite 
condition to its exercise of advisory jurisdiction when there is no compelling reason,671 e.g., 
judicial propriety672 or judicial restraint, for the Court to voluntarily refrain from doing so. In 
so finding, however, the Court did not take into account the progress of international disputes 
or situations between and among States and/or international agencies and/or organs.673 In 
Peace Treaties Case, the subject States opposed to the subject-matter/material jurisdiction of 
the Court, arguing that the Court’s authority should not interfere with domestic matters relating 
to basic human right and fundamental freedoms. In its response, however, the Court held that 
its advisory proceeding was originally designed to assist the UN, Member States, and organs 
and agencies by providing judicial guidance on the interpretation and application of 
international law.674 In this view, therefore, no state consent was deemed necessary by the 
Court as a precondition to commence its advisory proceeding. In Western Sahara Case, the 
Court reaffirmed that it did not require any state consent from the interested States to uphold 
its competence to render an advisory opinion on that legal question at hand even if there was 
	
670 KOLB, supra note 255, at 185. See East Timor, supra note 336, at 101. 
671 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 235; Expenses 
Case, supra note 400, at 155. 
672 See Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 24—5, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 104. 
673 Namibia Case, supra note 401, at 23—4 (holding that “it would not only remain faithful to the requirements 
of its judicial character…but also discharge its functions as the principal judicial organ of the UN.”) (alteration in 
original); Applicability Case, supra note 306, at 188—9 (finding that “the advisory opinions on legal questions 
are advisory, not binding. As the opinions are intended for the guidance of the United Nations, the consent of 
States is not a condition precedent to the competence of the Court to give them…In the present case, the Court 
thus does not find any compelling reasons to refuse an advisory opinion after considering the principle of the 
jurisdiction ratione consensus.”) (alteration in original). 
674 Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 70—1, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 102. See 
also Genocide Case, supra note 443, at 19; Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, ¶¶ 46—9 (explaining that “the 
subject matter of the request is concerned with the powers and responsibilities of the UN in relation to international 
peace and security.”) (alteration in original). 
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an on-going international conflict between sovereign States.675 And yet, the Court left open a 
possibility in Western Sahara Case to decline certain advisory requests if deemed appropriate 
due to its judicial propriety.676 In other words, the Court may refuse to render its advisory 
opinion in certain circumstances where giving its opinion would result in circumventing the 
fundamental principle of the international justice system.677 Notably, in Israeli Wall, the Court 
also found no compelling reason to refuse the request at hand.678 
 The jurisprudence of the ICJ on this issue can be better identified through the contextual 
interpretation of the relevant articles of the UN Charter, which prescribe the personal 
jurisdiction and subject-matter/material jurisdiction in the Court’s advisory proceeding. First, 
the UN Charter Article 96 explicitly provides that an advisory request must be submitted by 
“duly organized organ[s], agencies, or entities”679 among which is empowered by either the 
UN Charter or any resolution of the UNGA. Based on the interpretation of such context, 
therefore, a State involved in an international dispute or situation is not generally entitled to 
raise an objection against the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, since it is not originally regarded 
as the subject to the personal jurisdiction of advisory proceeding. Second, it should be noticed 
that an advisory proceeding was not invented to encourage the Court to participate directly in 
the dispute-resolution process between sovereign States. Rather, as the sole and primary 
judicial institution affiliated with the UN, the Court is occasionally called upon by an advisory 
request to express it non-binding but persuasive judicial opinion on a particular controversy 
contained in certain international disputes or situations to enhance the operation of the UN, its 
organs and agencies. Thus, it is problematic to conclude that the subject-matter/material 
	
675 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 24—5, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 104 (alteration in 
original). 
676 Western Sahara Case, supra note 422, at 24—5. 
677 Id. at 25. 
678 Israeli Wall Case, supra note 397, at ¶ 43—50. 
679 U.N. Charter art. 96. 
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jurisdiction in advisory proceeding is designed solely for the settlement of an international 
dispute or situation. 
 The ICJ has clearly identified its preferences on such issues by throwing out most of 
the raised objections claiming the state consent to be a prerequisite to the establishment of its 
advisory jurisdiction.680 In so doing, the Court was firm in establishing its advisory jurisdiction 
as against such objections, taking a detour to go around the fundamental principle of Eastern 
Carelia achieved by the PCIJ.681 As the principal judicial institution of the UN,682 the Court 
decided to engage more actively in international disputes and situations in which sovereign 
States and/or organs and agencies were disputing over legal controversies. It appears that the 
Court has attempted to maintain a balance between the administration of justice for the 
international community and its institutional function as part of the UN.683 Importantly, the 
Court in such precedents found that the concept of judicial restraint should not play a crucial 
role in the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction. In finding so, the Court continued its 
advisory proceeding in cases where the state consent of the States involved therein was in 
absentia. 
 In spite of these rulings, international scholars and lawyers continue to debate this issue, 
since the relevant instituting instruments stipulate no provision directly governing such issue. 
On the one hand, a group of scholars and lawyers assert that the state consent should be a 
necessary precondition to the establishment of advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ684 in consistent 
	
680 The Court exceptionally declined to proceed the request was in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons by holding that “…the very particular circumstances of the case, among which were that the question 
directly concerned an already existing dispute….” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, supra note 294, at 235—6, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 101. 
681 Eastern Carelia Case, supra note 304, at 27—9. 
682 See Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights, supra note 445, at 78 (stating that “the Court’s answer to requests for advisory opinions represents 
its participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused.”); Peace Treaties 
Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 71, cited in ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 95. 
683 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 112 (quoting the Court’s renowned holding that “no State can, without its 
consent, be compelled to submit its dispute with other States to adjudication.”). 
684 ROSENNE, supra note 241, at 1014; Pomerance, supra note 434, at 318—9. 
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with the foundation of the contemporary international justice system: Voluntary submission on 
the part of a sovereign State to the jurisdiction of international courts and/or tribunals is 
necessary.685 Based on the collective interpretation of the UN Charter Articles 14, 37, and 96, 
on the contrary, another group of scholars and lawyers argues that the fact that any dispute or 
situation between sovereign States and/or international organizations is pending should not bar 
the Court from expressing its advisory opinion.686 According to this view, the Court is capable 
of responding to either the UNGA’s or the UNSC’s request for its advisory opinion, 
irrespective of an objection raised by an interested State against its exercise of jurisdictional 
authority.687 
 In this hypothetical advisory request concerning the NLL Conflict, the ICJ, whose 
obligation is linked with its peaceful resolution as the principal judiciary of the UN, is likely 
to proceed to the merits stage in the absence of any compelling reason not doing so, given that 
it holds that the state consent should not be a prerequisite to the establishment of its advisory 
jurisdiction. As in Western Sahara Case, the Court is not likely to take any state consent of 
States interested in this Conflict into account at a preliminary stage of this case. Inasmuch as 
the dispute over the legal status of the NLL and equitable maritime delimitation has lasted for 
decades between the two Koreas, the Court is likely to find a reason to move forward to the 
merits stage to render its opinion. Moreover, given the fact that the efforts to conclude a 
negotiated settlement on this Conflict have not been successful, it is expected that such a 
request will not be construed as a way to circumvent the fundamental principle of Eastern 
Carelia. Rather, it will be understood as an effort pursuing the maintenance of the regional 
peace and security in the disputed waters, which is closely connected with the international 
peace and security as a whole. As with Israeli Wall, the Court is likely to rule that the peaceful 
	
685 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 98. 
686 CONFORTI, supra note 436, at 270; Conforti, supra note 437, at 86. 
687 Conforti, supra note 437, at 86. 
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settlement of the Conflict is a matter of grave concern of the UNGA and other primary organs 
of the UN under the UN Charter. 
Regardless of whether there is any state consent on the part of the States involved in 
the NLL Conflict, moreover, the ICJ is likely to conclude that an objection raised by such States 
against the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction is acceptable no matter what grounds they 
are on, based on the collective interpretation of the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. First, 
considering the personal jurisdiction of the Court in an advisory proceeding, no States will be 
deemed a subject to the Court’s advisory proceeding initiated by a competent organ of the UN. 
Insofar as they are deemed to be non-subject in this case, the Court will not conclude that the 
absence of the state consent on their part prevents the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction. 
Second, the objective of advisory proceeding is not to find an ultimate resolution of an 
international dispute or situation, but to assist the UN, its organs, and agencies by providing an 
equitable solution (or at least reliable legal guidance) in accordance with their competence and 
activities. Therefore, this hypothetical advisory request may not be submitted to conclude the 
ultimate resolution of the Conflict, but to provide proper legal assistance for the two Koreas 
and, if necessary, the UN. Although the Court’s opinion is acknowledged as persuasive and 
authoritative to a certain extent, it should be remembered that the Court will prefer not to 
directly engage in the ultimate settlement of the Conflict. This can also be supported from 
Peace Treatise Case, where the ICJ expressly stated that its advisory opinion provides the UN, 
Member States, and other agencies and organs with judicial interpretation and application of 
international law. 
 Given that the ICJ has dismissed most of the objections asserting the necessity of the 
state consent in its advisory proceeding, the Court is also unlikely to accept any similar 
assertion in this case insofar as it finds no compelling reason to restrain itself. As long as the 
Court finds that its institutional function is not damaged by exercising its advisory authority in 
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this case, the Court will decide to actively participate in pursuit of the administration of 
international justice. Moreover, it should be noted that neither judicial propriety nor judicial 
restraint can offer an absolute basis of an objection for any of the States interested herein to 
prevent the establishment of the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. 
 All things considered, if any of the competent organs of the UN listed in the previous 
discussions refers this hypothetical advisory request concerning the NLL Conflict to the 
advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the Court is highly likely to proceed to fulfill its role and 
responsibility as the principal judicial organ of the UN under the contemporary international 
system. Above all, the Court held in its precedents that the state consent is not a prerequisite to 
the establishment of its advisory jurisdiction. Thus, if there is no compelling reason to refrain 
from proceeding with the establishment, the Court will decide to move forward to the merits 
stage in this case. Based on the contextual interpretation of the relevant provisions, none of the 
States interested in this Conflict will be deemed fit to raise an objection against the Court’s 
advisory jurisdiction. Since the Court will not be able to propose a solution with executive 
force to this Conflict, it is more likely to proceed with this case in support of the UN.  
 
C. Overcoming Objections Claiming Non-admissibility of a Request or Exercise of 
Judicial Discretion 
 
1. Ascertaining the Admissibility of This Case  
 
Another question arising from this hypothetical advisory request is whether any 
objection claiming the lack of admissibility will block the ICJ from moving forward to the 
merits stage after it has established its advisory jurisdiction. Considering the jurisprudence of 
the Court discussed in Chapter II, an issue over the admissibility needs to be examined from 
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various angles. First, who can raise an objection claiming lack of admissibility in a given 
request? Any State involved in this case may bring up a preliminary objection of this sort, 
asserting that the Court should not exercise its judicial capacity. Second, at what stage may 
such an objection be raised? Since the admissibility issues inevitably touch upon “the validity 
of a claim,”688 they should be determined after the Court has assumed each of its jurisdictions 
at the preliminary stage.689 The admissibility of a claim/request relates to whether certain legal 
condition precedents, e.g., time limit and litispendence, have been met for the Court to move 
forward prior to adjudicating on the merits.690 Therefore, in practice, the Court determines a 
preliminary objection to the jurisdiction before it determines an objection to the admissibility 
of a claim/request. Specifically, even when the Court has already established its jurisdiction 
over the case, the Court will also be required to consider admissibility issues raised at the 
preliminary stage to proceed to the merits. Third, what issues will the Court contemplate in 
response to such objections? As issues pertaining to the admissibility are often directly 
connected with an advisory request, the Court will explore both procedural and substantive 
aspects of the Conflict, including all documents and evidence submitted to it rather than 
examining general interests, policies, or principles. 691  With consideration given to the 
particular context of this request, the Court will also determine the existence of any errors or 
omissions in the request.692 However, unlike jurisdictional issues, the Court will not bring up 
the lack of admissibility in such requests on its own motion, but will ask any involved State to 





691 Id.  
692 Id. 
693 Based on the principle of compétence de la compétence prescribed in the ICJ Statute Article 36, Paragraph 6, 
the Court has the right to determine the existence of its jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion or to render a 
judgment in a contentious case. ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 37. Id. Nonetheless, for example, the existence 
of a dispute – which falls within the scope of admissibility issues – may be treated exceptional so it may be 
automatically raised by the Court. Id. 
Hyun Jin Kim 
S.J.D. Dissertation 183	
the Court may be able to separate a question of jurisdiction from the merits, while admissibility 
may be more closely attached to the merits itself, thereby making separation more 
problematic.694 Last, what kind of admissibility objections are expected to be brought before 
the Court? In practice, as there is no defined category either in the legal sources or in the 
jurisprudence about the types of admissibility objection, the Court in this case is likely to 
encounter with diversified grounds for admissibility.695 
Throughout its existence, the States involved in the ICJ proceedings have presented a 
wide range of admissibility objections based on various grounds in both contentious and 
advisory proceedings. To date, however, only one objection claiming “non-availability of 
essential factual information” was accepted by the PCIJ at the preliminary stage in Eastern 
Carelia. In the precedents reviewed in Chapter III, the admissibility objection, which might 
have an implication for this doctoral project, was raised in Interpretation of Peace Treaties, 
First Phase, where the three signatory States had asserted their position on the following 
grounds: The arbitral procedure provided in the Peace Treaties of 1947 for the settlement of 
disputes relating to its interpretation or application should not be placed at issue since there 
was no dispute. In response, by reference to the functional difference between contentious and 
advisory proceedings, the Court decided that it would have to discover the existence of a 
dispute for the purpose of enlightening the UNGA in regard to the application of the treaty 
since there were claims brought against those States to be adjudicated.696 
 So, judging from the preceding advisory cases, what types of admissibility objections 
are anticipated to be raised to prevent the establishment of the ICJ advisory jurisdiction over 
this case? First, as witnessed in Interpretation of Peace Treaties, First Phase, the non-existence 
of an international dispute or situation may cited. Although there has been no large-scale armed 
	
694 Id. 
695 BROWNLIE, supra note 257, at 711. 
696 Id. 
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conflict after the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, the NLL Conflict has been at the center 
of the regional confrontation that can always be escalated into a large-scale armed conflict 
between the two sides, including the US and China. Second, the history of political and 
diplomatic negotiations held to draw a negotiated settlement for the Conflict may also be 
adduced as a basis of admissibility objections. However, as pointed out at the outset of this 
project, such negotiations have not led to any practical and effective solution to the Conflict. 
Therefore, it is not likely to be considered a persuasive ground for the Court to dismiss the 
admissibility of this request. Third, it may be argued whether a competent organ of the UN 
making this request has the necessary standing. Based on the discussions above, though the 
Secretariat acting through the UNSG may still be an option to be counted, either the UNGA or 
the UNSC appears to be the most promising subject to refer the Conflict to the Court’s advisory 
proceeding. If so, the lack of necessary standing should not be a basis for an admissibility 
objection, given the scope of roles and responsibilities of both organs prescribed in the UN 
Charter. Last, it may also be disputed whether any other compulsory means provided in the ICJ 
Statute have been exhausted in preference to the Court. Apart from the fact that the States 
concerned in this Conflict have made the decades-long efforts to find a solution thereto through 
political and diplomatic channels, no compulsory means need to be necessarily exhausted by 
the two Koreas, as well as other States concerned herein, before commencing the Court’s 
advisory proceeding. 
Considering the jurisprudence established by the ICJ related to the admissibility 
objections, it is unlikely that any admissibility objections will be accepted by the Court to 
prevent it moving forward to the merits stage. As mentioned, the concept of admissibility was 
originally designed to cast doubt on the competence of the Court after it being established the 
jurisdictional authority over a given claim/request brought before it. In response to an objection 
claiming the admissibility, the Court has explored a wide range of issues that are closely linked 
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with the merits of the cases on a case-by-case basis. As a State interested is not restricted in 
raising an admissibility objection, it will be able to plead such objection based on whatever 
grounds to prevent the Court from proceeding to the merits stage of this case. In conclusion, 
although any objection claiming the non-admissibility of this request is likely to delay the 
process of an advisory proceeding of the Court in this case, it is not conceivable that such 
objections will entirely prevent the Court from rendering its advisory opinion. 
 
2. Issue over Exercising Judicial Discretion in This Case 
 
 The final issue to be determined is whether the ICJ will exercise its discretion after 
having established each type of its jurisdictions over this hypothetical request. The Court has 
established a principle that it may refrain from exercising its advisory jurisdiction in its sole 
discretion even after it confirms both personal and subject-matter/material jurisdictions, if and 
when it finds any compelling reason to do so. This was clarified by the Court in Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: “The Court may give an advisory opinion…the ICJ Statute 
leaves a discretion as to whether or not it will give an advisory opinion that has been requested 
of it, once it has established its competence to do so.”697 In Kosovo Opinion, the Court decided 
not to use its discretionary power. Similarly, in Israeli Wall, the Court contended that it should 
turn down the advisory request due to judicial propriety, yet nevertheless decided to move 
forward in that proceeding, ruling that insofar as its conclusion would be based on sufficient 
information and evidence, and expected influence would not be unequivocal, it would be 
entitled to deal with the legal and political elements bound up with the issue at hand. 
	
697 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 294, at 234—5, quoted in 
KOLB, supra note 255, at 272. 
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Based on the rulings established in the preceding advisory opinions and the self-
awareness of the ICJ about its role and responsibility as the primary judicial organ of the UN, 
it is logical to conclude that this hypothetical advisory request concerning the NLL Conflict 
will be adjudicated by the Court. In support of this conclusion, it should first be noted that the 
Court has never used its discretionary power to reject any advisory requests.698 In addition to 
this, the Conflict has many similar features in many aspects with Kosovo Opinion and Israeli 
Wall where the Court did not turn down the advisory requests by using its discretionary power, 
due to the gravity to the States concerned and the potential impact on future regional and 
international relations that would be achieved through a peaceful resolution. Most importantly, 
however, the Conflict posed and will pose a direct threat to the regional and global security 
that requires attention from the UN and its principal organs, i.e., the UNGA, the UNSC, and 
the Secretariat. Indeed, the Court tends to accept an advisory request made by such political 
organs of the UN more liberally,699 whereas it tends to be more “restrictive and cautious”700 in 
accepting an advisory request from the specialized agencies. Given that the Court placed 
emphasis on its role and responsibility within the organization as the principal judicial authority 
under the contemporary international order,701 the Court is not likely to find any compelling 
reason to refuse the request in this case. On the premise that the Court determines that accepting 
this request will not disrupt its authority in contentious proceeding,702 the Court will exercise 
judicial authority to promote its judicial function and integrity by applying legal norms and 
	
698 In the cases of Eastern Carelia and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court refused to 
answer, explaining that it had no jurisdiction at all over the requested matters. 
699 Id. 
700 ALJAGHOUB, supra note 241, at 38. 
701 Peace Treaties Case, First Phase, supra note 306, at 71 (holding that “its participation in the activities of the 
Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused.”), quoted in KOLB, supra note 255, at 273. 
702 The following is a list of expected situations where the Court may refuse to exercise its advisory jurisdiction 
due to the concerns over its principal function over contentious cases: a case is about to be submitted to the 
contentious procedure; advisory proceedings are premature; there is a risk that third parties will lose some of their 
procedural rights; the proceedings are, given the circumstances, a method of directly bypassing the contentious 
procedure; it irremediably lacks the necessary facts to be able to deliver a judicial act deserving that name; and 
the advisory proceedings will in some other way oblige the Court to act contrary to its prestige and integrity. 
KOLB, supra note 255, at 275. 
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principles in an equitable manner, preventing arbitrary and capricious interpretation and 
application of international law to the Conflict.703 
 
D. Conclusion of This Chapter 
 
Based on the discussions above, it can be doctrinally concluded that there is no decisive 
disruptive factor at the preliminary stage impeding the ICJ’s exercise of its jurisdictional 
authority over the NLL Conflict, regardless of which primary organ is actually making this 
hypothetical advisory request. As explained in Section B of this chapter, an advisory request 
made appropriately and legitimately by one of the competent primary organs of the UN, though 
the competence of the Secretariat and the UNSG acting on behalf of the Secretariat may be 
controversial, to receive the Court’s opinion on the Conflict will meet the requirements 
necessary to get through the preliminary stage. More to the point, any objection based on other 
grounds, such as the lack of admissibility, is not likely to be accepted by the Court given its 
jurisprudence established throughout the preceding proceedings. 
After verifying the possibility of establishing each type of the jurisdictions in this case, 
it is possible to confirm that an advisory proceeding of the ICJ should be considered the most 
promising alternative for the construction of a dispute-resolution framework for the NLL 
Conflict under the present international judicial system associated with the UN. First, based on 
the collective interpretation of the relevant legal instruments, it can be concluded that the Court 
will establish its personal jurisdiction over this hypothetical advisory request seeking an 
opinion on the Conflict in spite of any ultra vires objection raised against it. Although the 
UNGA, which is provided broader competence by the UN Charter, appears to be a more 
realistic and valid body to make this request due to the complexities among the Permanent 
	
703 See KOLB, supra note 255, at 274. 
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Members of the UNSC, it should also be noted that the UNSC is originally entrusted with a 
primary authority and responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Second, in order to increase the likelihood that the Conflict is submitted to the Court’s advisory 
jurisdiction, the UNSG, acting on behalf of the Secretariat as the head of the principal organ of 
the UN, may be also entrusted to make this request. Even though there might be a concern 
about abusive or excessive use of authority by the UNSG or the Secretariat acting through it, 
this will contribute to more attempts to settle international disputes or situations in a more 
equitable way in compliance with the established rules and principles of international law. 
Third, as the Court has interpreted the sphere of subject-matter/material jurisdiction in a 
flexible manner in connection with its advisory proceeding, the controversies arising out of the 
Conflict will fall into the scope of the term “legal question,” regardless of certain political or 
factual elements or abstract compositions intermixed with legal ones. Last, as the Court has 
persistently held, the state consent is not a prerequisite to the establishment of its advisory 
jurisdiction instituted by a request of an international body. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that an advisory proceeding of the Court should be regarded as the most promising 
alternative to construct a judicial forum for the settlement of the Conflict where obtaining the 
state consent from any of the States concerned seems unattainable. 
Although other types of objections may be raised to disrupt the ICJ moving forward to 
the merits stage in this case, such objections seem unlikely to stymie the process of the Court, 
given the established jurisprudence of advisory proceedings. First, any State involved in the 
Conflict may pose a preliminary objection of admissibility to disrupt the Court’s proceeding. 
Even though such State may invoke whatever grounds in support of its objection, a question of 
admissibility tends to be closely attached to the merits of a request at issue. Considering the 
Court’s findings on this matter, it is unlikely that a State will effectively extract a persuasive 
ground of non-admissibility from the facts and circumstances surrounding the Conflict. Second, 
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it is not conceivable for the Court to find any compelling reason to refrain from rendering its 
advisory opinion in this case where the Conflict posed and will continue to pose a serious 
security threat to the region and the globe. In Kosovo Opinion and Israeli Wall Case, in which 
both factual circumstances and legal questions are analogous to those surrounding the Conflict, 
the Court proceeded through its procedures to render its advisory opinions on the basis that the 




Due to the lack of its legal basis in any form of mutual agreement between the parties 
to the KAA, the valid legal status of the NLL as a maritime demarcation line and equitable 
maritime delimitation for the disputed waters have been at issue for decades, giving rise to 
continuing military confrontations between the two Koreas in the Yellow/West Sea. Though 
some facts still remain unconfirmed, it is generally recognized that the Line was originally 
designated as a line of internal operational control by the UNC to prevent South Korean naval 
and civilian boats from navigating too far north by mistake or with intention after the execution 
of the KAA. Inasmuch as the delimitation of land and/or maritime jurisdiction is regarded as 
one of the most crucial elements of an international peace treaty or armistice agreement, it is 
hard to incorporate the Line into the KAA system in the absence of any mutual consent. 
Moreover, it is also difficult to confirm that the Line has been recognized by the parties as a 
maritime demarcation line, considering the decades-long dispute over its validity and legality 
since the West Sea Incidents occurred in 1973. Since the States concerned in the Conflict have 
not been able to draw a negotiated settlement based on mutually acceptable international 
standards regarding the status of the Line and boundary delimitation through their political and 
diplomatic efforts, it was inevitable that military conflicts would flare over the Line and its 
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vicinity, including the First and Second Yeonpyeong Naval Skirmishes, the Bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong Island and the Sinking of South Korean Warship Cheonan. 
In recognition of a need to relieve such heated politico-military tensions in the disputed 
waters, the States concerned in the NLL Conflict have tried to resolve the dispute, since they 
agree that the resolution of the Conflict is a starting point for the construction of a peace regime 
in the Korean Peninsula. Unfortunately, however, none of these attempts have been successful 
thus far. Throughout the Conflict, a variety of arguments and claims have been proffered for 
and against the legal status of the NLL, as well as options for a new maritime delimitation in 
the disputed waters. When reconciliation was favored by the governments of the two Koreas, 
there were meetings at various official levels to seek possible ways for the peaceful use and 
development of the disputed area. At that time, the West Sea Initiative was announced by the 
Roh Moo-hyun administration in order to implement such initiatives, though that was not 
followed up by the subsequent administrations led by the conservative party. There were also 
a series of meetings held to deal with the aftermath of the armed conflicts between the two 
sides. Nevertheless, however, none of these meetings led to any ultimate solution to the 
Conflict. Even if the two Koreas signed off multiple documented agreements, i.e., the 1992 
Basic Agreement and the Protocol on Non-aggression attached thereto, those agreements did 
not facilitate a final resolution of the Conflict due to the absence of an action plan specifying 
concrete steps for implementing the agreed issues pertaining to the status of the Line and 
redrawing thereof. At the 3rd inter-Korean summit held in 2018, the heads of the two Koreas 
expressed their concerns about the Conflict and exchanged opinions on its peaceful settlement, 
although that has not resulted in any implementation. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the dispute over the valid legal status of the NLL and 
equitable maritime delimitation lie at the center of the NLL Conflict, there has been no 
noteworthy attempt from any of the States concerned to seek a judicial solution under the 
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present international system. Although the lack of basis of the Line in international law has 
caused the constant wrangling between the two Koreas, they have instead sought a political 
solution through diplomatic talks. Throughout the Conflict, North Korea has been defying both 
the validity and legality of the Line by asserting that it neither recognizes any legal claim to it 
nor has acquiesced to such. Accordingly, North Korea has been attacking South Korea’s 
arguments based on the principle of acquisitive prescription or the theory of historical 
consolidation. In addition, North Korea has pointed to the absence of an express provision 
pertaining to the Line in the text of the KAA, refuting South Korea’s argument that the Line 
has served as an effective follow-up measure for the enforcement of the armistice system. North 
Korea, furthermore, refers to the UNCLOS that governs the contemporary international 
maritime order to reinforce its argument against the legal status of the Line. Conversely, South 
Korea has been maintaining a symmetrical position in defense of the validity, legality, and even 
effectiveness of the Line throughout the Conflict. That is to say, South Korea has justified the 
legal status of the Line by reference to the principle and theory of customary and conventional 
international law, e.g., the principle of acquisitive prescription and the theory of historical 
consolidation. To legitimize its status in the KAA system, South Korea has also asserted that 
the Line has been implemented as a necessary follow-up measure for the stable materialization 
and effective management of the armistice system in the post-war time, invoking the basic 
principle of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatise. Despite 
North Korea’s rebuttal, South Korea has asserted the Basic Agreement and the Protocol on 
Non-aggression as convincing documented proof supporting the valid legal status of the Line 
as the maritime demarcation line in the disputed waters until the two Korea reach a separate 
agreement on maritime delimitation. 
With due consideration given to the background of the NLL Conflict, Chapter III of 
this dissertation has analyzed a selection of the precedents rendered by the ICJ through its 
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advisory proceedings. Following the basic method of a legal case analysis, six advisory 
opinions have been analyzed to support the conclusion of this doctrinal research. The six cases 
have been chosen in consideration of their comparable circumstances with the Conflict, which 
appear to be sufficient to offer a route for the States concerned in this Conflict to consider the 
advisory proceeding as the most promising alternative to construct a dispute-resolution forum 
under the present international judicial system. Similar factual circumstances, objections 
invoking procedural deficiencies, the existence of controversial legal questions, efforts made 
by the international community in the aftermath, consequences and impacts have been taken 
into consideration. Although the Court could not always lead the States involved in some 
international disputes or situations to the ultimate resolution, the opinions of the Court have 
substantively contributed in most of the cases to make progress by providing its judicial 
guidance. Although an advisory opinion rendered by the Court is not provided to exert binding 
force upon a sovereign State, the States, organs, and agencies involved in an advisory 
proceeding are required to deal with the settlement of disputes or situations involving legal 
controversies in conformity with such opinions due to its binding effect as to the point of law. 
From this perspective, this dissertation has analyzed six selected cases of the Court’s advisory 
proceeding with the aim of proposing the advisory proceeding as the most promising 
alternative to create a judicial forum for the settlement of the Conflict under the contemporary 
international system. 
The Kosovo Opinion is a good example for the States concerned in the NLL Conflict 
in a sense that the UNGA and the ICJ made collective and collaborative efforts to deal with the 
international situation involving legal questions, which was deemed to be directly concerned 
with the maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern European region. The Court of 
Kosovo Opinion replied to the procedural question raised in connection with the establishment 
of its advisory jurisdiction by referring to the UN Charter, Article 96 as well as the ICJ Statute, 
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Article 65. To be specific, the Court affirmed a legal nature of the question brought before it, 
even if it admitted to the fact that certain politico-military motives were blended therein. In its 
final opinion, the Court upheld the legality of KPIS’s unilateral declaration of independence 
under international law and the opinion affected other separatist movements around the globe, 
thereby affecting the development of international law concerning the right to self-
determination. 
The Israeli Wall Case was selected because the substantive and procedural issues, and 
the ICJ’s advice rendered to encourage the States involved therein to pursue a negotiated 
settlement for the peaceful resolution, support the conclusion of this dissertation. The 
substantive issue was whether the Wall had any valid legal status as Israel had alleged. Similar 
to South Korea’s position in the NLL Conflict, Israel invoked rules and principles of 
international law in its favor, such as self-defense, military exigencies, state of necessity and 
national security, justifying the Wall as a necessary measure for the regional peace and stability. 
Most importantly, this case is to be noted for the purpose of this paper, because the Court of 
Israeli Wall Case upheld the UNGA’s resolution to submit its request for an advisory opinion 
in spite of the UNSC’s prior involvement in this issue, as well as re-affirming the 
unnecessariness of the state consent as a prerequisite to the establishment of its advisory 
jurisdiction. The Court found that the UNSC had neglected to perform its primary role and 
responsibility to protect international peace and security, and that no negotiated settlement 
would be expected to offer a solution to this situation. Thus, the finding of the Court supports 
one of the suggestions made by this dissertation that the UNGA’s referral of the Conflict to the 
Court’s advisory proceeding, regardless of the UNSC’s reluctance or opposition, may always 
be the most promising option to initiate such proceeding. In other words, the mechanism of the 
UNGA could be operated in a complementary sense for that of the UNSC in certain 
circumstances where the latter has failed to exercise its role to maintain international peace and 
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security. More significantly, the Court of Israeli Wall Case issued a de facto judicial directive 
to other Member States, the UNGA and the UNSC not to support any further illegal action but 
to contemplate a new solution in good faith in compliance with international law. As inferred 
from Israeli Wall Case, the Court’s advisory opinion on this hypothetical advisory request 
about the Conflict, once rendered, may provide a judicial guidance to lead the States concerned 
to ultimately settle the issue in accordance with the opinion. At least, the Court’s interpretation 
of customary and conventional international law as well as the UNCLOS will have a binding 
effect upon the States concerned therein as to the point of law so that they will not be able to 
interpret the law in an arbitrary and capricious manner in their own favor. 
Having analyzed the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which the 
growing awareness of the ICJ’s advisory proceeding as an international judicial framework for 
interpretation and application of international law was witnessed among States, this dissertation 
has excluded other organs and agencies affiliated with the UN as a competent entity for 
requesting an advisory opinion of the Court concerning the NLL Conflict. In other words, the 
reason for such exclusion is that neither determining the status of the NLL nor delimiting any 
alternative line will directly fall within the scope of the competence of any such organs or 
agencies other than the primary organs. This case has been chosen to support the conclusion of 
this doctoral project proposing such primary organs as best suited to make this hypothetical 
advisory request about the Conflict. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the fundamental limit of the effect of the ICJ’s advisory 
opinion was identified, this dissertation has selected Western Sahara Case inasmuch as its 
major issues related to customary and conventional international law adjudicated by the Court 
are analogous to those surrounding the NLL Conflict. In this case, Morocco claimed its 
acquisition of the territory at issue based on its alleged historical, legal, ethnic, and/or cultural 
ties thereto, whereas Spain, on the other hand, declined the existence of recognition therein on 
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its part. Thus, the fact and issues surrounding the conflict in Western Sahara Case remind those 
surrounding the Conflict in many aspects, including the fact that there were other stakeholders, 
including Mauritania and the Polisario Front, claiming own position in order to prove their ties 
to the territory. Throughout the dispute over the legal status over the Line and equitable 
maritime delimitation in the disputed waters, the two Koreas have referred to the principle and 
theory of customary and conventional international law, as well as the UNCLOS. Therefore, 
this dissertation has also focused on the similar legal arguments claimed during the course of 
Western Sahara Case and its aftermath so as to demonstrate that the Court is likely to have its 
subject-matter/material jurisdiction over this hypothetical advisory request seeking the Court’s 
opinion on the Court. 
This dissertation also analyzed a series of advisory opinions of the ICJ concerning 
South West African (now Namibia), including both International Status of South West Africa 
Case and Namibia Case, since those can be defined as a product of the collective and 
collaborative efforts made by the international community for the peaceful resolution of the 
situation. First, in International Status of South West Africa Case, the Court borrowed a general 
principle of law recognized by civilized nations relating to the law of trust in order to define 
the Union’s continued occupation as a violation thereof. As a matter of law, there is no definite 
or agreed legal source governing the NLL and other issues arising from the NLL Conflict. 
Therefore, as the Court in such precedents applied the general principle accepted by civilized 
nations, the States concerned in this Conflict will also be allowed to invoke various legal 
sources for and against the legal status of the Line. 
Namibia Case is a good example of the UNGA’s continued efforts in cooperation with 
the organized international framework could lead the international community in practice to 
figure out the ultimate solution to such thorny dispute between sovereign States. For the 
purpose of this doctoral project, this case has been analyzed in order to highlight that the 
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effective collaboration between the UNGA and the Court’s substantively authoritative opinion 
rendered in an effort to fulfill its international obligation as the primary judicial organ of the 
UN successfully led the UNSC to institute this advisory proceeding. Therefore, it is possible 
to conclude that the UNGA’s referral of the NLL Conflict to the Court’s advisory proceeding 
will serve as a starting point for the construction of a judicial framework for the resolution of 
the Conflict. Moreover, the most important implication of this case is that the Court made the 
concerned States and other Member States comply with its advisory opinion on this matter. 
Despite the absence of binding force of its advisory opinion, the Court of Namibia Case 
induced constant and persistent efforts on the part of the UNGA and UNSC in accordance with 
its opinion regarding the issues surrounding Namibia. The outcome of this case supports the 
conclusion of this dissertation that an advisory opinion of the Court rendered in relation to the 
Conflict will be persuasive to the international community as a whole so that they will come 
up with ways to assist the States concerned in this Conflict to seek a peaceful resolution on a 
judicial basis. 
In the two phases of Peace Treaties Case, this dissertation has discovered an 
implication by which of the primary organs of the UN should be the principal subject referring 
this hypothetical advisory request for the NLL Conflict. First, the Court in the second phase 
gave a direction regarding the allocation of roles and responsibilities among sovereign States, 
and the UN and its affiliated organs and agencies in a harmonious way in the post-war period. 
The Court first clarified that it would adjudicate and prepare its opinion only on the basis of 
established rules and principles of international law to assure sovereign States the reliability of 
its process, procedure, and decision rendered in a forthcoming proceeding. Therefore, it is also 
to be noted in the context of the Conflict that the Court in this hypothetical case will not apply 
rules and principles in an arbitrary and capricious way to analyze facts and issues and prepare 
its opinion. Second, the Court of Peace Treaties Case found a limited authority granted to the 
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UNSG in relation to such dispute-resolution at international level, by stating that the UNSG 
had no authority to unilaterally appoint a member to the Treaty Commission, which was one 
of the main issues in that case. Therefore, for the purpose of this dissertation, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the Secretariat and the UNSG acting on its behalf should be considered a lower 
priority than the UNGA or the UNSC as a primary organ instituting this hypothetical request 
concerning the Conflict. 
Chapter II of this dissertation has elaborated the jurisdictional system of the ICJ with a 
priority given to advisory jurisdiction, and Chapter IV, in furtherance of this doctrinal research, 
has articulated how the system can be operated if this hypothetical advisory request is 
submitted to seek for the Court’s opinion on the NLL Conflict. Simply put, having found its 
capacity to adjudicate an international dispute or situation involving a legal question, the Court 
proceed to determine the admissibility of such question in preference to touching upon the 
merits thereof. Basically, however, this operational mechanism is applicable to both 
contentious and advisory proceeding of the Court. 
Considering the jurisdictional requirements and characteristics of the contentious 
proceeding of the ICJ, nonetheless, it is problematic as a promising alternative for the 
construction of a dispute-resolution framework for the NLL Conflict under the contemporary 
international order. As noted above, the Court is allowed to settle certain international dispute 
or situation of legal nature brought before it on the condition of voluntary submission by a 
sovereign State, insofar as such dispute or situation is arising out of, or in relation to any 
disagreement on a question of law or facts, a conflict, or a clash of legal views or of interests 
between sovereign States. Significantly, however, this contentious jurisdiction requires the 
existence of the state consent as an essential precondition on the part of both contesting and 
defending States parties involved in any forms stipulated in the ICJ Statute or permitted under 
international law. This consensual/consent-based jurisdiction is often defined as the main 
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distinction between the international judicial system and domestic ones in civilized nations. In 
the context of the Conflict, therefore, it is difficult to assume that the two Koreas will sign off 
on an agreement specially drafted to litigate this Conflict before the Court based on the ICJ 
Statute Article 36, paragraph 1. Moreover, nor do other options, i.e., incorporating a 
compromissory clause in advance or declaring the optional clause in accordance with the ICJ 
Statute Article 36, paragraph 2, seem likely to be adopted by both of the governments of the 
two Koreas, considering the history of the efforts made to conclude a negotiated settlement. 
Throughout the duration of this Conflict, no practical proposal for its resolution has been 
successfully implemented despite a great deal of time and effort invested by all of the States 
concerned therein.  
Given the facts and circumstances surrounding the NLL Conflict, therefore, the most 
promising proposition, which also can be considered practical and effective, is the advisory 
proceeding of the ICJ. In so doing, the States concerned will establish a good precedent in 
handling any pending or upcoming inter-Korean disputes or situations in a judicial manner so 
that the two Koreas will also be able to step forward to the introduction of a peace regime to 
the Korean Peninsula. There are two reasons why this doctrinal project has been choosing the 
advisory proceeding in line with its thesis. First, in the light of procedural practicality, the 
establishment of advisory jurisdiction on the Conflict will be efficient and effective. As 
examined above, the Court may render its advisory opinion on any legal question at the request 
of the UNGA, UNSC, or any other organs or agencies that have received a legitimate 
authorization. In an acute confrontation between sovereign States like this Conflict, the 
collective body of third-party States, which is acting in compliance with the UN Charter, should 
be deemed more objective and neutral in determining relevant facts and circumstances 
surrounding such confrontations. Second, it is preferable to receive the Court’s non-binding 
but persuasive judicial interpretation on the legal issues, since this is less burdensome than 
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receiving a judgment with binding force through contentious proceedings of the Court. More 
to the point, it is to be noted that in practice the Courts’ interpretation and application of laws 
and legal documents in its advisory proceeding has binding force over international organs and 
agencies, at least as to the point of law. It is also to be remembered that, in the event that all 
the States concerned wish to resolve their issue according to the Court’s opinion, there is also 
a way for them by signing off a specially drafted international treaty conferring a binding 
authority upon the Court’s advisory opinion. In other words, it is possible for the two Koreas 
to be bound by an advisory opinion with respect to the Conflict if they wish to do so. 
 For the purpose of this doctrinal project, the UNGA, which may have a broader 
competence than the UNSC pursuant to the UN Charter Article 10, may be considered the most 
suitable entity for instituting this hypothetical advisory request concerning the NLL Conflict. 
The UNGA appears to have legitimate interest in the outcome of this proceeding, such as the 
maintenance of peace and security, design of a practical and effective collective measure for 
the prevention of potential security threat in the East Asian region, and ultimate settlement of 
such long-standing international conflict of its own accord. The UNGA is entitled to have its 
competence to request the Court’s advisory opinion on the Conflict on its own motion without 
contravening the UNSC’s function and authority. 
Given the past history of the five veto-wielding Permanent Members, it is problematic 
to specify the UNSC as the only possible option for the conclusion of this dissertation. Pursuant 
to the UN Charter Article 96, paragraph 1, both the UNGA and the UNSC are entitled to 
exercise their original right to request an advisory opinion on any legal question in connection 
with their activities. Since the Court is not likely to accept an ultra vires objection raised against 
the establishment of its personal jurisdiction in this hypothetical case given its reasoning 
clarified in the precedents like the Israeli Wall Case, Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case, 
Expenses Case, Namibia Case, both the UNGA and the UNSC are at liberty to submit this 
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Conflict to the Court’s advisory proceeding. Nevertheless, it is still uncertain that the UNSC is 
the only organ for this project, due to the fact that the UNSC’s decision-making process will 
have to go through a voting procedure among the Permanent Members in which some members 
may object to the advisory jurisdiction. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, other organs and agencies, except for the Secretariat 
or the UNSG acting on its behalf, should not be considered an option for filing this hypothetical 
advisory request for the NLL Conflict. In practice, there may be an occasional need for the 
UNSG (or in some cases Secretariat acting through the UNSG) to request an advisory opinion. 
To that extent, it should not be concluded that the Secretariat or the UNSG acting on its behalf 
cannot be a possible option in connection with this doctoral project. However, in the context 
of the Conflict, the involvement of the UNSG or Secretariat is likely to upset the balance among 
the organs of the UN, since it may be perceived as circumventing the process of consultation 
among the members of the international community. However, it is still doctrinally reasonable 
to leave open the possibility that the Secretariat or the UNSG acting on its behalf may request 
for the Court’s advisory opinion on the Conflict on the condition that it has acquired a prior 
authorization from the UNGA. When it comes to other organs and agencies affiliated with the 
UN, the Court’s holdings identified in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, 
where the Court accepted the ultra vires objection, provides a comprehensive explanation. 
Under the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute, those organs and agencies may be authorized to 
request an advisory opinion, but the legal questions involved in the Conflict are not likely to 
be deemed as arising within the scope of any of their activities. 
 Having assumed the principal organ for the personal jurisdiction of the ICJ on this 
hypothetical advisory request, it should be understood that the NLL Conflict is a dispute 
involving a mixture of diplomatic, political, historic, factual, and legal questions. 
Notwithstanding this, the question can be reformulated on its legal elements. As found in 
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Western Sahara Case and Expenses Case, this work of reformulation can be performed either 
by the subject requesting an advisory opinion prior to submission or by the Court itself at the 
preliminary stage. Insofar as the Conflict can be defined as a question of legal character, the 
Court will establish its subject-matter/material jurisdiction over this hypothetical case, 
irrespective of other types of elements therein. More to the point, abstractness that may be 
contained in the Conflict, if any, will not prevent the Court from establishing its subject-
matter/material jurisdiction. 
 Similarities between the subject-matter of precedents explored in Chapter III and those 
of the NLL Conflict strongly suggest that the ICJ will establish its subject-matter/material 
jurisdiction on this matter. In Israeli Wall Case, Israel justified the status of the Wall by 
reference to self-defense right, state of necessity, military exigencies and national security, 
whereas the Wall was criticized for its restriction on freedom of movement and blockade of 
access. It is very likely that the issues adjudicated in Israeli Wall Case will also be 
contemplated by the Court when dealing with this hypothetical case concerning the NLL. In 
addition, the matters of Western Sahara Case were mainly concerned with the legal status of 
the given territory and the rightful ownership of that territory. So, assuming that this 
hypothetical advisory request is submitted, the Court will at the merits stage have to examine 
analogous issues, such as the valid legal status of the Line, the opposition to its status, and 
equitable maritime delimitation. Therefore, it is doctrinally reasonable to conclude that the 
Court will find the interests of the UN and the international community as a whole by 
establishing its advisory jurisdiction. 
 However, this should not be considered a way of circumventing the principle of Eastern 
Carelia, which requires the state consent as an essential condition precedent to international 
judiciary’s jurisdiction over a sovereign State, as the Court reaffirmed in Western Sahara Case 
and Peace Treaties Case. Even assuming that any State concerned in this Conflict has not given 
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its consent to the establishment of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction based on any given reason, 
the Court will not refrain from proceeding to the merits stage. Insofar as the Court has not 
found any compelling reason not to proceed, the Court will stick with the established 
jurisprudence to fulfill its obligations to administer justice and proper judicial function for the 
maintenance of international peace and security as the principal judicial organ of the UN. More 
to the point, given Israeli Wall Case where the Court found that seeking a peaceful settlement 
of the given situation was of grave concern, the Court is unlikely to find any compelling reason 
not to move forward its advisory proceeding in this hypothetical case. 
Considering the ICJ precedents in which the Court declined a vast range of objections 
challenging the admissibility of an advisory request, it is unlikely for any of the States 
concerned in the NLL Conflict to present any compelling admissibility claim to prevent the 
Court from proceeding toward its merits stage. Specifically, in this Conflict, there has existed 
disputes involving both legal controversies and armed conflicts between the sovereign States 
where no political efforts have resulted in any negotiated settlement through diplomatic dialog, 
thus allowing the principal organs to have a basis to seek a solution on behalf of the entire 
Member States of the UN. Furthermore, given the Court’s rationale held in the precedents like 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Kosovo Opinion Case and Israeli Wall 
Case, the Court in its own discretion is likely to acknowledge the necessity and gravity for the 
peaceful resolution of the Conflict for the maintenance of peace and security in the region as 
well as the globe. 
As the main objective of this dissertation is to lay down a doctrinal foundation for an 
advisory proceeding of the ICJ, this research is expected to contribute, not only to the 
development of international law, but also to the improvement of inter-Korean relations. By 
suggesting a judicial guidance on the disputed questions of law, this hypothetical case initiated 
by the one of the competent primary organ’s advisory request will lead to a permanent 
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resolution of the long-drawn-out conflict between the two Koreas where any ground-breaking 
solution through political or diplomatic channels is hardly achievable. In this regard, the Court 
has been adjudicating on a number of territorial disputes and armed conflicts through the 
operation of its contentious proceeding. Given that there is no difference between contentious 
and advisory proceeding in dealing with substantive laws, the Court will be capable of offering 
an equitable solution to the legal controversies arising from this Conflict. As observed in the 
aftermath of the precedents rendered through the Court’s advisory proceedings, it will be 
difficult for the States concerned in this Conflict to act counter to an advisory opinion, once 
rendered through this hypothetical case, on the points of international law. Thus, they will not 
have any option but to comply with such opinion so long as it is concerned with the question 
of law. By offering a judicial guidance for the two Koreas in this case, the Court will also be 
able to fulfill its mission as the principal judicial organ of the UN, developing preventive 
diplomacy among Member States, peaceful relations between Member States and legal norms 
for the international community in its entirety. Besides, as mentioned above, it is to be 
remembered that the two Koreas will always be able to agree to a separate form of bilateral 
treaty so as to subject themselves to the Court’s advisory jurisdiction rendering an advisory 
opinion on the legal questions emerging from the Conflict. All in all, the resolution of the inter-
Korean conflict through judicial way will completely transform the existing dispute-resolution 
framework for the two Koreas, thereby establishing an excellent precedent for finding a judicial 
solution to other stalled or to any upcoming disputes between the two Koreas as a pathway to 
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